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//
HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
MILITARY OPERATIONS
\
MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited
LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA • MADRAS MELBOURNE
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
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HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
BY DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE
MILITARY OPERATIONS
FRANCE AND BELGIUM, 19 14
;jONS, THE RETREAT TO THE SEINE, THE MARNE AND THE AISNE AUGUST-OCTOBER 1914
COMPILED BY
BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR JAMES E. EDMONDS
C.B., C.M.G., R.E. (Retired), p.s.c. MAPS AND SKETCHES COMPILED BY
MAJOR A. F. BECKE
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First Edition 1922
Second Edition 1925
Reprinted 1926, 1928
Third Edition 1933
ReprirUed 1937
V 5 30
PRINTED IN GRKAT BRITAIN BY R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED EDINBDROH
PREFACE
Since the original edition was compiled in 1920-21, the battlefields of 1914 have been visited by many parties of British officers, and much interesting information has been elicited on the ground. The volumes of the French and German official histories dealing with the period, besides numerous regimental histories, French, German and British, have been issued.^ It was therefore thought desirable to carry out a thorough revision of the text, particularly as the portions of the original dealing with the French and German forces had been pieced together from various un- official books, and were by no means complete. The maps and sketches have been revised accordingly, and some new ones added, notably a layered map of the Marne battlefield. No such revision of the other published volumes of the history will be necessary.
The opportunity has been taken to give in greater detail the information obtained during open warfare by the Royal Flying Corps ; for in the first volume of the official history " The War in the Air," the late Sir Walter Raleigh did not include sufficient for the purposes of military study. Further particulars also have been given of the destruction of bridges during the retreat : the work of collecting information from survivors was undertaken by Major-General Sir Reginald Buckland, Chief Engineer of the Fourth Army of the B.E.F., and occupied him two years — which gives some idea of the labour involved in this kind of work. A summary of his investigations was published in the Journal of the Royal Engineers.
J. E. E.
August 1933.
* The German Warne volume in 1926, the French Marne volume in 1S33.
V
PKEFACE TO THE FIKST EDITION
This history has been compiled with the purpose of pro- viding within reasonable compass an authoritative account, suitable for general readers and for students at military schools, of the operations of the British Army in the Western theatre of war in 1914-1918. It is based on the British official records.
The present volume covers events from mobilization up to the middle of October 1914 only, a period of two and a half months, and is on a scale which to a large extent treats the battalion, squadron and battery records as the basis of the story. In succeeding volumes it will not be possible or desirable to adhere to this, and succes- sively the brigade, division and even corps may become the unit of narrative. For this volume the scale adopted seems appropriate, in view of the importance of small units in the early operations, of the lessons to be derived from the study of the work of these units in open warfare, and of the desirability of leaving a picture of what war was Hke in 1914, when trained soldiers were still of greater importance than material, and gas, tanks, long-range guns, creeping barrages and the participation of aircraft in ground fighting were unknown.
The mass of documents to be dealt with was very great, and the difficulty has been not in obtaining in- formation, but in compressing and cutting down what was available. The British records comprise not only the war diaries of every staff and unit engaged, with their voluminous appendices containing all orders, intelligence,
vii
viii MILITARY HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
etc., received and issued, and detailed reports of actions, but they include also the General Headquarters files, the Commander-in-Chief's diary, and practically every telegram and message despatched and received. These official documents have been supplemented by private diaries and papers which have been kindly lent, by regimental records, and by interviews with officers who took part in the operations.
On a modern battlefield, however, knowledge of events is extraordinarily local, and the transmission of informa- tion difficult ; in addition important witnesses only too often become casualties. Though written orders and messages are absolutely reliable evidence of the matters with which they deal, war diaries and reports of actions, written up immediately after events, are liable to contain mistakes. Commanders and staffs are naturally more concerned in finding out and reporting the exact situation and condition of their troops and of the enemy, in sending up reinforcements, ammunition and supplies, and recording experience for future use than in the collection of historical matter. In fact, even officers well known to be specially interested in military history have confessed that during the war the idea of collecting or keeping material for its future historian never occurred to them. Many incidents deserving of record may therefore have escaped notice. It will greatly assist in the compilation of monographs or of a fuller official history in years to come, if readers who can supply further information or corrections will com- municate with the Secretary of the Historical Section, Committee of Imperial Defence, 2 Whitehall Gardens, London, S.W.I.
The text and maps now presented are the result of the co-operative labours of the staff, past and present, of the Historical Section, Military Branch,^ which, in collabora- tion with the Disposal of Records Department, War Office, is also charged with the sorting and arrangement of the
1 Special assistance in compiling this volume has been rendered by Major A. F. Becke, Major F. W. Tomlinson, Captain G. C. Wynne and Mr. E. A. Dixon.
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION jx
records dealing with operations overseas. This latter part of its work absorbed most of its energy and time until well on into 1921. The Branch did not obtain a permanent home until October 1919 ; thus a large amount of im- portant material did not become available until it was unpacked and sorted after this date, and it was then found necessary to re-write an account of the initial operations already partly drafted.
The British Expeditionary Force in France in 1914 was not acting independently, and formed only a small part of the Allied Armies engaged ; it has therefore been necessary to include an account of the action of the French and Belgian forces sufficient to provide a proper frame- work for the British operations. As regards the Belgian Army, ample material for this purpose has been published by the Belgian General Staff. The French General Staff has not yet issued any history, but much information with regard to the French plans and operations has already been made public : officially in the reports of Parliamentary Enquiries, semi-officially by historians like M. Hanotaux, M. Engerand, M. Madelin and General Palat {Pierre Lehautcourt), and in the form of reminiscences and memoirs by actual participants, such as Generals Lanrezac, Gallieni, Dubail and Mangin. It was not, therefore, thought necessary to trouble the French General Staff except as regards the incident of the assistance rendered by General Sordet's Cavalry Corps at the battle of Le Cateau, when a copy of the war diary of the troops concerned was very courteously furnished. With this exception, it must be understood that for the French operations the only absolutely authoritative statements quoted are the orders, instructions, intelligence reports, etc., received officially by G.H.Q. from the French Grand Quartier General.
The published German accounts of the early part of the war are very numerous, and they deal both with the decisions and orders of the higher commanders and the operations of many corps and even smaller fighting units. The most notable are the books of the three Army com-
X. MILITARY HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
manders, von Kluck, von Biilow and von Hansen, the General Staff monographs "Liittich-Namur " and "Mons," the official list of battles and engagements, with the names of the formations, etc., present, entitled " Schlachten und Gefechte," and the stories of participants like General von Zwehl, General von Kuhl, Hauptmann Bloem (the novelist) and Hofprediger Vogel.^ It was originally in- tended to give the accounts derived from German sources in the form of notes at the end of each Chapter ; but, after consideration, it was decided that such an arrangement might prove inconvenient, and that it was better as a general rule to include them in the body of the Chapters, as close as possible to the events in the British narra- tive to which they refer. This arrangement, in view of the difference of the character of the material, has naturally caused breaks in the style and scope of the story, but it makes the comparison of the two accounts easier.
General Freiherr Mertz von Quirheim, the Director of the German Reich sarchiv, Berlin, which has custody of the war records, has been good enough to furnish material in order to clear up a few points on which there seemed insufficient information.
As separate histories of the Royal Air Force and the Medical Services are being compiled, a detailed account of their work has not been included in the narrative.
Two sets of maps have been prepared. The one, distinguished by the word " Sketches," sufficient for the general reader, is bound in the volume ; the other, intended for the use of students of war, is issued separately. Except the situation maps for the battle of the Aisne, which are taken from the originals, the maps have been compiled from data and sketches in the war diaries or furnished by officers, or from French and German publications.
The typescript or proof sheets have been read by a number of commanders and staff and regimental officers who took part in the events narrated, and the compiler has been greatly assisted by their advice and criticism,
1 See List of Books, pp. xxv-xxix.
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION xi
for which he tenders them his most sincere thanks. He is specially grateful to Mr. C. T. Atkinson, his predecessor in charge of the Branch, for advice and help at all times, ■which his intimate knowledge of the records made most valuable ; and both to him and to Mr. W. B. Wood, the partner in the compilation of a book on an earlier war, for the reading and correction of the proof sheets.
J. E. E.
April 1922.
Issued with " 1918 " Vol. III.
ADDENDUM TO " 1914 " Vol. I (1933 Edition)
Page 280, penultimate line. After '" further south " add new footnote :
"■ It is now accepted in France that the British retirement on the night of the 4th/5th September was in accordance with the instructions from General Joffre in force at the time and not a ' derobade '. See ' Joffre et GalUeni a la Marne ', pp. 65-7, by Capitaine P. Lyet, published in 1938 by the ' Service Historique ' of the French General Staff with a preface by General Gamelin, Chief of the General Staff of National Defence, who was one of General Joffre's General Staff officers at the time of the Battle of the Marne 1914."
ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA
over to France to be ' butchered by Haig ', while Lord French refused to agree to the removal of a single man from England. ' Life and Letters of Lord Wester- Wemyss,' by Lady Wester- Wemyss, p. 375." *
Page 473, footnote 2. Add :
"General Debeney in his ' La Guerre et les hommes ', p. 25, says the French sector taken over by General Gough was ' jeune ', and continues, ' ce secteur etant moins bien fortifie . . . toutes les " jeunes " organisations aussi bien les Allemandes que les alliees ont saute comme bouchons de champagne sous Teftort des materiels de 1918 '."
Page 493. At bottom of page add :
" German Casualties. " Colonel and Divisional Commander Bircher, of the Swiss Army, who is generally well informed about German matters, states in his ' Krieg ohne Gnade ', p. 207 : ' Losses of the Germans (21st March until end of April) in the Operation Michael,
308,000 killed and wounded '."
Page 498. VII. Corps table, after "11 Aus. Brigades." add :
" 4th AustraUan Division (Major- General E. G. Sinclair- MacLagan) :
12 Aus., 13 Aus. Brigades. From 8 a.m. 29th March : 15th Australian Brigade (5th Australian Division).""
Page 499, lines 12-14. Delete " 4th Australian Division ... 13 Aus. Brigades." and substitute "■ 4th Austrahan Brigade (4th Australian Division)."
Page 523, paragraph (c). After " ammunition supply." add in parentheses: " (The four batteries of 12-inch howitzers on railway mount- ings were, however, kept in action with the co-operation of the 109th Railway Company R.E.) ".
NOTES
The locations of troops and places are given from right to left of the front of the Allied Forces, unless otherwise stated. Thus, even in the retreat to the Seine they are described from east to west. In translations of German orders they are left as in the original, but otherwise enemy troops are enumerated in relation to the British front.
The convention observed in the British Expeditionary Force is followed as regards the distinguishing numbers of Armies, Corps, Divisions, etc., of the British and Allied Armies, e.g., they are written in full for Armies, but in Roman figures for Corps, and in Arabic for smaller forma- tions and units, except Artillery Brigades, which are Roman ; thus : Fourth Army, IV. Corps, 4th Division, 4th Infantry Brigade, 4th Cavalry Brigade, IV. Brigade, R.F.A.
German formations and units, to distinguish them clearly from the Allies, are printed in italic characters, thus : First Army, I. Corps, 1st Division.
