[CLARKE (John) M.A.]

A Second Defence of Dr. Clarke's Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God . . .

London, Knap ton, [1733]

Ar^

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C-K

A Second

DEFENCE

0 F

Dr. Cla?'kes Demonstration

O F T H E

Being and Attributes of Gov;

1 N

ANSWER

T O T H E

POSTSCRIPT publiflied in the Second Edition of Mr. Law's Tranflation of Dr. Kin g's Origin of Evil.

By the Author of the Firji Defence.

LONDON:

Printed for James, John and Paul Knaptox, at the Crown in Ludgate-Jlreet, near the Weft End- of St. Paul's.

[3]

O F

Space and Duration.

Etaphyfical Difputes, if not ma- naged with the utmoft Can- dour and Fairnefs, will prevail but little, either in fettling the Queftion between the Perfons concerned, or clearing it to the reft of the World. They who have no other End in their Inquiries, than to find out Truth and Right, can have no Reafon to depart from a fair Treatment of each other ; knowing how weak it is to turn the Arguments they would confute into Ridicule, or to treat Perfons with Contempt undefervedly ; and that fuch Treatment is as unworthy any Man of Learning and Judgment, as it ought to be beneath the Perfon fo treated to make any Return of it. Mr. Law having pub- lished a fecond Edition of his Tranjlation of Archbijhop King'j Origin of Evil, and hav-

B 2

ing

4 Of Space and Duration*

ing annex'd a Pojifcript in Anfwer to the three firfl Parts of My Defence of Dr. Clarke, I fhall here endeavour to make the whole Matter as clear, and give him as plain an Anfwer, as I can.

I. Firft then, I afferted that Space was either Something real, difHnct from Body or Matter ; or elle in the Inftance there al- ledged, there would be no Difference be- tween an Affirmative and a Negative. This Confequence, the Tranfktor fays, />. i. is a very lame one ; for the Reafon why they (two was ) do not touch, is becaufe they are really diftant : but is Diftance therefore in the ab- ftradl any Thing real? We two differ ; or there s a Difference between us, but is Diffe- rence itfelf anyThing exifting f &c. If Things are really diftant from each other, the Dis- tance between them is certainly Something real, viz. a certain Length of Space. When He explains this by faying, we two differ, or there's a Difference between us — is Diffe- . rence between us and Diftance the fame Thing ? When we fpeak of Difference be- tween two Things, we mean that there is fornething in the one which is not in the other : and the Particle between does not be- token in this cafe ^Diftance or Length of Space, but only the Confederation of that which is in the one and which is not in the other, be it what it will. When I al- iened Diftance or Length of Space to be re- ally

Of Space a?tcl Duration. 5

ally fbmething, I did not mean that it was a Subftance ; but mull: it therefore be ab- folutely nothing ? are Properties, Relations, &c. mere Nothings ? If they are, we mall find prefently that Subflances are nothing too, iince they are only fo many conftituent Nothings ( Properties ) taken together. ( See pag. 13, 14, in the Pofifcript.) But if Pro- perties are mere Nothings, how come we to talk of different Properties, and different Relations, and the feveral Degrees of them ? According to this way of Reafoning, they are only different Degrees and different Re- lations of Nothing, that is, no Degrees, nor no Relations at all. And fo when we talk of the Difference of Subftances, we mean only that one Subftance is made up of more or different kinds of Nothings. If there be no Ideata, nothing without us to anfwer the Ideas or Notions in our Minds, then we may put one Relation or one Property for an- other ; and we may affirm in all Propriety of Speech, that two Bodies which are twice as far diftant from each other as two other Bodies are, are yet equally diftant, becaufe Diftance is Nothing, and there can be no Quantities no Differences of Nothing. The Dijlance that is between two Bodies, which do not touch, is a part of Space, and Space is fomething which penetrates and receives all Bodies : the Idea of which and of its actually Exigence ( though we fuppofe all

created

6 Of Space and Duration.

created Beings away ) we can by no means get rid of; and therefore fince it neceffarily will remain, and fince it cannot exifr. fepa- rately of itfelf; it undeniably proves the Exiltence of fome Subftance, whofe Property it is, and which conftitutes its Exiflence.

2. In Anfwer to my mowing the Diffe- rence between Whitenefs and Space, he fays, p. 2. that Whitenefs is an abjlrac~l Idea which can have no Subfiflance of it/elf, and fo far it agrees with pure Exte?ifion, &c. If this be all he means by an abflracJ Idea (which is far from his Meaning in other Places, ) I very readily grant pure Extenfion to be of the fame Kind : But pure Extenfon is not Space but a Property of Space, as White- nefs is not Body, but a Property of Body. If you confider Space as nothing but a Pro- perty, it cannot fubfift of itfelf, but muff require fome Subftance as Whitenefs does : Yet it does not follow, that it is the Proper- ty of Body only, which is what he feems to think through the whole Poftfcript.

3. What I faid concerning the Difference between Darknefs and Space, the Tranflator endeavours to evade the Force of, by fay- ing, ibid, that he was fo far from averting Darknefs to be a Capacity of receiving Light, that he only propojedit as a parallel piece of Nonfenfe with the former ( with Space's Ca- pacity of receiving Body. ) Whether he meant the one or the other mult be judged

of

Of Space and Duration. y

of by his own Words, to which I refer the Reader: however my Argument is equally conclusive, which foever he meant, becaufe I proved Darknefs not to be, and not to have a Capacity of receiving Light; for whatever has a Capacity to admit another Thing muft exifl even whilft it receives that other Thing : And in this confifts the Difference between Darknefs and Space (befides other Differences between them which the Trans- lator has pafs'd by, ) and therefore it could not be proposd as a parallel piece of Nonfenfe with the former. In Anfwer to the Argu- ment, he fays, p. 2. that I affign an acci- dental Impediment in the Cafe, &c. What I affigned was fuch an Impediment, if he will call it an Impediment, as deftroys the Tranf- lator's Definition of Darknefs. But in truth the Minutenefs of the Pores, cannot be call'd an accide?ital Impediment, becaufc we can never fuppofe the Pores that are in the Par- ticles of Light to be quite filled with o- ther Particles of Light, that are fmaller \ for no Particles can be fuppofed to fit the Cavities of other Particles fo exactly as to leave no Cavities between. And the Cafe would be the fame mould we fuppofe them ftill fmaller ( were it pofiible ) and fo on without End. As to the laft Part, p. 3. where he endeavours to turn my Argument upon myfelf, I anfwer, That as Matter is infinitely divifble, there can be no part of Space fo