The usual Army, and sometimes the Army List, abbreviations of regimental names have been used in the narrative ; for example, " 2/R. West Kent " or " West Kents" for 2nd Battalion The Queen's Own (Royal West Kent Regiment) ; " the Somerset " or " Somerset L.I." for The Somerset Light Infantry ; K.O.Y.L.I. for the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry ; K.R.R.C. for The King's Royal Rifle Corps. To avoid constant repetition, the " Royal " in regimental titles is often omitted : for instance, the Royal Warwickshire are called " the War- wickshire."
Abbreviations employed occasionally are : — G.H.Q. for British General Headquarters. G.Q.G. for French Grand Quartier General (usually spoken as " Grand Q.G."). xiii
xiv MILITARY HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
O.II.L. for German Oherste Heeresleitung (German Supreme Command). N .B. — "G.H.Q." in German means Grosses Haupt-Quartier, that is the Kaiser's Headquarters, pohtical, mihtary and naval, as distinguished from O.H.L. OfTieers are described by the rank which they held at the period under consideration.
The accents in French and Belgian place names well known to British troops have been omitted.
The meaning of Reserve, Ersatz, Landwehr as applied to German formations is explained on pp. 21, 22. Of other German terms used, Jdger and Schuizen both signify riflemen formed in special battalions ; Abteilung means a group of three batteries of artillery ; a German artillery brigade consists of two regiments each of two or three Abteilungen.^
Pioniere : are the German field Engineers ; the word cannot well be translated by " Engineers " or " Pioneers," as the men in the Pioniere units, although thc}'^ have a thorough training in field engineering, are not tradesmen of the class found in R.E. Companies, and are only employed on field duties : besides, in Germany there was an " In- genieur Korps," which had duties in the construction and maintenance of fortresses.
Time in German narratives and orders, which in the period dealt with was one hour earlier than British, has been corrected to our standard, unless it is specified " German time."
* Abteilung also means a mounted machine-gun battery with cavalry, as opposed to the M.G. Kompagnie, which forms part of an infantry regiment or Jdger battalion.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
PAGE
The Armies of the Western Allied Forces :
Great Britain ..,.,.. 1
France ........ 14
Belgium ........ 18
Germany ........ 20
CHAPTER I
The Outbreak of War ...... 23
Progress of Events ...... 31
The British Entry into France . . . .48
Notes : I. Alleged German Troop Movements before Mobiliza- tion . . . . . . .54
II. The Sehlieffen Plan 56
CHAPTER II
22nd August 1914 :
First Contact with the Enemy . . . .62
Note : German Uncertainty as to the Position of the B.E.F. . 68
CHAPTER III
The Battle of Mons, 23rd August . . . .71
Note : The German Account of Mons . . . .94
CHAPTER IV
The Retreat from Mons and Action of Elouges, 24th
August ....... 96
Notes : I. German Movements on the 24th August . .114
II. Operations of the French Troops on the British Left,
20th-24th August . . . . .116
XV b
xvi MILITARY HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER V
The Rktreat (continued), 27th-28th August :
Smith-Dorrien's Force .....
Haig's I. Corps ......
General Situation, Night 28th/29th August . Notes : I. ^Movements of the German First and Second Armies after Le Cateau ....
II. Movements of the French Fifth Army from Charle roi to Guise ....
III. General Joffre's Congratulatory Telegram .
IV. British Losses, 23rd-27th August
PAOE
The Rktreat from Mons (continued), 25th August . 118
Notes : I. Movements of the German First and Second Armies,
23rd-25th August . . . . .129
II. Movements of General Valabregue's Group of Reserve
divisions, on British Right, 21st-25th August . 131
CHAPTER VI
The Retreat from Mons (continued), Evening and Night OF 25Tn/26TH August : Maroilles and Landrecies ; Solesmes . . . 132
Notes : I. Movements of the German First Army on 25th
August . . . . . .149
II. First Belgian Sortie from Antwerp, 24th, 25th,
26th August . . . . .151
CHAPTER VII
The Battle of Le Cateau, 26th August. Dawn till Noon 152 Note : German Plans for the 26th August . . .169
CHAPTER VIII ^
The Battle of Le Cateau, 26th August (continued).
Noon to 5 p.m. ...... 171
CHAPTER IX
The Close of the Battle of Le Cateau, 26th August.
5 P.M. TO Nightfall ..... 186
The Retreat from the Battlefield .... 197
The I. Corps on the 26th August .... 200
Notes : I. German Accounts of Le Cateau . . . 204
II. General d'Amade's Force on the British Left, 26th
August ...... 210
CHAPTER X
212
219 229
233
237 238 238
CONTENTS xvii
CHAPTER XI
PAGE
The Retreat (continued), 29tii-31st August :
29th August ....... 239
30th August ....... 242
31st August ....... 246
Notes : I. Movements of the German First and Second Armies,
29th-31st August . . . . .250
II. The Battle of Guise, 29th-30th August . . 252
CHAPTER XII
The Retreat (continued), 1st September :
The Fight at Nery . . . . . .255
The Rear-guard Action of Crepy en Valois . . . 259
The Rear-guard Actions of Villers Cotterets . . 260
Notes : I. German Movements on 1st September . . 265
II. The Army of Paris . . . . .267
CHAPTER XIII
The Last Stages of the Retreat, 2nd-5th September . 268 Notes : I. Operations of the German First and Second Armies,
2nd-5th September . . . .287
II. The Genesis of the Battle of the Marne . . 293
CHAPTER XIV
The Battle of the Marne :
6th September : The Return to the Offensive . . 295
The French on the 6th September .... 302
Notes : I. The German Right Wing on the 6th September . 304 II. The Despatch of General Joffre's Order for the
Battle of the Marne .... 306
CHAPTER XV
The Battle of the Marne (continued) :
7th September : The March to the Grand Morin . . 308
The French on the 7th September . . . .313
Note : The German Right Wing on the 7th September . .315
CHAPTER XVI
The Battle of the Marne (continued) :
8th September : The Forcing of the Petit Morin . .318
The French on the 8th September .... 326
Note : The German Right Wing on the 8th September . . 328
xviii MILITARY HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER XVII
PAGE
The Battle of the Marne (concluded) :
9th September : The Passage of the Marne and the Retreat
of the Germans ...... 332
The French on the 9th September .... 344
Notes : I. The German Right Wing on the 9th September . 347 II. Tlie Second Belgian Sortie from Antwerp, 9th-13th
September . ..... 356
CHAPTER XVIII
The Pursuit to the Aisne, 10th-12th September :
10th September ...... 358
The French on the 10th September .... 364
11th September : The Inchne to the North-East . . 364
Tlie French on the 11th September .... 366
12th September : The Advance to the Aisne . . 366
The French on the 12th September .... 372
Note : The German Retirement from the Battle of the Marne 373
CHAPTER XIX
The Battle of the Aisne, 13th September :
The Passage of the Aisne ..... 377
The French on the 13th September .... 391
Note : The 13th September on the German Side . . 392
CHAPTER XX
The Battle of the Aisne (continued) :
14th September : The Fight for the Chemin des Dames . 395
The French on the 14th September .... 418
15th September : The Deadlock .... 419
The French on the 15th September .... 422
Note : The 14th-15th September on the German Side . . 423
CHAPTER XXI
Last Days on the Aisne : J
General Situation ...... 428 '
Operations on the Aisne ..... 439
Note : The German Strategy during the Battle of the Aisne . 453 J
CHAPTER XXII
The " Race to the Sea " and the Transfer of the B.E.F.
to Flanders ...... 456
GENERAL INDEX 577
INDEX TO ARMS, FORMATIONS AxND UNITS . . 585
TABLE OF APPENDICES
XIX
TABLE OF APPENDICES
1.
2.
3. 4.
5. 6. 7.
8.
9. 10.
11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.
Order of Battle of the British Expeditionary Force, August and September 1914 ....
Notes on the organization of some of the principal forma- tions and units of the British Expeditionary Force in 1914 .......
Order of Battle of the French Armies in August 1914
Notes on the organization of some of the principal French formations and units in 1914
Order of Battle of the Belgian Army in August 1914
Order of Battle of the German Armies in August 1914
Notes on the organization of some of the principal German formations and units in 1914
Instructions to Sir John French from Earl Kitchener August 1914 ......
The French plan of campaign, Plan 17 (translation)
Sir John French's Operation Order No. 5, 1 p.m. 20th August 1914 (with march table and allotment of Army troops) ......
Sir John French's Operation Order No. 6, 11.55 p.m. 21st August 1914 ......
Sir John French's supplementary instruction to Cavalry Division, 11.35 p.m. 21st August 1914
Sir John French's Operation Order No. 7, 8.25 p.m. 24th August 1914
Sir John French's Operation 25th August 1914
4th Division Operation Order 1914 .
II. Corps Operation Order No 1914 .
Sir John French's Operation 27th August 1914
Sir John French's Operation 28th August 1914
Sir John French's Operation August 1914 .
Sir John French's Operation 30th August 1914 .
Sir John French's Operation 31st Auarust 1914
Order No. 8, 7.30 p.m. No. 1, 5 P.M. 25th August , 6, 10.15 P.M. 25th August Order No. 9, 8.30 p.m. Order No. 10, 11.30 p.m. Order No. 11, 9 p.m. 29th Order No. 12, 5,15 p.m.
• • • •
Order No. 13, 8.50 p.m.
G.H.Q. messages to I. Corps anticipating and confirming order to retire, 1st September 1914
471
485 488
490 492 493
496
499 501
508 513 514 515 516 618 520 521 522 524 525 527 529
XX MILITARY HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
PAOE
23. Correspondence with regard to halting on the Marne and
the retreat behind the Seine (translation) . . 530
24. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 14, 7.30 p.m.
2nd September 1914 . . . . .533
25. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 15, 11.50 p.m.
3rd September 1914 . . . . . .535
26. Le General Commandant en Chef au Field Marechal Sir
John French, Commandant en Chef les forces Britan- niques, 4th September 1914 .... 537
27. Letter of Sir John French to Earl Kitchener, 7th September
1914 ........ 538
28. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 16, 6.35 p.m.
4th September 1914 ...... 540
29. Table giving length of daily marches (in miles) from 20th
August to 5th September (both inclusive) . . 542
30. General Joffre's Instruction for the battle of the Marne
(translation) ....... 543
31. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 17, 5.15 p.m.
5th September 1914 ...... 545
32. Cavalry Division Operation Order No. 11, 5th September
1914 (with march table) ..... 547
33. I. Corps Operation Order No. 10, 5th September 1914 . 548
34. II. Corps Operation Order No. 15, 5th September 1914 . 549
35. III. Corps Operation Order No. 7, 5th September 1914 . 551
36. Sir John French's Special Order of the Day, 6th September
1914 ........ 552
37. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 18, 9 f.m. 7th
September 1914 ...... 553
38. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 19, 7.30 p.m.
8th September 1914 ...... 555
39. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 20, 8.15 p.m.
9th September 1914 ...... 556
40. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 21, 8.15 p.m.
10th September 1914 . , . . .558
41. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 22, 6 p.m. 11th
September 1914 ...... 560
42. General Joffre's Special Instruction No. 23 of 12th Sep-
tember 1914 ....... 562
43. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 23, 7.45 p.m.
12th September 1914 ..... 563
44. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 24, 6 p.m. 13th
September 1914 ...... 565
45. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 25, 14th Sep-
tember 1914 ....... 567
46. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 26, 8.30 p.m.
15th September 1914 ..... 569
TABLE OF APPENDICES xxi
PAGE
47. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 27, 8.30 p.m.
16th September 1914 . . . . .570
48. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 28, 3 p.m. 1st
October 1914 . . . . . . .571
49. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 29, 11 a.m. 2nd
October 1914 . . . . . . .573
50. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 30, 8 a.m. 4th
October 1914 . . , . . . .575
51. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 31, 8.30 a.m.
5th October 1914 . . . . . .576
SKETCHES AND MAPS
SKETCHES (Bound in Volume) A. The Retreat from Mons
1. General Theatre of Operations (Western Front)
2. Concentration of the Armies (Western Front)
3. Operations 4th-22nd August (German Armies in
Belgium) ....
4. Operations of B.E.F., 23rd-28th August .
5. The Eve of Mons, 22nd August .
6. The Eve of Le Cateau, 25th August
7. Le Cateau, 26th August
8. The Battle of Guise, 29th August
9. Operations, 28th August-5th September (Re
treat of B.E.F.)
10. The German Advance, 17th August-5th Sept.
11. 1st September 1914
12. The Marne, 5th September
12a. General Joffre's Projects for the Counter Offensive ....
13. Operations, 6th-13th September (Advance of
B.E.F.) . . . • •
14. The Marne, 6th September
15. The Marne, 7th September
16. 8th September. Situation as known at German
G.H.Q. .....
17. The Crisis, 9th September. The B.E.F. crosses
the Marne ....
18. The Marne. The German Retreat
19. The Aisne, 14th September
20. The Aisne, 20th September
21. The Extension of the Battle Line northwards
15th September-8th October .
B. The Advance to the Aisne .
xxiii
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„ 457 End-paper
xxiv MILITARY HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
MAPS
{In Separate Case)
Plate 1. Order of Battle of a German Cavalry Division and a German Corps in August 1914.
Map 1. The Concentration of the Armies (Western Front).
2. Theatre of Operations (Western Front) 1 : 1,000,000.
3. Mons to Compiegne, 1 : 250,000.
4. Compiegne to Paris and Melun, 1 : 250,000.
5. Situation, 17tii-24th August.
6. Battlefield of Mons, 1 : 100,000 (layered).
7. Mons, Sunday, 23rd August.
8. Action at Elouges, 24th August.
9. B.E.F., night, 25th/26th August.
10. Battlefield of Le Cateau, 1 : 40,000 (layered).
11. Le Cateau, 26th August.
12. Actions at Fesmy and fitreux, 27th August.
13. Retreat from Mons, 23rd-29th August.
14. Situation, 27th August (night).
15. Situation, 28th August (night),
16. Situation, 29th August (night).
17. Situation, 30th August (night).
18. Situation, 31st August (night).
19. 1st September, 1 : 100,000.
20. Situation, 1st September (night).
21. Situation, 2nd September (night).
22. Situation, 3rd September (night).
23. Situation, 4th September (night).
24. Situation, 5th September (night).
25. The Marne Battlefield, 1914 (layered).
26. Situation, 6th September (night).
27. Situation, 7th September (night).
28. Situation, 8th September (night).
29. The Crisis of the Marne, 9th September (afternoon).
30. Situation, 9th September (night).
31. Situation, 10th September (night).
32. Situation, 11th September (night).
33. Situation, 12th September (night).
34. Situation, 13th September (night).
35. Battlefield of the Aisne, 1 : 100,000 (layered).
36. Battle of the Aisne, 25th September 1914.
LIST OF BOOKS
TO WHICH MOST FREQUENT REFERENCE IS MADE
Baumgarten-Crusius : " Die Marneschlacht 1914." By General- major Baunigarten-Crusius. (Leipzig : Lippold.)
An account of the battle of the Marne and the events leading to it, founded on official records. It is written particularly from the point of view of the German Third Army by a Saxon general. This was the first German book which told the truth about the Marne. Baumgarten-Crusius II. : " Deutsche Heerfiihrung im Marne- feldzugl914." By Generalmajor Baumgarten-Crusius. (Berhn : Scherl.)
A further contribution to the solution of the question of responsibility for the orders to retreat at the battle of the Marne. Belgian General Staff : " Military Operations of Belgium in Defence of the Country and to Uphold her Neutrality." (English translation : London, Collingridge, Is. net.)
Report, compiled by the Belgian General Staff, for the period July 31st to December 31st, 1914. Bloem : " Vormarsch." By Walter Bloem. (Leipzig : Grethlein.)
One of the most graphic and dramatic accounts of war yet written. The author is a well-known German novelist, who was serving, as a Reserve Captain, in the 12th Brandenburg Grenadiers {III. Corps of von Kluck's Army). He gives the story of his experiences from outbreak of war to the Aisne, where he was wounded on ChivTCS Spur.
There is an English translation : " The Retreat from Mons, 1914." (Peter Davies.) Brandis : " Die Stiirmer von Douaumont." By Oberleutnant von Brandis. (Berlin : Scherl.)
The author served in the 24th Regiment of the ///. Corps at jMons, Frameries, etc. He later took part in the capture of Fort Douaumont, Verdun ; this incident is commemorated in the title of his book.
BuLOw : " Mein Bericht zur Marneschlacht." By Generalfeld- marschall von Biilow. (Berhn : Scherl.) Translated into French as " Mon rapport sur la bataille de la Marne." (Paris : Payot.)
A clear military narrative, with sketch maps, by the com- mander of the German Second Army, which includes the battle of the Aisne 1914.
XXV
xxvi MILITARY HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Engerand : " La Bataille de la Frontiere (Aout 1914)." By Fernand Engerand, Depute. (Paris : Bossard.)
The author was " rapporteur " of the Parhamentary Com- mission which inquired into the loss of the Briey Basin. He gives a summary of the report, with important documents as appendices.
Falkenhayn : " General Headquarters 1914-1916 and its Critical Decisions." By General Erich von Falkenhayn. (English translation, Hutchinson & Co., 21s.)
Von Falkenhayn was Prussian Minister of War in 1914 ; but on 14th September he took over the duties of Chief of the General Staff from von Moltke. The book deals mostly with the successes of the Russian theatre of war, but contains much of importance as regards decisions in the West.
F.O.A. (French Official Account) : " Les Armees Fran9aises dans la Grande Guerre." Ministere de la Guerre : fitat-Major de I'Armee-Service Historique. (Paris : Imprimerie Nationale.)
The first three volumes of " Tome I " cover the period from the outbreak of war to 14th September 1914, the first volume commencing with the pre-war plans, including Plan XVII. It is a severely technical record, reinforced by a mass of documents, there being seven volumes of these to three of text in the ' ' Tome." Both text and maps are inaccurate as regards the B.E.F. at the Battle of the Marne.
Gallieni : " Memoires du General Gallieni). Defense de Paris." (Paris : Payot.)
A most valuable record. With Situation Maps.
G.O.A. (German Official Account) : " Der Weltkreig 1914 bis 1918. Bearbeitet im Reichsarchiv. Die militarischen Operationen zu Lande." (Berlin : Mittler.)
The first two volumes were published at the end of 1924, and many more have since appeared. Those dealing with the Western Front up to the end of October are the first, third, fourth and fifth.
Although complete documents are not quoted, sufficient data are published for the reader to form his own conclusions. In the fifth volume the scale of the narrative is much reduced and, generally speaking, the maps hardly reach the standard of the text.
G.O.A. K.u.K. : The first volume, with appendices, of " Kriegs- riistung und Kriegswirtschaft," published in 1930.
A separate part of the German Official Account it deals with " Preparations for War." That section devoted to military preparations traces the increase of the German Army from 1875 to 1914.
Hanotaux: " Histoireillustreede la Guerre de 1914." By M.Gabriel Hanotaux. Nine volumes published. (Paris : Gounouilhou.)
A beautifully illustrated work containing a large number of official documents, which make it valuable. The twelfth volume carries the narrative as far as the " Race to the Sea."
LIST OF BOOKS xxvii
Hausen : " Erinnerungen an der Marnefeldzug 1914." By General- oberst Freiherr von Hausen. (Leipzig : Koehler.)
A personal and historical account of the campaign up to the end of the battle of the Marne by the commander of the German Third Army, with numerous sketch maps and an order of battle of the German forces.
Heubner : " Unter Emmich vor Liittich. Unter Kluck vor Paris." By H. Heubner, Hauptmann der Reserve und Professor in Wernigerode. (Schwerin : Bahn.)
A very vivid account by a professor and Reserve captain, which ends at the Aisne 1914. He belonged to the 20th Infantry Regiment, 11th Infantry Brigade, 6th Division, III. Corps of von Kluck's Army and was at Mons, the Ourcq, etc.
Kluck : " Der Marsch auf Paris, und die Marneschlacht 1914." By A. von Kluck, Generaloberst. (Berlin : Mittler.) Trans- lated as " The March on Paris 1914." (Edward Arnold, 10s.)
Von Kluck's own statement, with a very fine map showing the movements of the German First Army.
KuHL : " Der deutsche Generalstab in Vorbereitung und Durch- fiihrung des Weltkrieges." By General der Infanterie H. von Kuhl. (Berlin : Mittler.)
An account of the work of the Great General Staff in preparation for and during the war, specially valuable for the part dealing with the development of the German plan of campaign. The author was the Chief of the Staff to von Kluck and Crown Prince Ruppreeht of Bavaria, and had served 22 years on the Great General Staff before the war.
Kuhl's " Marne " : " Der Marnefeldzug 1914." By General der Infanterie H. von Kuhl. (Berlin : Mittler.) Published January 1921.
LOHRISCH : " Im Siegessturm von Liittich an die Marne." By Oberleutnant der Reserve Dr. H. Lohrisch. (Leipzig : Quelle und Meyer.)
The author served in the 27th Infantry Regiment of the IV. Corps in the early fighting, including Le Cateau.
" Liittich-Namur " : " Der grosse Krieg in Einzeldarstellungen. Herausgegeben im Auftrage des grossen Generalstabes." (Olden- burg : Gerhard Stalling.)
In the series of Great General Staff monographs. A very complete account of the capture of Liege and Namur.
" Marnedrama " : " Das Marnedrama 1914."
This is also in the series of Great General Staff monographs. Published in 1928, in five volumes, it treats of the Battle of the Marne in much more detail than G.O.A. but as its manifest purpose is to glorify the officers and men of the old German Army its comments and claims will hardly bear investigation. The sketch maps, however, are of considerable value.
" Mons " : " Die Schlacht bei Mons."
In the same series of Great General Staff monographs. There are excellent maps showing the German dispositions.
xxviii MILITARY HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
M.W.B. : Militiir Wochenblatt. (Berlin : Mittler.) The principal German military journal.
Palat : " La Grande Guerre sur le Front Occidental." By General Palat (Pierre Lehautcourt). In fourteen volumes. (Paris : Chapelot.)