fmall,

8 Of Space and Dm- at ion.

fmall, as to be incapable of receiving Tome Panicle of it. Now if Light '; as Light, could be : rov'd to be infinitely divifible, fo as that a Particle- of Light, could be divided i unitely, and that every part of that Par- ticle after every Divifion fhould be a Par- ticle of Light, and have the Power of rai- ling: the fame Idea in us ; the Difference between them muft be very evident. For there mu:l be a part of Space (which ab- ftractly confidered may be called Darknefs, ) incapable of receiving Light, becaufe Light, muft be of fome determinate Magnitude, otherwife it would not be able to affect human Senfes, and cbnfequently could not be called Light ; but there can never be a part of Space fo fmall, as not to have a Particle of Matter commenfurable to it, though perhaps that Particle can be come at only by an Infinite Being. If this be well confidered and applied to the Place objected againft, I believe the whole Cafe will appear very plain.

4. But, fays he, p. 3. (in Anfwer to my afferting Infinity not to be an actual Addition of finite Spaces, tho' all the Idea, we can get of it, arifes from die nee, ) if all the Idea we can get concerning it, arifes purely from an < rs Addition of. finite Spaces,

>/ muft it ( that is, our Idea ) be dlfo com- posed of fuel? Portions of that fame Space, or

■• 'tis fomething of which we have no Idea

at

Of Space and Duration. 9

at all, &c. This plainly fuppofes our Idea to be the thing itfelf, or an exact Picture or Image of it, which is in this Cafe the mofl abfurd Thing imaginable. When he fays, that Infinity is fomething of which we have no Idea at all, if by Idea be meant an I- mage or an exact Reprefentation of the Thing in our Minds, it is very true, becaufe it is beyond our Comprehenfion ; but then 'tis not true that we have no Notion at all of it, or that we do not apprehend clearly that fomething muit actually be Infinite. There are a Multitude of Things which we have Ideas of, (by which I mean Objects of our Underftanding ) though we have not exact Keprefentations and Pictures of them painted in our Minds. This, I think, is too plain to be infifted on.

5. In the next Section, p. 4. he fays, that I mujl determine this fame Thing contain- ing to be either a Sub/lafice or Property, dec. But I think he mould have confuted both Dr. Clarke's and my Proof that it ( Space ) was a Property, before he required a new One ; and that he is far from having con- futed either {hall be mown in its proper Place.

6. In the next Section, ibid, he plainly fuppofes our Idea of a Thing, to be the Thing itfelf, in imagining Space to be as the Idea of it is roving indeterminate and perpetually growing, and therefore, in An-

C fwer.

io Of Space and Duration.

fwer, I defire him to read what he obje&s againit over again.

7. The next is much of the fame Kind; f. 5. an Anfwer to it may be feen in the Tranflator himfelf, ( Book the firft, Note the feventh ) where he tells us, that Reafon con- vinces us that there are many Things of which we can form no Imagination, and therefore Knowledge can reach beyond Ideas in his Senfe of the Word, Ideas.

8. I urged that Infinity was an indivi- dual Attribute of the Deity, and that it was therefore impomble it mould be the Attri- bute of any Thing elfe, &c. To which he replies, p. 5. that Infinity is an Attribute of any infinite Thing, as well as Exten/ion is of every Thing extended. This I apprehended upon a Review I had not fufficiently ex- plained, and feared there would arife from it fome fuch Difficulty as this j I mall there- fore endeavour in this place to explain my Meaning, that it may ferve for an Anfwer to this Section. The Thing I would have expreffed is, that as God by exifting every where, and always properly conftitutes E- ternity and Infinity, therefore ftrictly and properly fpeaking there is but one Infinity^ which is the Infinity or Immenfity of God, which is extended all Ways, which com- prehends all Time and Space, that either have been, are, or poffibly can be. When therefore I afferted that it is " impoflible

" that

Of Space a?id Duration.

ii

" that Infinity could be an Attribute of any *i Thing but God " ; I meant that no o- ther Being befides him could conftitute In- finity ; and that the Infinity of all other Beings would be only a mere Endlefsnefs, becaufe real Infinity would remain though all Beings but God ceas'd to exift. So like- wife what I faid about Extenfion is to be underftood, that if every particular limited Being were deftroyed, yet ftill there would be fuch a Thing as real Extenfion, though the particular limited Extenfion which be- longed to thofe Beings ceas'd ; therefore Ex- tenfion cannot be a Property of thofe Be- ings, but is the Property of the Deity a- lone. So alfo in Knowledge > every particu- lar Degree of fuch Knowledge which any Being is poflefs'd of, is the Property of eve- ry fuch particular Being, and when any fuch Being ceafes to exift, the particular Know- ledge of that Being ceafes alfo ; but Know- ledge itfelf ceafes not, and confequently that can be the Attribute only of the wife Creator and Governour of all Things.

9. When all finite Beings are away, fays the Tranflator, p. 6. all real Extenfion goes with them, &c. When finite Beings are iup- pos'd away, every particular bounded Ex- tenfion belonging to thofe Beings goes along with them ; but to fuppofe Extenfion itfelf to go too, is a Petitio Princifni ; becaufe it is fuppofing it (Extenfion) applicable to

C 2 none

1 2 Of Space and Duration*

none but created Beings, which he exprefsly fays in another Place, and which fhall be there more particularly confidered.