A valuable unofficial compilation, as regards the movements of the French. The sixth volume deals with the Battle of the Marne, and the seventh carries the story of the war on the Western Front to end of the " Race to the Sea," 1914. The maps are portions of the 1 : 80,000 with no troops marked on them.
PosECK : " Die deutsche Kavallerie in Belgien und Frankreich 1914." By Generalleutnant von Poseck. (Berlin : Mittler.)
The author was Chief of the Staff of the I. Cavalry Corps. It is a very valuable summary of the German cavalry operations, based on the official records, and has been translated in the United States.
" Regt. No. . . ." These are references to war histories of German regiments. Most of them are in the series " Erinnerungsblatter deutscher Regimenter," published by Gerhard Stalling, Olden- burg. The volumes vary in length and value : some give detailed accounts of the fighting with extracts from the remini- scences of combatants ; others merely reproduce the official war diaries.
" Schlachten und Gefechte " : " Die Schlachten und Gefechte des Grossen Krieges, 1914-1918. Quellenwerk nach amtlichen Bezeichnungen zusammengestellt vom Grossen Generalstab." (Berlin : Sack.)
An official list of battles compiled by the Great General Staff showing the formations, etc., engaged in each, and lists of the higher commanders, with excellent index.
Stegemann : " Geschichte des Krieges." Vols. I. II. and III. By H. Stegemann, a Swiss journalist. (Stuttgart : Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.)
A good general account of the war from the German point of view.
Tappen : " Bis zur Marne." By Generalleutnant Tappen. (Olden- burg : Stalling.)
The author was head of the Operations Section of Supreme Headquarters until August 1916. His book gives considerable insight into the opening operations up to and including the Marne, but has led to a good deal of controversy in Germany.
VoGEL : " 3,000 Kilometer mit der Garde-Kavallerie." By Hof- prediger Dr. Vogel. (Leipzig : Velhagen und Klassing.)
This is practically a picturesque diary of the operations of the Guard Cavalry Division from outbreak of war to May 1915, written by the Divisional Chaplain.
WiRTH : " Von der Saale zur Aisne." By Hauptmann der Land- wehr A. Wirth. (Leipzig : Hesse und Becker.)
A small diary by an orderly officer attached to the Staff of the 13th Reserve Division {IV. Reserve Corps) that fought at Le Cateau, etc.
LIST OF BOOKS xxix
" Ypres " : " Ypres 1914 " (Constable : 5s.), translation of " Die Schlacht an der Yser und bei Ypern ini Herbst 1914." (In the same series as " Liittich-Namur.")
Contains, besides an account of the First Ypres, a good many details of the organization of the German Army.
ZwEHL : " Maubeuge, Aisne, Verdun." By General der Infanterie von Zwehl. (Berlin : Curtius.)
The author commanded the VII. Reserve Corps, captured Maubeuge, and reached the Chemin des Dames ridge at the Aisne just in time to prevent tlie British I. Corps from seizing it. There is a good account of the battle and much else of interest in the book.
INTRODUCTION
THE ARMIES OF THE WESTERN ALLIED POWERS
GREAT BRITAIN
Eighteen hundred and seventy-one, the year which saw the proclamation of the German Empire at Versailles, wit- nessed also the beginning of a new epoch in the history of the British Army. It was then that the first steps were taken to replace the old army of Peninsular model by a force raised and organized on modern lines : the system of purchase, under which officers of the cavalry and infantry bought their commissions in each successive regimental rank, was abolished ; short service was adopted, not so much with the idea of attracting recruits as of building up a reserve ; and regiments of infantry, except those which were already composed of more than one battalion, were grouped in pairs. Ten years later, in 1881, this grouping was made permanent, the old numbers were abolished and the infantry was re- constituted into double-battalion regiments with territorial titles on a territorial basis. ^
The old Militia, Regular and Local, remained, as always, on a territorial basis. It was gradually drifting back to the function, which it had fulfilled during the Napoleonic wars, of a recruiting depot for the army, but without the ballot ; for the enforcement of the ballot had for a long time been suspended by an annual Act of Parliament.
Side by side with the Militia stood the Yeomanry Cavalry, first called into being by the threat of a French invasion in 1794-95. It had always attracted an excellent class of recruit, but its training was very limited, both in scope and duration.
Behind the Militia and Yeomanry were the Volunteers,
^ An excellent account of the development of the Army will be found in " The Army Book of the British Empire " (H.M. Stationery Office, 5s.). It unfortunately stops at 1893.
VOL. II B
2 INTRODUCTION
chiefly infantry. They also had been first formed in 1794-95 ; but in 1806-7 they had been transformed into Local Militia, recruited by ballot without power of sub- stitution, and subject to the same discipline as the Militia. After 1815 the Local Militia soon died out ; but in 1859 the Volunteers were revived on the original basis of 1794-95.
The best part of a generation, however, was needed for the new army system initiated in 1871 to settle down and bear fruit. The home battalion of a regiment was for years little more than a group of boys who, as they matured, were drafted out to the battalion on foreign service. Only in India was the real British Army of grown and fully- trained men to be seen.
In 1899-1902 the war in South Africa put the British military forces to a rude practical test. Never before had so many troops been sent overseas. The Regular Army was found to be too small for the work even when the Reserves had been called out, so that means to supplement it had to be improvised. The Militia and Yeomanry volunteered for foreign service almost to a man ; the Volunteer battalions sent a succession of companies to the Regular battalions of their regiments in South Africa, and formed special active service units ; finally the Overseas Dominions and Colonies enthusiastically raised and des- patched contingents. The experience acquired in this war by all arms and by all branches of the Staff was soon to prove of the utmost value.
In February 1904 the office of Commander-in-Chief was abolished, and an Army Council was set up. It gave the Secretary of State a board of six advisers : four professional soldiers, each of them at the head of a great department, and two civilians, known as the financial and civil members. The duties of the Commander-in-Chief as regards inspection of troops were transferred to an Inspector-General of the Forces.
Next came the constitution of a General Staff, on principles which were established at a meeting of the Army Council on 9th August 1905. The Chief of the General Staff was authorized to proceed with its formation on 11th November 1905. Instructions for its organization were promulgated by a special Army Order of 12th September 1906. Such a body was a complete innovation in the British Army. The word " Staff " had been known for generations, but signified originally no more than the Department of the Commander-in-Chief as contrasted with
THE BRITISH ARMY 8
that of the Secretary of State for War — of the Horse Guards as distinguished from the War Office. This Staff, however, was an administrative one only ; there was no such thing as a Staff at Headquarters charged with such duties as are now associated with the name. Nor was the Headquarters Staff at the Horse Guards consulted as to military plans and operations. Its business was to pro- vide such trained men as the Cabinet required, not to advise as to their duties or their employment.
The General Staff came into being under the guidance of Mr. (later Lord) Haldane, who became Secretary of State for War in December 1905, and was charged with the duty of reorganizing the land forces not only of the country, but of the Empire.
The need of reform was urgent, for the Germans made little concealment of their intention to enter the lists for the domination of the world, and were not only perfecting vast military preparations, but quietly insinuating them- selves into the control of the most important financial and commercial undertakings of their neighbours. They had already established an elaborate system of espionage, and were abusing the hospitality of friendly States by organizing also a system of sabotage — that is to say, the destruction, by secret agents introduced in time of peace, of such im- portant means of communication as telegraph lines, rail- way junctions and bridges, and the like.^ Hitherto our ancient and glorious rival had been France ; but this new enemy lay to the east and not to the south ; and the eyes of those charged with the defence of the United Kingdom were now turned towards the North Sea instead of across the Channel.
There was now also a prospect that, in order to fulfil our treaty obligations, it might become necessary to land a force on the continent of Europe for the purpose of protecting the integrity of Belgium, and to operate in conjunction with the French and Belgian armies in case of a German attack on France which should involve the viola- tion of Belgian neutrality. Hitherto Britain had always
^ An assurance has been received from the Reichsarchiv that neither in the Marine Archiv (Navy Historical Section) nor in the MiUtary Section and the Espionage Section has anything of the nature of the sabotage system mentioned in the text been discovered. Doubtless the arrange- ments detected in the Empire were the work of irresponsible individuals. In any case, no harm was done in the United Kingdom ; for on declaration of war all suspected German agents, except one who was absent from England on a holiday, were arrested.
4 INTRODUCTION
depended upon a nominally voluntary army for service abroad ; but the numbers which could thus be raised were unlikely to be sufficient in an European war on a modern scale ; and to combine a voluntary with a compulsory system of recruiting at short notice seemed impracticable, even if Parliament could have been brought to assent to it. The problem presented to Mr. Haldane, therefore, was how to reorganize the existing forces so as to raise them to the highest point of efficiency, and to provide for their rapid expansion in time of need.
In the reorganization of 1908 the first step was to build up a General Staff which should be the brains of the army. Special care was taken to separate its work, as a department concerned with strategy and training, from that of the old Headquarters Staff, whose duties were purely administra- tive. The instruction for officers of all branches of the Staff was provided at the Staff College, Camberley, which was greatly enlarged, and at the Indian Staff College at Quetta, then recently founded by Lord Kitchener. From the graduates of these institutions officers for the General Staff and for the Adjutant-General's and Quartermaster-General's Departments were chosen. For the technical instruction of the Administrative Staff special arrangements were made at the London School of Economics for selected officers, including Staff College graduates, to be trained in such matters as business management and railway organization.
The initial difficulty of providing a reserve of officers was very great. Mr. Haldane turned to the universities to supplement the military colleges at Sandhurst and Woolwich by converting the Volunteer Corps which had long existed at our older universities into Officers' Training Corps.i In these, under the guidance of the General Staff and with the concurrence of the university authorities, practical military instruction was given not only to army candidates but to many students who did not intend entering the military profession as a career. Public schools which possessed Volunteer Corps were invited to convert them into contingents of the Officers' Training Corps ; whilst universities and schools which did not pos- sess such corps were encouraged to form them, and those which did so were given the privilege of nominating a
1 The idea of turning the University Volunteers into an Officers' Training Corps was suggested by Lord Lovat and others just after the conclusion of the South African War, but was not then taken up by the authorities.
THE BRITISH ARMY 5
certain number of boys for admission to Sandhurst without further examination.
In the Regular Army one great need of the mounted branches was a reserve of horses to make good the deficiencies on mobilization. This was supplied by taking a census of all horses in the kingdom, and obtaining statutory power to requisition all which were suitable for military purposes.
In the Artillery there was an insufficiency of ammuni- tion columns to meet the increased expenditure of ammuni- tion due to the introduction of quick-firing guns. The Garrison Artillery Militia was therefore turned into a Special Reserve, to be used primarily in the formation of these columns ; thirty-three Regular batteries, which had their full complement of guns but few men, were employed to train them. The general reserve of artillery was, by careful nursing, increased. By 1912 the number of batteries which could be mobilized for war had been increased from forty-two to eighty-one. The field artillery was gradually organized into brigades, each of three batteries and an ammunition column.
In the Infantry steps were taken to restore the observ- ance of the system, generally called after Lord Cardwell, that for every battalion abroad at least one should be at home. The balance had been upset as a consequence of the South African War and our rapid Imperial expansion. By the withdrawal of certain colonial garrisons, the proportion was eventually established at eighty-four battalions at home — including nine of Guards that did not come into the Cardwell system — and seventy-three abroad.
The Army Service Corps, reorganized in 1888, had proved itself so efficient in South Africa that it needed little more than such changes in organization as were entailed by the introduction of motor transport. In 1900 the War Office had appointed a Mechanical Transport Committee, and by 1911 two schemes were in operation, viz. (a) the Provisional Subsidy Scheme, by which civil vehicles could be requisitioned for military purposes, until through (b) the Main Subsidy Scheme the number of vehicles built to the War Office specifications for private owners should suffice to supply the needs of the Army. Both schemes were employed to furnish the necessary vehicles on mobilization in 1914. In 1912 the transport of the divisions and the cavalry was reorganized. The horsed baggage and supply wagons were grouped into Train companies, leaving only first line or fighting trans-
6 INTRODUCTION
port with regimental units. For each division there was formed a divisional supply column of motor lorries, whose business it was to bring up rations to a point where the supply sections of the divisional Train could refill, and, if possible, to take back sick and wounded.
In the Medical Services of the Army many important changes were made in organization, training and adminis- tration.^ They were due not only to the experience gained in the South African War, but to the lessons learnt from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, and to the revision of the Geneva Convention in 1906, which afforded a new basis for the organization of voluntary aid. In the place of the bearer companies and field hospitals each division and the cavalry division were provided with self-contained field ambulances, and a new echelon — the clearing hospital — was introduced to facilitate the rapid evacuation of wounded, which was to be the great feature of the new system. Motor transport, though proposed in 1908, was only introduced on a very meagre scale, suflftcient for peace purposes. The Army Nursing Service was put on a firm basis. Under the auspices of an Army Medical Board, of which eminent civilian specialists were members, sanitation, measures for prevention of disease, inoculation, and the provision of pure water, received special attention. To keep the medical service in touch with the General Staff, officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps were appointed to special sections of the Directorates of Military Operations and Military Training. The medical service of the Territorial Force was organized similarly to that of the Regular Army, and large provision made for the formation of hospitals in time of war and the organization of voluntary aid.
The Militia was renamed Special Reserve, to indicate what it had long been in practice — a depot for feeding the Regular Army.
The Regular Army, or First Line, was reorganized into an Expeditionary Force consisting of six divisions of all arms and one cavalry division. Each of the six divi- sions comprised three infantry brigades, or twelve battalions altogether, with divisional mounted troops, artillery, engineers, signal service, supply and transport train, and field ambulances. The total war establishment of each division was thus raised to some 18,000 of all ranks and
^ They will be found described in detail in " History of the Great War, Medical Services, General History," and are therefore enumerated here very briefly.
THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 7
descriptions, of whom 12,000 were infantry, with 24 machine guns, and 4,000 artillery, with seventy-six guns (fifty-four 18-pdrs. ; eighteen 4-5-inch howitzers ; and four 60-pdrs.). The Cavalry Division comprised four brigades of three regiments each, and cavalry divisional troops, consisting of artillery, engineers, signal service and medical units. ^ The strength was some 9,000 of all ranks and 10,000 horses, with twenty-four guns (13-pdrs.) and twenty-four machine guns. Although the nucleus of one corps staff was maintained in time of peace, at Aldershot, and corps had been formed at manoeuvres, it was not originally intended to have any intermediate echelon between General Headquarters and the six divisions. The decision to form corps was — in order to conform to French organization — made immediately on the formal appointment on mobilization of Field - Marshal Sir John French as Commander-in-Chief. Thus it happened that two out of the three corps staffs had to be improvised ; even for each division four staff officers had to be found, as the Peace Establishment contained only two out of the six of the War Establishment. None the less, the organization of the Expeditionary Force was a great step forward in the preparation of the army for war.
The Yeomanry became the second line of cavalry, and was reorganized into fourteen brigades.
The Volunteers were treated according to the precedent of Castlereagh, who had invited them to convert themselves into Local Militia, on pain of disbandment. So, too, Mr. Haldane bade them either become Territorial troops or cease to exist, Mr. Haldane further reverted to the old policy of decentralization, and entrusted the raising and administration of the Territorial Force to the County Lieutenancies, renamed Territorial Associations, under the Presidency of the Lords Lieutenant. The only difference between the schemes of the two statesmen was that Castlereagh insisted upon compulsory personal service, under the ballot, for the Local Militia, whereas Mr. Haldane did not — or rather, in the prevailing temper of Parliament, could not — do the same for the Territorial Force. This force, whose establishment was something over 300,000 strong, was organized upon exactly the same lines as the Regular Army. Its units were grouped into fourteen divisions, commanded by major-generals of the Regular Army, with small Regular staffs.
^ The 5th Cavalry Brigade was left independent.
8 INTRODUCTION
The old Militia Garrison Artillery was replaced by Territorial Coast Artillery. The field artillery of Terri- torial divisions was armed with 15-pounder guns converted into quick-firers, and 5-inch howitzers used in the South African War ; its heavy artillery consisted of 4-7-inch guns. Thus none of its armament was modern.
So much for the reorganization of the Territorial Forces on paper. Unfortunately, before 1914, both Special Reserve and Territorial troops sank so far below their establishment as to cause some anxiety at headquarters ; but it was not doubted that many old Territorials would rejoin the force at the approach of danger, and this con- fidence proved to be well justified. It was not anticipated that the Territorials would be ready for the field in less than six months after mobilization ; but since they would have at least some training, and as their organization was identical with that of the First Line, they could be em- ployed to reinforce the Regular Army, either by units or by complete divisions, as they became ready.
It had been Mr. Haldane's intention to make the County Associations the medium for indefinite expansion of the forces in case of need. The rough plans for such expansion were actually blocked out, some of the Associations possess- ing, in whole or in part, the machinery for carrying the plan into effect. But the scheme had not yet received statutory sanction, and had not been worked out in detail. Meanwhile, the County Associations justified Mr. Haldane's faith in them, and their zeal and ability were of the utmost value to the War Office and the country.
The first textbook issued after the South African War for the instruction of the army was " Combined Training," dated 1902, written by the late Colonel G. F. R. Hender- son. This, in 1905, became Part I. of "Field Service Regulations." In 1909 the book was superseded by the issue of " Field Service Regulations — Part I. (Operations)," while " Part II. (Organization and Administration)" was published for the first time. These manuals dealt with the general principles governing the employment of the army in war.
Individual training — that is, the physical training, including route marching, bayonet fighting, musketry, signalling, scouting, and generally the education of the individual in his duties and the use of his arms — was carried on during the winter ; this gave place in the spring to the training by units, first of squadrons, companies and
THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 9
batteries ; next of cavalry regiments, infantry battalions and artillery brigades ; then of cavalry and infantry brigades, first alone and secondly in conjunction with other arms ; and lastly of divisions ; the whole culminated in inter-divisional exercises and army manoeuvres.
The great feature of the training for the attack and counter-attack was combination of fire and movement. Ground was gained as the enemy was approached by rushes of portions of a battalion, company or platoon, under cover of the fire of the remainder and of the artillery. By this procedure, a strong firing line was built up some 200 yards from the enemy ; when fire superiority had been attained an assault was delivered. An attacking force was divided into firing line and supports, with local reserves, and the advance was often made in parallel lines in extended order ; but the form was essentially elastic and adapted to the ground, with the definite objects of maintaining control, utilizing such cover as was available, and presenting as difficult a target as possible to the enemy.^
IVIobilization was regularly practised. Every winter certain units were brought up to war establishment in the prescribed manner, the reservists and horses required to complete them being represented by men and animals from other units. In 1910 one of the two Aldershot divisions was mobilized at the expense of the other and by volunteers from the 1st Class Army Reserve, and so was able to take part in the manoeuvres at war establishment. Not only fighting units, but also such branches as the Ordnance and the Postal Service were represented at manoeuvres, and their work was carried on under conditions approximating to those of active service.
All these reforms were pushed forward under the in- evitable disadvantages which have ever hampered the British Army. Recruits were dribbling in at all times of the year. Trained instructors were being withdrawn for attachment to the auxiliary forces, and drafts of trained men were constantly leaving their battalions during the autumn and winter for India. The commanders, again,
^ The soundness of the principle of the combination of fire and move- ment was abundantly proved during the war ; but, as experience was gained, it was found that there was no role for " supports " of the kind laid down in the pre-war manuals ; reinforcing a line already stopped by casualties merely meant increasing losses without corresponding gain ; it became apparent that the proper employment of " local reserves " was to exploit local successes, and to fill defensively gaps in an attacking line that had been brought to a standstill.
10 INTRODUCTION
could never tell whether their next campaign might not be fought in the snows of the Himalayas, the swamps and bush of Africa or the deserts of Egypt — a campaign in Europe hardly entered into their calculations. It was practically impossible for the General Staff to keep abreast of the detailed information required as to possible theatres of war. Nevertheless, British regimental officers, to use their own expression, " carried on," although confronted with two changes uncongenial to many of the older men among them : the cavalry was trained to an increasing extent in the work of mounted infantry, and was armed with a rifle instead of a carbine ; and the Regular infantry battalions were organized into four companies instead of eight.
In every respect the Expeditionary Force of 1914 was incomparably the best trained, best organized, and best equipped British Army which ever went forth to war.^ Except in the matter of co-operation between aeroplanes and artillery, and use of machine guns, its training would stand comparison in all respects with that of the Germans.^ Where it fell short of our enemies was first and foremost in numbers ; so that, though not " contemptible," it was almost negligible in comparison with continental armies, even of the smaller States. ^ In heavy guns and howitzers, high-explosive shell,^ trench mortars, hand-grenades,^ and
1 For the Order of Battle and organization of the British Expeditionary Force, see Appendices 1 and 2.
2 The German General Staff in 1912 considered it an " ebenbiirtiger Gegner " — man for man as good as their own. (Kuhl, " Der deutsche Generalstab," p. 87.)
3 The following, which is translated from the German Admiralty Staff's "Der Krieg zur See 1914-1918 : Nordsee," 1. p. 82, is of interest in this connection :
" The Supreme Command made no demands whatever on the Navy to stop or delay the British transports. On the contrary, it seemed not to place much value on the action of the efficient (wertvoll) but numerically weak Expeditionary Corps. In any case, when at the beginning of the war Frigate-Captain Heydel of the Operations Section was sent by the Admiralty to inquire if the Army laid stress on the interruption of the transport of troops, the Chief of the General Staff personally replied that the Navy should not allow the operations that it would otherwise carry out to be interfered with on this account ; it would even be of advantage if the Armies in the West could settle with the 160,000 English at the same time as the French and Belgians. His point of view was shared by many during the favourable commencement of the offensive in the West."
* No high-explosive shells were provided for the 18-pdr. and 13-pdr. field guns ; but for the 60-pdr. and 4-5-inch field howitzer a proportion of the rounds carried in the field was high explosive : for the former 30 per cent and for the latter one-third (2 shrapnel to 1 H.E.).
^ There was a service hand-grenade, but it was a complicated one, with a long shaft, which proved unsuitable in trench warfare, and a single one cost £1:1:3.