10. I faid that it appeared no Contra- diction to me to mppofe God to create an infinite Being. In Anfwer to this, he fays, ibid, that it makes him equal to his Creator in J'ome one RefpeB, which is as bad as to make him equal in all. This is a Confe- quence I do not fee : For the Infinity, or rather E?tdlefsnefsy of fuch a Being is merely dependent and contingent , it is alone from the Good-will and Pleafure of its Creator, that it mould be at all : Whereas the Infi- nity of God is independent and neceffary, comprehends and penetrates the other, and is therefore as much fuperiour to it as In- dependency is to Dependency, or Neceffity of Exiflence to mere Contingency and Chance.

1 1. The Tranflator had '<■ argued that it " was improper to apply Bounds or Boun- " ders to Non-entity, or Space, " which he confidered as merely Nothing. I anfwered, that this was a direct Contradiction to fpeak of Space as a mere Pojibility : and argued that to fpeak of Non-entity in general, or to affirm that it is porTible, that there mould be no Being at all exifting, that is, that there might be an abiblute Nothing, is the greateft Abfurdity that can poffibly be ima- gined. But, fays the Tranflator, p, 7. with- out '

Of Space and Duration. 1 3

cut this (fuppofing Nothing to become Something) pray where is the Abfurdity ( I mean a priori ) in faying or fuppofing mere Nothing ? Sec. If indeed we could not prove a pofteriori, that fomething did always exift, we could never have proved a priori that fomething muft or could not but always have exifted, and therefore there could have been no Argument a priori at all. But this makes nothing againft our prefent Queftion j for to fay that without an Argument a poferiorii the Argument a priori could not have been known, is only faying, that if no created Beings had ever exifted j no fuch Beings could have proved that fome Being has always exifted, and could not but always have exifted. By Arguments drawn a pojleriori, we prove that there actually does and has always exifted fome one unchangeable Being ; by Argu- ments a priori^ or from the direct Con- tradiction in th .-». Nature of Things in the contrary Suppofition, we prove that there could not but have always exifted fuch an unchangeable Being.

12. Here, as in fome Sections foregoing, our Idea of a Thing is fuppofed to be the Thing itfelf, or elfe it is fuppofing Space as meafurable by Poles and Yards to be parallel to Number (which no Body denies in that Senfe :) The Quotation, he fays, /. 7. is from a greater than Dr. Cud worth, ami

is

14. Of Space and Duration.

is fo far from implying Space and Number to be the fame Thing, that it is exprefsly intro- duced as another parallel Cafe j i. e. parallel to the former only in the Reafon of their be- ing both incapable of Bounds, but one is po- fitively fo, and the other negatively. Whe- ther the two following Pages are fo abun- dantly confuted, as the Tranflator thinks, I am very willing to leave to the Reader's Judgment.

13. This Section about Infinites, where he fays, p. 8. " a pofitive or abfolute Infinite " is every Way incapable of Addition, the " other Infinite is directly the Reverfe, ' I think, needs no other Anfwer, but only to refer the Reader to the Places objected a- gainft, and to leave it to his Judgment, whether we cannot fuppofe a Line to be ( not have an Idea or Image of a Line ) infinitely extended each Way, fo as to be incapable of any Addition to its Length, and the fame of a Surface, &c.

14. Here again,/*. 9. the 'Thing is fuppo- fed to be the Idea, or the Idea to be of the fame Nature exactly with the Thing; for though we can add to or take from the Idea of Duration, can confider it by Parts, &c. it is no Confequence that Duration is itfelf increafible or diminifhable.

15. I had endeavoured to prove in my former Defence, that God had a Power of Creating from all Eternity ; this the Tranf- lator

Of Space and Duration. 1 5

lator trys to fhift off, by faying, p. 10. that God could not act without taking up fome Time : But this is merely arguing from comparing the Nature of our Actions with the Actions of God, which is too abfurd to be infifted upon by any Body ; for if God could not act, could not exert his Power of Creating from Eternity, the former Confe- quence holds good, viz. that he exifted a whole Eternity a parte ante, before he had, or before he could exert that or any other Power. I fhould be glad to fee the Diffe- rence between not having a Power, and having a Power without being able to ex- ert that Power, though indeed the Tranfla- tor afferts, that it is no Defect in a Being not to be able to exert a Power which it has, which is the fame Thing to me as to fay that it is no Defect in a Man's Eyes when he cannot fee. The Cafe in fhort is this; the one Suppofition is a direct Con- tradiction, the other is only inconceivable, and therefore, as the Tranflator fays, the Lejjer Difficulty is to be chojen ; and if we alfo confult his Remarks {page 77, fecond Edit. ) we fhali there find a very clcar Anfwer to this whole Matter. On the one Hand, fays he, there is a certain Altera- tion made, a pojitive Effect without a Caufej which is a clear Contradiction. On the 0- ther Hand there is a Difficulty indeed, but not an apparent Contradiction, On the one

hand

1 6 Of Space and Duration.

hand there is a plain Diverfity or Altera- tion in the Deity, which is a clear Contra- diction: On the other hand there is a Power fuppofed to be exerted, the Manner of which we can by no means underftand, on this Side therefore is a Difficulty, but not an apparent Contradiction. And again in the fame Remark. This may be hard to conceive^ but cannot be dented without af- firming fomething worfe, namely, an exprefs Contradiction. If therefore, by plain De- duction of Reafon, it can be proved, that God had the Power of Creating from E- ternity (whether he actually exerted that Power or no is out of the Queftion, that depended alone upon his own Good-will and Pleafure ) it evidently follows, that our not being able to conceive it, or there be- ing many Difficulties in fuch a Suppofition is no Proof againft it. What I quoted from the Tranflator before, and which will ferve for an Anfwer to feveral other Places, is very applicable here, viz. That Reafon con~ winces us that there are many Thingi of which we can form no Imagination. Nei- ther can it be efteemed any Anfwer, to fay, that Creation from Eternity was impojjible, and therefore no Defect in God not to be able to do what was impoffible ; for this is fuppofing a Thing impoffible for a whole Eternity paft, and after that to become pof- fiblc of a fudden, which equally proves a-

gain#

Of Space and Duration, jy

gainfl the Immutability of God, fmce it is plainly giving him a new Power, a Power which he was a whole Eternity without, and which it was impoffible for him to have before.