THE NATIONAL RESERVE 11
much of the subsidiary material required for siege and trench warfare, it was almost wholly deficient. Further, no steps had been taken to instruct the army in a knowledge of the probable theatre of war or of the German army, except by the publication of a handbook of the army and of annual reports on manoeuvres and military changes. Exactly the same, however, was done in the case of the armies of all foreign States. The study of German military organization and methods w^as specifically forbidden at war games, staff tours, and intelligence classes, which would have provided the best opportunities for such instruction. ^
The last of the preparations for defence which requires mention here is the formation of the National Reserve, initiated by private enterprise in August 1910 with the approval of the Secretary of State for War and the Army Council. Its object was to register and organize all officers and men who had served in and left any of the military or naval forces of the Crown, with a view to increasing the military strength of the country in the event of imminent national danger. The National Reserve was divided into two classes : ^ one to reinforce existing units of the Regular Army, and the other to fill up vacancies in the Territorial Force, to strengthen garrisons, guard vulner- able points, or perform any other necessary military duties either as specialists or fighting men. By 1914, the National Reserve numbered about 350,000. On mobilization many of the members rejoined military and naval service ; the remainder formed eventually the nucleus of the Royal Defence Corps.
As regards the other military Forces of the Empire, in 1907 there was a conference of Dominion Premiers in London, and the opportunity was seized to make the General Staff an Imperial one. Britain offered to train officers of the Overseas Dominions at the Staff Colleges, and to send out staff officers of her own as servants of the Dominion Governments. It was urged that there should be in all the forces of the Empire uniformity of armament
1 Ignorance of the German Army proved a serious handicap in the early part of the campaign. British soldiers imagined that every German wore a spiked helmet, so that Jager, who wore a kind of shako, and cavalrymen in hussar busbies and lancer caps were mistaken for French- men or Belgians ; machine-gun crews, carrying their weapons into action with the trestle legs turned back, were thought to be medical bearers with stretchers, and were not fired on.
2 See " National Reserve Regulations," issued with Special Army Order, March 7, 1913.
12 INTRODUCTION
and organization. The Dominions cordially welcomed these proposals. The Imperial General Staff was formed and unity of organization was established. The Dominions reserved to themselves the right of deciding whether to participate with their forces in the event of hostilities outside their own territories.
In India, the reorganization of the army on modern lines into nine divisions, six cavalry brigades and a certain number of independent brigades by Lord Kitchener in 1903, was designed to meet the Russian menace and make India independent of assistance from overseas for twelve months. As a consequence of the Anglo-Russian Agree- ment in 1907, and the state of Indian finances, this re- organization was never completed. The " Army in India Committee " of 1912-13 recommended that the field army should consist of seven divisions, five cavalry brigades and certain army troops, a force sufficient to deal with Afghanistan and the frontier tribes combined, till rein- forcements could arrive. This was the authorized Field Army when war broke out in 1914, but even this had not been provided with all its mobilization equipment. No troops were maintained for the specific purpose of war outside the Indian sphere. Not till August 1913 was the Government of India invited to consider the extent to which India would be prepared to co-operate with the Imperial Forces in the event of a serious war between Britain and an European enemy. It was agreed that the Army Council might count upon two — possibly three — divisions and one cavalry brigade. Actually in 1914, as will be seen, two infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions were sent to France, a division to the Persian Gulf, the equivalent of the infantry of two divisions to Egypt, besides minor detachments, and all but eight battalions of British infantry were withdrawn from India, their places being filled by British Territorial troops. But no measures were taken to make India the Eastern military base of the British Empire by the provision of arsenals and the development of the industrial resources of the country for war purposes, except in certain minor items. ^
The supreme direction of war in England, which originally lay in the sovereign, and was actually exercised
^ Field artillery ammunition and rifles in small quantities, small-ariit ammunition, certain vehicles, boots, saddles, harness.
THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE 13
by William III., passed after that monarch's death to the principal Ministers, and has remained with the Cabinet, or a group within the Cabinet, ever since. Up to 1904 no precedent had ever been set for the formation of a Council of War or of any standing advisory body for the Cabinet in naval and military matters in view of an outbreak of war.
In 1895, however, a Defence Committee of the Cabinet was formed which, after some changes in 1902, was finally turned by Mr. (later Lord) Balfour in 1904 into the Committee of Imperial Defence. It was then placed under the direct control of the Prime Minister, and a Secretariat was pro- vided to record its deliberations and decisions, to collect information, to outline plans necessary to meet certain contingencies, and to ensure continuity of policy.
Much good work was done by the Committee in various directions. Full measures were thought out in 1909 for counteracting any hostile system of espionage and sabotage, the Official Secrets Act being amended in 1911 to give the Government greater powers. An amendment of the Army Act in 1909 also gave authority to billet troops in time of emergency. Lastly, the essential steps to be taken im- mediately upon the outbreak of war were all studied ex- haustively, and a distribution of the consequent duties among the various departments, even among individual officials, was arranged in the minutest detail, so that there should be no delay and no confusion. The results of these preparations, and the regulations finally laid down, were embodied in a " War-book," and all essential documents were prepared beforehand, so that they might be signed instantly, the very room in which the signature should take place being fixed and a plan showing its exact position attached to the documents.
Altogether, Britain had never entered upon any war with anything approaching such forwardness and fore- thought in the preparation of the scanty military resources at the disposal of the War Office. The Committee of Imperial Defence was still, however, only an advisory body possessing no administrative or executive functions.
From 1911 onward the French and British Staffs had worked out in detail a scheme for the landing of the Expeditionary Force in France, and for its concentra- tion in the area Maubeuge — Le Cateau — Hirson, but, though there was an " obligation of honour," there was no definite undertaking to send the whole or any part
14 INTRODUCTION
of this force to any particular point, or, in fact, anywhere at all.^
FRANCE
(Sketches 1 & 2; Maps 1 & 2)
For France the problem of defence against her eastern neighbour was a very difficult one. The frontier had no natural protection, both banks of the Rhine and the crest of the Vosges being in German hands, and the population of France was not only smaller than Germany's, but steadily sinking in comparison. She first sought to assist the solution of the problem by creating great fortified regions along her borders, alternating with selected gaps. Thus, from the Swiss frontier to Epinal there were roughly forty miles of fortification ; from Epinal to Toul a space of forty miles — the well-known Trouee de Charmes — was left undefended ; from Toul to Verdun was another forty miles of fortification ; and from Verdun to the Belgian frontier another gap of thirty miles. In second line were the second- class fortresses of Besan9on, Dijon, Langres, Rheims, and Laon ; and in rear of them again the entrenched camps of
^ The first steps in the elaboration of the British scheme were taken in 1906, as a result of a conversation between Major-Gen. (afterwards Lieut. -Gen. Sir James) Grierson, then Director of Military Operations at the War Oflice, and Colonel Huguet, then military attache at the French Embassy in London. The studies were pursued by General Grierson and his successors, Major-Gen. (later Lieut. -Gen. Sir) J. Spencer Ewart and Br.-Gen. (later Field-Marshal Sir Henry) Wilson, with the authority of the Prime Ministers, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and Mr Asquith, under the reserve that in no case should they constitute an engagement for the British Government.
Similar arrangements of a non-binding nature had been made between the Italian and German General Staffs for Italy to assist Germany in certain circumstances, by " strengthening the German Western Armies " by the despatch of an Army, and the holding of French forces, if only " small ones, to the Alpine frontier. The Italian fleet should, together " with the Austro-Hungarian, form a counter- weight to the French Medi- *' terranean fleet." (G.O.A. i. p. 20.)
An account of the steps which led to the British General Staff being given permission by the Government to enter into relations with the French General Staff will be found in " The Quarterly Review " of April 1932, in an article, entitled " The Entente-Cordiale and the Military Conversations," by Major-Gen. Sir George Aston.
There was no arrangement with Belgium of any kind, her Government having made it clear that they would maintain strict neutrality, opposing with all the Belgian forces France or Germany, if either violated the frontier, or any third Power interested who might land troops in Belgium, or try to use Belgian territory as a base of operations. See the article " The Belgian Conversations of 1912 " by Professor Emile Cammaerts in " The Contemporary Review " of July 1933.
SKETCH 2.
THE CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMIES.
AUGUST 1914
NORTH Z,-^-
GERMAN ARMIES GREEN
fRSSCH ARMIES BtUe
BBLOIAN ARMY BROWN
B:B.P. CONCKSTSATWN ARBA RED
y'"'\
Origmal potitimi of Prmch l^ft «n Vlan 17 : ;
OBesanfOD •' X I
..J
SCALE OF MILES
20 10 O
-fa
±1
80 too i 1
Ordnance Survey, 1924..
307S/J3.
THE FRENCH ARMY 15
Lyons and Paris. There were no modern fortifications on the Franco-Belgian frontier, but La Fere, Maubeuge, and Lille were defended by old-fashioned detached forts.
The steadily aggressive attitude of Germany justified the uneasiness of France. In 1882 Germany formed a Triple Alliance with Augtria and Italy. In 1890 France responded by an Alliance with Russia. In 1891 Germany emphasized her hostile bearing by renewing the Triple Alliance ; while in 1899 she rejected the Tsar's proposal for a limitation of armaments. In 1905, 1911, and 1912 she made important additions to her army, raising its strength to twenty-five active corps, as against the fifteen with which she had taken the field in 1870 ; and behind these twenty- five she had nearly an equal number of Reserve corps. ^ On 30th June 1913 the total number of men with the colours in peace was raised from 711,000 to 856,000 ; this not only made the army the readier for an attaque brusquee, so much dreaded by the French, but assured a substantial corresponding increase in the effectives of reserve formations.
France could only reply by reimposing the term of three years with the colours, which in 1905 she had reduced to two years. This signified an augmentation of 220,000 men to her peace strength. But, even so, France had at the outbreak of war, roughly speaking, only three millions and a half of trained men, whereas Germany had over five millions ; ^ and, moreover, Germany's reserve forma- tions were more completely organized than those of the French.
The French Army in peace was composed of ten cavalry divisions ; twenty-one army corps, each corps area also furnishing in war a Reserve division ^ and certain Territorial brigades ; and a Colonial Corps.
On mobilization, according to the plan in force in
^ See page 21.
2 G.O.A., K.U.K., i. p. 219, puts the French trained strength at 5,007,000, and total available at 5,940,000 !
F.O.A., i. (i.) p. 52, gives the theoretical mobilizable strength (with 680,000 reinforcements in the depots) for service in France at 3,580,000. This total does not take into account all of the coloured troops : including these the mobilizable streng^th realized was 3,683,000 (" Commission de I'Armee," p. 203, by General Pedoya, President of the Senate Commis- sion of the Army during the war).
^ The Reserve divisions were numbered by adding 50 to the army corps number up to the 71st : thus the I. Corps area provided the 51st Reserve Division. The word " Reserve " was dropped in June 1915, after which date the divisions were known by their numbers only. The XIX. Corps was in Algeria.
16 INTRODUCTION
1914/ these forces formed five Armies, with seven divisions of cavalry, and a cavalry corps of three divisions. The Reserve divisions were grouped into pairs, threes, or fours, and allotted either to Armies or defences, or kept at the disposal of General Headquarters.^
Whilst the British and Germans had a charger-loading (5 cartridges) rifle, the French infantry had a magazine rifle with 8 cartridges in the butt ; these fired it became a single-loader. On the other hand the French field gun was a true " Q.F.," with a rate of fire almost double that of the British or German ; but, again, the French corps and divisions had no howitzers or heavy guns, and only a few groups of heavy guns of small range under Army control. In all a French Active corps had 28 battalions and 120 field guns ; a German, 24 battahons, 108 field guns, and 52 howitzers (4-2 or 5-9-inch). Map 2. The zones of concentration selected in peace for the
Sketch 2. five Armies were, commencing as usual on the right :
First Army (General Dubail) — Region of Epinal.
Second Army (General de Castelnau) — Region of Nancy.
Third Army'(General Ruffey) — Region of Verdun.
Fifth Army (General Lanrezac) — Between Verdun (exclusive)
and Mezieres, with a detachment east of the INIeuse. Fourth Army (General de Langle de Gary) — In general reserve
in region Sainte Menehould — Commercy. On either flank was a group of Reserve divisions :
On the right — a group of four Reserve divisions — Region of Belfort.
On the left — a group of three Reserve divisions (General Valabregue) — Vervins.
The French Staff in choosing the areas of concentration were in face of the following facts. At Metz there was an immense German entrenched camp touching the frontier, and connected by four main lines of railway with the heart of Germany. From this a sudden blow — the attaque brusqiiee — could be easily struck with all the force of perfect organization ; it was imperative to take measures to parry it. On the other hand, the German school of strategy favoured envelopment from one or both flanks. This in a war with France signified, indeed, violation either
1 Known as Plan XVII. ; the text is given in Appendix 9. The eariier plans and the origin of Plan XVII. will be found in F.O.A., i., chapters i. and ii.
* For the Order of Battle and organization of the French Armies see Appendices 3 and 4.
THE FRENCH PLAN 17
of Belgian or of Swiss neutrality, or of both ; but Germany- was not likely to be squeamish about such matters. Such violation might not go beyond a peaceable passage of troops across a corner of the neutral territory, yet still might suffice for the aggressor's purpose of turning a flank.
To meet menaces so different in kind as direct attack in the centre and envelopment on the flanks, the French General Staff decided to take the offensive and to con- centrate facing the Eastern frontier, trusting to fortifica- tions and to covering troops to gain sufficient time to move the mass of the army elsewhere if required. It was intended to attack as soon as possible with all forces united : the First and Second Armies south of Metz, and the Fifth north of it ; the Third Army was to connect these two main attacks and arrange for the investment of Metz as they progressed. The employment of the Fourth Army depended on the action of the enemy ; if the Germans moved into Luxembourg and Belgium, it was to co-operate with the Fifth Army ; if the enemy merely covered the common frontier, it was to go to the support of the right attack. A detachment of the First Army (one corps and one cavalry division) was detailed in the plan to carry out a special operation on the extreme right in Alsace, with the object of holding any enemy forces which might attempt to advance on the western slopes of the Vosges, and of assisting in the removal of that part of the population which had remained faithful to France. It was hoped by the general offensive movement at any rate to dislocate the plans of the enemy, wrest the initiative from him, and, if he were moving through Belgium, strike a mortal blow at his communications.
No provision, it will be noticed, was made to meet an envelopment carried out through Belgium west of the Meuse, or to cover the gap between the western flank of the Fifth Army and the sea, in which there were only local Territorial troops and a few old fortresses incapable of offering serious resistance to any invader. The informa- tion at the disposal of the French General Staff appeared to indicate that the Germans would attack from Metz, and had not sufficient troops to extend their front west of the Meuse. Beyond arranging for an alternative concentration of the Fourth and Fifth Armies should the enemy enter Luxembourg and Belgium, there was no preparation against a wide enveloping movement.
On mobilization, General Joffre, vice-president du Cori'
VOL. I c
18
INTRODUCTION
seil supSrieur de la guerre et chef de VJ^tat Major General, was appointed Commandant en Chef of the French Armies, with General Behn as Chief of the Staff.
The approximate strength of the Armies (with the Reserve divisions on the flanks included in the totals of the nearest Army) was, in round numbers, after certain exchanges had taken place (viz. the transfer of two corps and two Reserve divisions from Fifth Army to Fourth, of one corps from Second to Fifth, etc.) ^ : —
First Army Second Army Third Army Fourth Army Fifth Army
256,000 men 200,000 „ 168,000 193,000 254,000
1,071,000 men
BELGIUM «
In 1914 the Belgian Army consisted of a Field Army organized in six divisions and a cavalry division, and fortress troops which formed the garrisons of Antwerp, Liege and Namur. Antwerp was the great fortress of Belgium, the final refuge and rallying point of her forces and population in case of invasion by a powerful enemy. Its defences originally consisted of a strong enceinte, i.e. a continuous inner ring of fortification, and a girdle of forts, some two miles from the town, finished in 1868. Though a second girdle of forts and redoubts outside the first had been gradually added from 1882 onwards, the line was incomplete, there were several gaps and intervals in it, and it was on the average only some eight miles from the town, an altogether insufficient distance under modern conditions. Nor was the construction of the forts, although improvements were in progress, capable of resisting modern heavy artillery; notwithstanding that the guns were pro- tected by armour (cupolas and tourelles), the fact that they were inside the forts, which were conspicuously upstanding, and not in well concealed batteries outside, made them easy
1 See footnote, page 40.
* The details of the operations of the Belgian Army are taken from the official account : " L' Action de I'Armee Beige. Periode du 31 juillet au 31 dccembre 1914," which has since been translated as " Military " Operations of Belgium. Report compiled by the Belgian General Statf " for the period July 31st to December 31st, 1914 " (London, Collingridge, Is. net). For the Order of Battle see Appendix 5.
THE BELGIAN ARMY 19
targets. The same remarks as regards construction apply- to the defences of Liege and Namur ; these fortresses were " barrier forts and bridgeheads " on the Meuse ; they constituted the first line of Belgium's resistance, and were designed to guard the approaches into Belgium from the east and south-east, and hinder any force from crossing the Meuse either from France into Germany or Germany into France. They were never intended to be defended a outrance and depended on field troops for the defence of the intervals between the forts. At Huy on the Meuse between Namur and Liege there was an ancient fort, which at best might secure sufficient time for the destruction of the railway bridges and tunnel situated there.
The reorganization of the Belgian Army authorized by the Government in 1912, had barely begun to take effect. In accordance with this a force of 350,000 men was to be formed: 150,000 for the Field Army, 130,000 for the fortress garri- sons, and 70,000 for reserve and auxihary troops. But these numbers would not in the ordinary course have been available until 1926. Actually in August 1914 only 117,000 could be mobihzed for the Field Army, and a smaller proportion for the other categories.
The six divisions were stationed in peace so that at short notice they could quickly confront any enemy, were he Germany, France, Great Britain or Holland : 1st Division around Ghent ; 2nd Division, Antwerp ; 3rd Division around Liege ; 4th Division, Namur and Charleroi ; 5th Division around Mons ; 6th Division, Brussels ; and Cavalry Division, Brussels. Thus the 1st Division faced England ; the 3rd, Germany ; the 4th and 5th, France ; and they were intended to act as general advanced guards as occasion arose and gain time for the movements of the other divisions to the threatened area.
On the ordinary peace footing only part of the recruit contingent was with the colours, so that in case of danger of war, the Belgian Army had first to recall men on un- limited leave, in order to raise its forces to " reinforced peace establishment," the ordinary strength of the units of the Continental Powers, and then to complete the numbers by mobilizing reservists. Thus not only was Belgium normally less ready than most nations, but she was in the throes of reorganization, and could not put into the field even as many men as the British Regular Army.
20 INTRODUCTION
GERIHANYi
From 1815 to 1860, the Prussian Army had practically remained stationary in numbers, with a peace strength of 150,000 men formed in eight Army Corps, maintained by a yearly contingent of 40,000 recruits, who served three years with the colours. One of the first acts of Wilhelm I. on coming to the throne in January 1860 was, in opposition to the wishes of his Legislature, to raise the annual con- tingent to 63,000, and the peace strength to 215,000. From thence onwards there was a steady increase of the Prussian military forces.
The war of 1866 made Prussia head of the North German Confederation, whilst Hesse-Darmstadt, Wiirt- temberg, Bavaria and Baden were bound to place their armies at the disposal of Prussia in time of war. In 1870, in addition to her original eight corps, she was able after arrangements with the other States to put into the field the Guard, IX., X. (Hanoverian), XI., and XII. (Saxon), and /. and II. Bavarian Corps, and eventually the XIII. (Wiirttemherg) and XIV. (Baden), with a war-strength of roughly 950,000.
The formation of the German Empire in 1871 made expansion still easier, for by the Constitution one per cent of the population could be in training under arms. The subsequent peace strengths were ^ : —
|
Cavalry |
Other |
One Year |
||||||
|
Divisions. |
Brigades. |
Offlcera. |
N.C.0'8. |
Ranks. |
Volunteers |
|||
|
1875 |
• |
37 |
38 |
17,213 |
53,956 |
347,703 |
7,000 |
|
|
1882 |
37 |
38 |
18,134 |
57,694 |
369,580 |
9,000 |
||
|
1888 |
39 |
39 |
19,294 |
61,867 |
406,542 |
10,000 |
||
|
1890 |
43 |
45 |
20,285 |
65,001 |
421,982 |
8,000 |
||
|
1893 |
43 |
46 |
22,458 |
77,864 |
479,229 |
9,000 |
||
|
1898 |
43 |
46 |
23,176 |
78,237 |
479,229 |
9,000 |
||
|
1902 |
48 |
46 |
24,292 |
80,985 |
495,500 |
11,000 |
||
|
1910 |
48 |
46 |
25,722 |
87,071 |
504,446 |
13,145 |
||
|
1911 |
48 |
46 |
25,880 |
88,292 |
507,253 |
14,000 |
||
|
1912 |
50 |
51 |
27,267 |
92,347 |
531,004 |
14,350 |
||
|
1914, |
Aug. |
50 |
55 |
30,459 |
107,794 |
647,793 |
16,000 |
|
|
(Sanctione( |
i) |
50 |
55 |
32,000 |
110,000 |
661,500 |
^ For the Order of Battle and organization of the German Forces see Appendices 6 and 7.
^ G.O.A., K.U.K., i. and tables in the Appendix volume.
The largest increase, it will be noticed, came after 1912. A project was put forward at the end of that year by the Chief of the General Staff, who stated, in view of the Balkan War, which had just broken out, that " the Army was not strong enough for the duties required of it " — which were to carry out the Schlieffen plan of campaign. The increase was
THE GERMAN ARMY 21
The approximate mobilizable strength was : —
Trained officers and men . . . 4,300,000 (5,020,700)1 Partially trained . . , . 100,000 —
Untrained 5,500,000 (5,474,000)
9,900,000 (10,494,700)
The Army was organized into 25 Active army corps Plate i. (50 divisions) — the Guard, I. to XXI., and /., //., ///. Bavarian ; and in each army corps district cadres were provided to form certain Reserve divisions (32), Ersatz divisions (7), Landwehr brigades and regiments (equivalent to 16 divisions), from the supernumeraries in the depots. There were also 11 cavalry divisions.