1 6. Laftly, fays he, p. 10. If every M of Man, as fuch, is temporary and requires a Beginning, the Cafe muft be the fame in God, &c. This is a Confequence not to be granted, nor can I fee, how it would follow from its being otherwife, that every divine Aft regarding Man or any 'Thing elfe muft be £- ternal. Every Action of God that is per- formed now, or was in any particular Time, requires a Beginning ; but thofe Actions, that were from Eternity ( if God did act from Eternity, ) had no Beginning, neither did they require any Beginning. But does it follow, that becaufe all the Actions of God in any particular Time required a Beginning, therefore all his Actions in ge- neral, that ever were or ever could have been, did : Or that if fome did not require a Beginning, therefore all did not ? That if he did create any Beings at all from Eter- nity, he therefore made us all from Eternity j that every A6i of Providence is hkewife E- ternal, and that whatever may concern our Pojierity hereafter, muft alfo neceffarily be eternal? To fuppofe God to have a Pow- er at one Time, and not at another, is to aippofe a Change in Him ; but to fuppofe

D him

1 8 Of Space and Duration.

him to exert that Power at one time and not at another, juft as he pleafes, does not iuppoie any Change at all but in his Will. What my Principles will lead to farther, I do not fee.

17. When a Suppofition is made from clear and plain Demonftration, as is the Cafe here ( which I believe any impartial Perfon, who confiders the State of the Ar- gument will readily grant, ) then all Argu- ments arifing from our want of Concep- tion, and which upon that Account over- throw the Suppofition (fince each Side of a Propofition cannot be demonstrated true) are nothing to the Purpofe. The Cafes are quite different, when we make an abfur-d Suppofition, on purpofe to mow its Abfurdity (wrhich oftentimes cannot be feen fo clear without firfr. making the Suppofition) and when we make a Suppofition, the Poffibi- lity of which is a necefTary Confequence of Demonftration, and then argue againft it, becaufe we cannot conceive it.

18. Here the Tranflator only fhows, p. 12. that we cannot have a pofitive Idea of in- finite Space, which is nothing to the Pur- pofe, becaufe Space may be pofitively infi- nite, without our having an Idea or Image of its Infinity ; for we may and certainly have an Idea or Notion that it is Infi- nite.

19. That

Of Space and Duration. 1 9

19. That Space is fomethlng more than merely mental, was fufficiently proved in my former Defence, to which I refer the Reader, p. 12. If only the Sun and Moon exifted, they would properly be in no place at all, he fays, nor could they be /aid to change Place, only with refpeci to each 0- ther. If this be fo, Let us fuppofe the Sun in the Center, and to turn round its Axis, or round the common Center of Gra- vity between the Sun and Moon, and the Moon to move round the Sun and about her own Axis in the fame time, fo that the fame Side of the Sun mould be al- ways towards the fame Side of the Moon, and the Diftance always equal, I mould be glad to know ( fince they remain the fame with relation to each other ) whether the Moon was in the fame Place and flood ftill, all the Time that it turned round the Sun.

20. To urge any Thing againft argu- ing about Things above our Ideas , will equally prove againft himfelf, who conti- nually fuppofes Things we can give no Ac- count of, Things ive can form no Imagina- tion of. To fuppofe a Subftance to be only all its condiment Properties taken together, p. 13. is by no Means fatisfactory ; for if no one of thefe Properties can exift of it felf, neither can they exift when taken all together, unlefs they can make one ana-

D 2 other

20 Of Space and Duration.

ther exifl, (or fomething be in the whole which is not in any of the Parts) and fo become Properties )f Properties, or Pro- perties inherent in one another, which they mud be, if they exift together, and can- not exift. any one of them feparately. This I am fure the Tranflator will not willing- ly grant.

21. All this vhole Section, p. 13. is only confounding thefe two Things , viz. having divifibie Parts, and being extended. Thefe Expreffions, beyond our Ideas, and, what we can form no Imagination of feem to me fynonomous, ( See Seel, jth above. )

22. That a Sitbjiance is not only all its effential Properties taken together, p. 14. has been before confidered, and what was there laid, is a fufftcient Anfwer to this whole Section.

23. As for the PafTage in Cudworth , which he charges me with leaving out, he left it out himfelf. I am as willing as he to truft it with the Reader, who muft judge for himfelf which Side it makes for.

24. A Being that has an Idea of Infi- nity, does not therefore fee to the End of all Diftance (that is a Con trad iction, ) but a Being which fees that Space is not pofitively infinite, may properly be faid to fee to the End of all Diftance , becaufe fuch a Being fees that it is not without End.

25.

Of Space and Duration, 2 1

25. The Difference between taking a Be- ing from itfelf, and taking Exiftence from a Being, is this, that the former is a flat Contradiction, becaufe it is fuppofing a Be- ing to be taken away, even whilft it re- mains. The Latter is not ; for to fuppofe Exiftence taken away from a Being, is only fuppofing a Jine qua non ( or in the Trans- lator's Phrafe a pofjible Perfection, without which it could not be) for if Exiftence be either a fine qua non, a Mode, or a pof-

fible Perfection, without which the Being ceafes to exift, the taking away that, is no Contradiction nor Abfurdity at all.

26. I faid that Dr. Clarke, when he ap- plied Properties to Space, did not confider it ftrictly as a Property, &c. This in- deed there was no Occafion for, becaufe there is no Abfurdity in fuppofing Proper- ties of Properties, or inherent in one an- other. Yet if the Tranflator had confidered the whole Sentence, he might eafily have feen what I meant, viz. not that Space was a Subflance, but only that if thofe Proper- ties which Dr. Clarke applied to Space, were fuch as could not exift in, or belong to, a Subflance, (though they might not fo accurately be called Properties of Space) unlefs Space was a Property of or belong'd to that Subflance alfo -, it was a fufficient Proof of the Exiftence of Space itfelf,

which

22 Of Space a7td Duration.

which was all I apprehend the Doctor ever intended.

27. In anfwer to what was faid of Pro- perties being inherent in one another, he fays, p. 15. that Figure is nothing exclufive cf every particular Shape, Ergo, fo is Ex- ten/ion, jetting a fide every extended Being, 6cc. All this I grant, but then I don't fee how it proves againft the Queftion ; or that it would follow, fuppofing all created Beings to be annihilated, that there would not remain fome extended Being, which feems to be what he aims at; to fuppofe there would not, is plainly a Petitio Prin- cipii. That Properties or Modes may in- here in one another, the Tranilator himfelf allows {page 69, id Edit.) for thefe are Attributes which have a Reference to Quan- tity, and can no more agree to Exiftence, which is but a Mode of Beings, than they can to NeceJJity or Contingence, which are Modes of Exiftence. Space, Duration, Ex- igence, and the like, are Modes, Properties, or Perfections of fome Being. If therefore thefe Perfections really exift, it evidently follows, that there is fome Being which pofferles them or in which they are.

28. To fuppofe Exfenfon and Duration as he does, p. 16. applicable to none but created Beings, muft be either begging the Queftion, or a Confequence of our getting

the

Of Space and Duration. 23

the Ideas of them from created Beings ; which latter is what he feems to have meant. But if this Confequence be of Force, it will follow, that whatever we get an Idea of from Created Beings, muft therefore be applicable to no other. So that, as the Idea of the Exiftence of God is ( according to himfelf, pag. 46, id. Edit.) entirely got from Created Beings, it is therefore appli- cable to no other Beings : Ergo, God does not exift. This is a Confequence, I think, he cannot avoid.

29. Here, fays he, p. 16. we are again got tofomething fupra nos, &c. Supra nos, I think may be joined with fome of the foregoing Terms, viz. Beyond our Ideas, what we can form no Imagination of, which feem to have the fame Meaning. (See SecJ. yth above.) But this whole Section is only anfwering three Lines, which have nothing to do with the Argument.

30. I had faid, that I did not underftand what he meant by prefent in his Jimp le Ef- fence, he refers me to Dr. Clarke, where,

he fays, p. ly. I may find another full as hard to under jl and, &c. But in the Place referr'd to, the Doctor had been before explaining what he meant, whereas the Tranflator feem'd to make him fay, that God was co-extended or co-expanded with every Point of the boundlef Immenfity ; but

this

24 Of Space and Duration*

this has been fufficiently explained in my former Defence, pag. $j.

31. From the Idea of Space being Jimple, I urged, that Space was really fomething in Nature ; to which the Tranflator objects, p. 1 7. Jirji that the Ideas of Space and Du- ration are not fmple, but made up of the leaf portions of each, viz. a fenfible point and Moment. For which he refers us to Mr. Locke, who fays, in the Place referr'd to, that " though our Ideas of Space and Du- " ration may be juflly reckon'd amongft " our fimple Ideas, yet none of the diftinct " Ideas we have of either, are without all " Manner of Compofition." But if thefe Ideas are not entirely fimple, but made up of the fimple Ideas of a fenfible Point and Moment, the Difficulty ftill returns, that is, that every Point and Moment mufl befome- thing actually without us, and confequently that the whole, which is compounded of thofe Somethings, muft be Something alfo. This he endeavours to anfwer, by faying, Se- condly, that if Space were a fimple Idea, it would not prove the Exiftence of any Thing without us, &c. To which I reply, that we cannot prove the Exiftence of any Thing at all without us, from a complex Idea. As therefore our Proof of the Exif- tence of any Thing, can be only from our Ideas ; and we having no other Ideas than

fimple

Of Necejfary Exijience. 25

fimple and complex, it moft clearly follows, that either Space muft b<z fomething actually exifting without us, or nothing at all can be proved to exift without us. To fay we may have a pofitive Idea from a privative Caufe, will by no means folve the Difficulty ; for the Reafon why we can have a pofitive Idea from a Privation, is, becaufe fuch an Idea is an Idea of a Place, or Part of Space, in which fomething ex- ifted, without that Thing ; 'tis an Idea of fome pofitive real Place, wherein that Thing had or did fometimes exift. But if our Idea of a Privation, was an Idea only of the Ab- jence of that Thing and of Nothing in its Place, of no Extenfion or Space in which it exifted ; fuch an Idea would be a pofitive Idea of nothing, which is a direct Contra- diction.

Of Necejfary Exijience.

TH E chief Reafon why many Per- fons have fo much ftuck at the arguing a priori, feems to arife either becaufe they imagine God to be prior to all Things, and that therefore an Argument a priori applied to God is to fuppoie fomething prior even to God,

E which

26 Of Necejfary Exiftence.

which they think an Abfurdity : Or elfe from their fuppofing every Thing to be ex- actly correfpondent to our Ideas ; from ima- gining that nothing can be otherwife than it appears to us, and from confounding the Difference between formal and efficient Qaxik&: AH which I believe is wholly owing to Prejudice, becaufe in all other Cafes they allow what they deny here: Thus they al- low, that there is an Eternity paft, though it be inconceivable even to the moft Lear- ned ; whatever therefore is reje&ed in one Cafe, ought to be fo in all other under the like Circumilances : And, I believe, I could mention an Inftance where they would al- low an Effect coaval with its Caufe; but I fhali now proceed to confider what the Tranflator has advanc'd againft me upon this Head.

i. He objects, to my faying, that we might fee that two and two were neceffarily equal to four,-- what ? Though we know not the Na- ture of two and two, or what thefe Words mean ? p. 18. that is, could we fee that two and two were equal to four, if we did not fee it ? No certainly, but does it therefore follow, that we cannot judge of the Relations of Things which we do know, unlefs we likewife knew the Eifence of thofe Things ? Surely we can fee that there is one felf-ex- iftent Being, fupreme Author and Governour of all Things, without knowing the Effence

of

Of Necejfary Exljlence. 27

of that Being which we know is infinitely beyond our Reach.

2. From the Abfurditv of an infinite in- dependent Series, we lee that there has ex- ifted fome one independent Being : That that Being could not but always have ex- isted, is proved from the Argument a pricri ; becaufe if we fuppofe no created Beings ever to have exifted ( which is plainly no impo;~: Suppofition ) we ftill fee a Neceffity for fup- pofing, or we cannot pombly without a Con- tradiction not fuppofe, the Exijlence of that Being. Apofieriori therefore we find that it is true in fact; and a priori we find it muft neceffarily be fo, that is, we find thai there muft neceffarily have been from Eter- nity one felf-exiftent Being, whether there ever had been any created Beings or no. 'Tis indeed true, that had there never been any created Beings (which is all that can be faid on that Side the Queftion, as v mown before) we never could per- ceived the Neceffity of fuch a felf-exiftent Being; but this is the fame Thing as to fay, that we fhould not have perceived this Ne- ceffity, had we ourfelves never exifted, which nobody could be fo abiurd as to aflert.

3. Necejjity's being a relative Term, is no Objection againft diftinguifhing it into two Sorts; for by Neceffity abfolutei I mea t that which had no Relation to any Thing but the Bdng itfelf, and by Nee

E 2 iii-

28 Of Neceftary Exiftence.

difbinguifhed from the former, that which had Relation to the Exiftence of other Be- ings.

4. In anfwering what the Tranflator calls a very reasonable Objection, I afferted, that " whatever Number of necerTary Beings there " were in Nature, there was necelTarily fuch <c a Number." But, fays he, p. 19. where' s the Abfurdity ( a priori ) of j'uppofing more than one fuch ? Tour Argument will ferve as well for twenty : viz. provided we allow them all neceffary, then none of them can be fup- pofed away. Here I find that if we make a Suppofition, that there are fuch a Number of felf-exiftent Beings, though it be only made in order to lhow the Abfurdity of fuch a Suppofition, as is continually the Cafe in Ma- thematicks, we muft not argue againft, or bring any Thing that overthrows this Sup- pofition, which was laid down, that we might fee the clearer, the Abfurdities that would arife from it, and which would con- fequently mow the ImporTibility of fuch a Suppofition.

5. The Abfurdity that would, confequent- ly arife from this Suppofition, was to be mown in the next Argument, which he lays, has nothing to do with the former Objection, becaufe it is no Contradiction to his Ideas in

fappofing more than one independent Being ; therefore the contrary cannot be demonjlrated. How this is any Anfwer to my Argument,

which

Of Necejfary Exigence. 29

which was to (how, that any Number but that which really is, implies a Contradiction in itfelf; and that if we did not perceive the right Number, it would follow, that that which was really no Contradiction appear'd to us a Contradiction, and that which was actually a Contradiction appear'd to be no Contradiction ; how what he fays is an Anf- wer to this, I fay, I cannot fee. It argues indeed, that in his Mind a great manyThings, which are certainly Contradictions in them- felves, are no Contradictions, i. e. He does not fee them ; becaufe he can fuppofe either one, two, three, or five hundred independent felf-exiilent Beings; one only of which Sup- pofitions is poffible, and all the reft: muff ne- ceffarily be Contradictions, notwithstanding his or any other Perfons Ideas. If it were polTible that there might be either one, two, or more felf-exiftent Beings, it is plain that they would be neceffary by Chance or Con- tingency, which is a flat Contradiction.

'that Exijlence, he fays, p. 20. which has no prior external Caufe is abfolutely imcausd, I know, no other DijlinElion, This is confoun- ding formal and efficient Caufes with each other. I anfwer therefore, that That Being, whofe Exiitence has no Reafon or Founda- tion may be conceived not to exift, I know no other Diftinction.

7. Here the Tranflator's Anfwer can be of no Force, p. 18. until he has proved that

the

3 6 Of Necejfary Exiftence.

the World could not poffiblv have been eter- nal, which he has not yet done.

8. Fitnefs or Agreeablenefs needs no other Relation than what is between the Action, and the Nature and Circumftances of the A- gent j it is fit for an Agent to act after fuch a Manner, that is, it is agreeable to the Nature and Circumftances of that Agent. It is no Solecifm therefore to fay, that fuch an Ac- tion is fit in it [elf, fince it only means that it is agreeable to the Nature and Circumftances of fuch or fuch a Being.

9. It is right and fit, p. 21. that a Creature fhould reverence its Creator, becaufe the Ac- tion of reverencing the Creator, is agreeable to the State and Condition the Creature is in; and it is agreeable alfo to the Nature of the Creator, becaufe the Creature is dependent upon him. That this is antecedent to any pofitive Command he allows : But how can this be, if it is right only becaufe it is a- greeable to the divine Will? How mould the Creature know that is is agreeable to the divine Willy before any pofitive Command ? He muft firft know the Foundation of God's Will, or fuppofe that he wills whatever is right, and then it is fit for him to act ac- cordingly becaufe it is right : Which Right- nefs he perceived antecedent to the divine Will, \3jJ1ich Will he took for granted was always agreeable to Right, therefore the Right- nefs of the Action made it agreeable.

10. A

Of Neceffary Exiftence. 3 1

10. A Being that has exifted from Eterni- ty, cannot, for that Reafon only, be neceffary. This Being, fays he, ibid, does not want to be made ( neceffary, ) that is, he fuppofes it fo from its own Nature; but this is only quis- ling upon the Word made. Not having had a Beginning is no Reafon indeed a priori, why a Being fhould be neceffarily exiflent, but it is a very good one drawn a pofteriori, &c. That it is no more a Reafon a pofteriori than a priori, I believe whoever confiders the Argu- ment for God's creating from Eternity, will fee very plain. In the Inflance of the Bal- lance, (be the Laws that govern it what they will) the Difficulty remains as long as the fore-mentioned Argument is conclunve.

1 1. A Canfe coceval with its Effect, he fays, p. 22. has been already conjidered; I an- fwer, but not confuted.

12. He fays, he Jhould be glad to know what other (than efficient) Caufe, willferve my Purpofe, &c. I mould be as glad to know, who ever afcribed Operations to a formal Caufe, or Reafon, or what Dr. Clarke very juftly calls a permanent Ground.

13. If he now is, ibid, and could never be- gin to be, is there any other pofjible Confe- quence but that he mujl have always been, &c. Here we muft firft confider, what Sort of Beings he applies thefe Proportions to, and then we mall fee the Want of Connection between them. A Being that did always

ex lit

32 Of Neceffary Exiftence.

exift, could never (that is, from the very Manner of its Exiftence ) begin to exift ; but does it thence follow, that it muft (neceffa- rilyi or 'tis nothing to thePurpofe) always have exifted, or that it does necejj'arily exift now. In a Word, the Cafe is plainly this ; he fuppofes a Being to have always exifted, and infers from thence (which is no Confe- quence at all ) that becaufe it did fo in Fact, it could not but have always exifted, or it did exift neceftarily always. His Argument therefore proves only this, that whatever actually did exift from Eternity, could not (without fuppoiing it not to have been eternal ) begin to exift. But why may I not fuppofe this Being to have begun to ex- ift, and therefore not to have been from Eter- nity ? Since it only contradicts the Suppo- iition of its being eternal. The Cafe of fuch a Being's exifting from Eternity, is only a contingent Exiftence, and in that it agrees with a Being that will exift to all Eternity; which Being, provided we allow the Suppo- lit ion true, never can ceafe to exift.

14. The Deity never could derive his Be- ing from any Things Ergo, he is underived. But his having exifted from Eternity, does not imply that ( nor is it any Proof to us that) he is underived.

15. Whatever was from Eternity, was ne- ver under a Capacity of being changed in any finite Time without a Cauie or Ground

of

Of Necejfary Exijience. 3 3

of that Change; but if it was from Eternity without any Caufe, it was from Eternity (though not at any particular Time) poffi- ble that it mould not have been at all, or that It mould have been otherwife, fince it might without any Reafon exift after any Manner, provided it exifted after that Manner from Eternity ; nor can its having exifted from Eternity be any Reafon, that there cannot be any Caufe capable of altering or diverfifying its Exiftence through all the Ages it exift- ed in.

16. That it implies a Contradiction a pri- ori, to fuppofe the felf-exiftent Being not to exift, has been mown before, though we mould not have known, perhaps, that it did fo, without Arguments a pofleriori, which was alfo before confidered, though no fuch Thing was faid, as that That was the Caufe of the Exiftence of God.

17. Having always exifted, is no more a Proof that a Being mujl always have exifted, p. 24. than exijling now is a Proof that it mujl exift now, or mall exift hereafter. The Reafon why we perceive God's Exiftence necejfary, is becaufe we cannot without a Con- tradiction fuppofe him not to have exifted always, not to exift now, and not to exift to all Rternity.

18. Self- exiftence can no more be a Con- fequence of Eternity, ibid, than it is a Confe- quence of this prefent Time ; for to deny

F the

34 Of Necejfary Exijlence.

the NeceJJity of an eternal Being, is no more abfurd than to deny any Being to be necef- fary ; becaufe both of them can with equal Eafe be fuppofed not to have exifted.

19. Here, p. 24. I refer the Reader to the Places objected againft, and he will fee plain- ly the want of Correction in the Tranfla- tor's Propofitions.

26. We can fee that created Beings, though they were from Eternity, may ceafe to ex- ift, and might never have exifted at all; 'tis no Reafon therefore a pofieriori, that what Was from Eternity cannot therefore ceafe to exift.

21. If there is no Reafon why an inde- pendent Being exifts, how {hall we be able to prove its Independency ? To fay we know it from its Eternity, will prove nothing, and was before confuted;

22. From the Confideration of Infinity a- rifes an Idea, which we cannot poffibly get rid of; fo that if we try to fuppofe nothing, the Idea of Infinity crouds itfelf along with it, and makes the Contradiction ftill plainer if porlible. The Idea of fomething is a ne- ceffary Idea, (o that, as the ingenious Au- thor of the Letters to Dr. Clarke in his Boyle's LeBures fays, " make what other Sup- " pofition you pleafe, yet we cannot help " (u ppofmg immenfe Space-, becaufe there " mufl be either an Infinity of Being, or

" (if

Of Necejfary Exift e7ice. 35

*• ( if you'll allow the Expreflion ) an inji- " nite Vacuity of Being?

23 . What he fays in the two following Pages is confounding the Meaning of a formal Caufe ; it is fuppofing it an actual Producer, it is fuppofing the Foundation of the Exif- tence of God to be really in Nature prior to his Exiftence, which has been fufficientiy ex- plained in my former Defence.

24. In the next Section the Tranflator af- ter the Words, / ask once more why it is, leaves out and always was, a Contradiction, &c. To anfwer, that the proper ^ueftion Jhould be, what is that Contradiction, &c, will not ferve him ; for if we fuppofe the Deity to have been alone in Nature, ( which, according to the Tranflator, we mufi fuppofe him once to have been,) I afk whether his Non-exiftence would not have been then both impoffible and contradictory ? If it would, then 'tis not the Phenomena of Na- ture that fhow us that he cannot but exift, for they only fhow us that he actually does. exift j though without them we mould not have feen the Impoffibility of his Non- ex- igence. He that can fee that a Thing may be without a Reafon, may with as much Reafon conclude that it was not till he faw it.

25. Why this NeceJJity is that wonderful Thing, &c. p. 27. which he defires to know, is, becaufe it is the Foundation the permanent

F 2 Ground

36 The Translators

Ground of the Exiftence of God. But the Cafe, with Refpect to God, is quite different : How do we know him to be the greateft Being, or that there may not be Others as great ? Not from his Eternity, unlefs we join Necejjity to it. Concerning the antecedent Caufe and Determination of the divine Will, fee the Places referr'd to in the Poflfcript*

The Translator's Demon- jiration Examined.

IN this Particular I fhall be very fhort, otherwife it would be, as he fays, to re- peat a great many Things, which have been laid before j efpecially relating to Eter- nity, and the PoJJibility of God's Creating from Eternity ; which they who are not convine'd of, mufl fee that it is no Defect in a Being that has Power, not to be able to ex- ert that Power, that is, mult fee a Power where there is none.

1. He begins anfwering my Argument by repeating his own, p. 28. which proves only againft our Conception, and therefore, as Dr. Bentlys did, proves nothing. A Series of Beings exifting from this prefent Time to all Eternity, is exactly of the fame Nature with g Series of Beings that were from Eternity

down

Demonft ration Examined. 37

down to this prefent Time, only the oppo- fite Way ; for as in the latter there never was a firft, fo in the former there never will be a laft, they are each of them ter- minated one Way, and infinite the other. What he means by partly infinite and partly finite, I understand not.

2. Either God exifted a whole 'Eternity without the Power of creating, or elfe fome created Beings might derive their Exigence from him from Eternity : To fuppofe God to be without that Power a whole Eternity a parte ante, is evidently a Contradiction ; if therefore the other Side appears only fo me- thing like a Contradiction, as the Tranflator expreffes it, p. 29. and does fo only becaufe it is above our Comprehenfion, it ought not for that Reafon to be rejected.

3. One entire endlefs Series, I own, does not agree to the Nature of fuch a Series ; it iliould rather have been, one entire begin- 72ingleJ's Series. Now this whole Series does not mean an infinite Series each Way, bur only all that of the Series which is now pan:. Where therefore is the Abfurdity in calling it this whole Series? or how have I produced the Doctor s Demonfiration again/} mxjelf? or how can this Series fo confide red, defiroy the Suppofition as much as afirjl and a lafi ?

4. In Anfwer to my aliening that Crea- ted Beings might eternally fpring from the

Work-

2$ The Translator's

Workmanfhip of the Almighty, as Light from the Sun, he fays, p. 30. that whatever is prior in our Ideas mujl be Jo in Nature, &c. All the Confufion which may appear in our fuppofing the Sun's Exigence from Eternity, and its emitting Light from E- ternity, is merely owing to our imperfect Ideas. The Inftant a luminous Body is crea- ted, it emits Light; whether the Motion of the Particles emitted are inftantaneous, (which they certainly are not,) or no, is nothing to the Purpofe, the prefent Queftion being only, whether they could have been emitted from Eternity , upon Suppofition that the Sun exifted from Eternity. I believe whoever conliders his Idea of Eternity paft, will find that the whole Difficulty, arifes purely from his not being able to conceive it without a Beginning, though he is fure there could be none; or fomething very like this. The Inftance of my Father being no Father till he had a Son, &c. is not at all parallel, for though no created Beings can be able to beget Sons coeval with them- felves ; yet I fee no Abfurdity in fuppofing the Deity to be able to do fo, who always had that unlimited Power, which he now has, and which he can never be deprived of. 5. The Tranflator refers us to Rg. 2d Edit, for a Proof of his Propofitions, i can fee no new Proof, and the old One mufl Hand or fall with his Notion of Eternity.

6. Dr.

DemonJIration Examined. 39

6. Dr. Clarke fays, in the Place referr'd to, that whatever fignijies either Difference vr Diverjity of Exijlencc is inconfijlent with Necejfity ; how this excludes all Perfections of the Deity, I cannot perceive : For as he always had thofe Perfections, there can be no Diverfity or Difference of Exiftence in him.

I fhall conclude with only making the following Obfervation upon 'Eternity pajl, which is what the Tranflator founds his whole Demonftration upon ; and I mail here endeavour to (how the Abfurdity of fuch Way of arguing in a plain Inftance. Mat- ter certainly exijls, this muft be allowed by every one that will truft his Senfes ; now as nothing could begin to exiji without a Caufe> whatever was not eternal could never have exijled, therefore Matter is Eternal, and consequently^ according to the Tranf- lator, is jelf-ex'ifient. To pretend to prove it not to be felf-exiftent, becaufe fome Per- fons fuppofe it to have had a Beginning, is plainly begging the Queftion. To fuppofe it Created, will be both begging the Quef- tion, and quite inconceivable : For the Ac- tion of Creating appears very like a Con- tradiction; it is fuppofing a Power exerted upon nothing, that is, not exerted at all. As Matter therefore confeiTedly exifts, and fince it was not created, it muft have been from Eternity, Ergo, it is felf-exijlent. This is a

necelTary

40 The Translator's &c.

neceiTary Confequence according to the Tranllator's Way of Arguing ; for Creation in Time is as hard to be reconciled to our Ideas, as Creation from Eternity j if his Ar- guments therefore againft that are conclu- sive, I humbly apprehend thefe here have v as much Force ; and if thefe are to be re- jected, as I think they defervedly ought to be, fo mould the Tranflator's, which are built upon as weak a Foundation. I mould be very well pleafed to fee how the World or Matter could be demonstrated not to btfelf- exijient, from any other Principle than its manifeft Contingency, or the PoJJibility of fuppofing it not to exift at all, or to exijl otherwife than it does : And if it is not felf- exiftent, it muft be created, whatever appa- rent Abfurdities that implies, fince the other is a flat Contradiction. So in the Cafe of Eternity, if it implies a Contradiction, to fuppofe God not to be able to create from Eternity, the apparent Difficulties on the other fide, can prove nothing againft it. This is the Notion I have follow'd throughout this Treatife; and as I have no Purfuit here after any Thing but Truth, I (hall be very willing to renounce any Thing here advanc'd, that mall at any Time hereafter be proved contrary to it.

FINIS.

7

I