The plan on which this great force would be used on the Eastern and Western fronts could only be surmised. It will, so far as it is known, be given later ^ after the opening moves of the campaign have been developed and described.
Service in the German Army was divided into : — service in the Active (or Standing) Army (two years, but three in the cavalry and horse artillery) ; service in the Reserve (five years, but four in the cavalry and horse artillery) ; service in the Landwehr (eleven years). The Landsturm included youths between 17 and 20, too young for service in the Army, and trained and untrained men between 39 and 45, who were thus over the ordinary military age.
The original Reserve corps which took part in the August offensive were formed mainly of Reserve men super- numerary to the requirements of the Active Army, with some Landwehr ; but the Guard Reserve Corps contained an Active division, and others, e.g. the V., VI., VII. and IX., each contained an Active brigade, as the Active corps of these numbers had each in peace time an extra brigade ; others had similarly an Active regiment. Soon after declaration of war, additional Reserve divisions and corps were built up of volunteers (mainly youths under full military age and men not yet called up, etc.), with a sub- sanctioned by the Reichstag in June 1913. In the spring of 1914 a decision was made to introduce complete universal service, no one escaping it, in 1916. This would probably have doubled the strength of the German Army.
1 The figures in brackets are from G.O.A., K.u.K., i. p. 219 ; the original ones were calculated before the war by the British Intelligence Branch.
* See page 56.
22 INTRODUCTION
stantial nucleus of about 25 per cent of trained men of the older classes.^
The Ersatz brigades and divisions of 1914 were not formed from untrained men of the Ersatz Reserve,^ but from trained men supernumerary to the numbers required for the Active and Reserve formations. They were organized like the Reserve formations but had not the full establishment of machine guns, cavalry, or artillery, and were entirely without field kitchens, medical units, train and ammunition columns. They were therefore not equivalent to other brigades and divisions in open warfare.
The Landwehr units were formed of men who had com- pleted seven years with the Active Army and Reserve, and were under 39 years of age.
As the war went on, the significance of the various classifications largely disappeared, and Active, Reserve, Ersatz and Landwehr divisions contained men of all categories.
The French were at the outbreak of war dressed in their peace-time old-fashioned uniforms — the infantry in blue, with red trousers, and kepi ; the officers conspicuous by reason of their shorter coats ; " horizon-blue " was not intro- duced until 1915. The Belgian infantry wore dark blue, with blue-grey trousers, adopting khaki in 1915. The Germans wore " field-grey," with a cover of that colour on the spiked helmet or other cavalry or Jdger head-dress. The British were of course in khaki, and wore the flat peaked cap.
1 " Ypres 1914," p. 5.
* This consisted of men temporarily unfit, or fit and liable for military service but not called up for training either because they were super- numerary to the annual contingent, or for family reasons, or on account of minor physical defects.
CHAPTER I
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
(Sketches 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5 ; Maps 1, 2 & 5)
The record of the negotiations and of the diplomatic corre- spondence and conversations which took place after the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his Consort at Serajevo on the 28th June 1914 until the outbreak of war is available in an official publication.^ In this work the efforts of the British Government to bring about mediation and their determination to take no step that would contribute to precipitate war are made abundantly clear. It is therefore unnecessary here to allude to diplo- matic proceedings, except to show how military preparations were affected by them.
On the 27th July, the British Government judged the situation to be sufficiently serious to warrant them in countermanding the dispersal, then in progress, of the Home Fleets at the end of the exercises at sea which had followed a test mobilization. At 5 p.m. on the 28th, on which day Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, the First Fleet was ordered to proceed to its preliminary war station in the North ; ^ on the 29th, at 2 p.m., the Government further ordered the precautionary measures
^ " British Documents on the Origin of the War," xi., edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (H.M. Stationery Office). As narratives and as commentaries on these documents should be read : " The History " of Twelve Days, July 24th to August 4th 1914. Being an Account of the " Negotiations Preceding the Outbreak of War, based on Official Pub- " lications," by J. W. Headlam (T. Fisher Unwin), and " The Outbreak "of the War 1914-1918 : A Narrative based mainly on British Official " Documents," by Professor Sir Charles Oman (H.M. Stationery Office).
" The naval precautions taken will be found fully described in " The History of the War: Naval Operations," i., by Sir Julian Corbett.
According to the protocol in Document No. 10855 of the official diplo- matic papers of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pub- lished in eight volumes under the title of " Osterreich-Ungarns Aussen- poUtik vor der Bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914,"
23
24 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
arranged by the General Staff to meet an immediate prospect of war, to be put in force. These affected the Regular troops only, and included the recall of officers and men on leave and furlough, and the manning of all coast defences.
The Belgian Government decided to place their Army upon its " reinforced peace footing." ^
On the same day, the 29th, the British Ambassador at Berlin was asked by the German Chancellor to give assurance of England's neutrality if Russia should attack Austria and an European conflagration were to ensue. To this significant enquiry Sir Edward Grey, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, responded on the 30th by a refusal to entertain the proposal. Russia on this day issued orders for the mobilization of her four Southern Armies ; and Germany threatened that she would begin mobilization unless Russia ceased hers. News was also received of the Austrian bombardment of Belgrade. In order to avoid the possibility of a frontier incident the French Government ordered that no individual, no patrol, should under any pretext pass a line between Hussigny (on the Luxembourg frontier, east of Longwy) and Delle (on the Swiss frontier, south-east of Belfort), described by a precise enumeration of localities. This line was on an average 10 kilometres inside the frontier.^
on the 27th July Count Berchtold, the Foreign Minister, told Kaiser Franz Joseph, in order to induce him to sign the declaration of war against Serbia, that, " according to a report from the IV. Corps, Serbian troops " have fired from Danube steamers on the troops near Temesvar, and, on " this being replied to, a general action developed. Hostilities are there- " fore actually opened."
In the draft of the declaration of war this incident was given as one of the principal causes of its despatch. Count Berchtold, having obtained the Kaiser's signature, struck out the paragraph, reporting to him on the 29th (Document No. 11015) that he had done so, as "the reports of the " fighting near Temes Kirbin have not been confirmed. On tiie contrary, " only an isolated report of trifling firing near Gradiste [equally false]." Ilerr Emil Ludwig in " July 1914" asserts, with regard to the outbreak of war, that in Germany, " of the 2.3 documents susceptible of falsification, " the Government falsified 18," but " the worst liar was Count Berchtold."
^ See page 19.
2 F.O.A. i. (i.) p. 76. This particular order was repeated on 31st July with the addition : —
" This proliibition applies to the cavalry as well as to the other arms. " No patrol, no reconnoitring party, no post, no individual, must be east " of the said line. Anyone who crosses it will be liable to court-martial. " It is only permitted to transgress this order in case of a very definite "attack." {Ide7n,p. 81.) The restriction was withdrawn at 2 p.m. on the 2nd August on account of German violation of the French frontier. {Idem, p. 85.)
FRANCE AND GERMANY MOBILIZE 25
At 1 P.M. on the 30th July the " Berhn Lokalanzeiger " 30-3iJuly issued a special number (Extrablatt), announcing that i^i'*- mobilization had been ordered. The statement was soon contradicted, but it had been telegraphed to Petrograd and at 6 P.M., before contradiction arrived, Russia ordered general mobilization.^ On the 31st Austria followed suit, and decreed the full mobilization of her forces, whereupon Germany made a formal proclamation of " Imminent Danger of War " {drohende Kriegsgefahr), which enabled measures similar to those of the British " Precautionary Period " to be taken.^ At the same time Germany pre- sented an ultimatum to Russia to the effect that, unless she ceased mobilization within twelve hours, Germany herself would mobilize upon both frontiers. Significantly, Turkey also ordered mobilization on the 31st July.^ Sir Edward Grey, on the same day, sent an identic request to Germany and France enquiring whether they would respect Belgian neutrality. France immediately answered with an unequivocal affirmative ; Germany, however, sent only an evasive reply ; and on the 1st August both France and Germany ordered general mobilization.
The beginning of mobilization in France raised a serious
1 See Renouvin, " Les origines immediates de la Guerre," p. 146 ; General Danilov (Quartermaster General of the Russian Army), " Russland in Weltkrieg 1914-15," pp. 25-6 ; General Suchomlinov (VVar Minister), " Erinnerungen," pp. 365-7.
2 On the proclamation of drohende Kriegsgefahr, the following pre- cautionary measures had to be taken in all Army Corps districts : —
Protection of important railway structures : — bridges, tunnels, etc.
Recall from leave of all members of the Active army.
Recall of troops, if away, to their garrisons.
Control of railway and other traffic.
Execution of the measures laid down for protection of the frontier.
Move of garrisons of active troops and fighting equipment to the islands of the North Sea coast.
In addition, in the frontier districts : —
Guard of railway lines ; defence of large bridges and important railway junctions, air-ship sheds and establishments important to aircraft and radio-telegraphy against attempts at demolition, including attacks by air- craft ; removal of sick into the interior of the country.
" If a hostile attack is made before definite mobilization, or it is evident ' that such an attack is imminent, the Army Corps commanders must take ' all necessary measures to remove inland from the threatened districts and ' protect all men liable to service, and all men found fit for military service, ' as well as all serviceable horses. They must also, as far as possible, ' remove all material resources from reach of the enemy, particularly ' depots of supplies, the monies of the State, petrol. In case of necessity ' measures must be taken to destroy them." (Kindly furnished by the Reichsarchiv.)
3 The " 1st day of mobilization " was the 3rd August. The secret treaty of alliance between Turkey and Germany was signed at Berlin on the 2nd August.
26 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
1 Aug. question for Great Britain. There was, it is true, no 1914. definite agreement or understanding that she should send assistance to France, and the British Government was free to decide, untrammelled, for peace or war. But a scheme had been elaborated, in the event of certain contingencies, between the General Staffs of the two countries ; and an essential point in this scheme was that the first movement of the British advanced parties, stores and so forth, should begin on the first day of mobilization. Assuming this coin- cidence of movement and mobilization, it was reckoned that six divisions — or four, if six could not be spared — one cavalry division and one cavalry brigade could be transported from Great Britain to concentration areas between Avesnes and Le Cateau, and would be ready to advance thence on the fifteenth day after the order for mobilization had been issued.
That the British mobilization, if it should take place at all, would be later than the French was now obvious. The British General Staff therefore suggested that measures might be taken to ensure that, if mobilization should come after all, movement to France of the advanced parties, which could be warned at once, should be simultaneous with the issue of the order for it. Another important measure was the guarding of the lines of railway to the ports of embarkation. This duty had been assigned to certain units of the Territorial Force ; but these were about to proceed to camp for their annual training ; and, unless the orders for that training were cancelled, there might be delay in the despatch of the Expeditionary Force. The Government considered, however, that the counter- manding of the orders for Territorial training would be construed as not less menacing than the order for mobiliza- tion itself ; and they shrank from any measure which might seem to extinguish the last hope of peace.
At 12 noon on the 1st August, the German ultimatum to Russia expired, and a general conflagration became inevitable.^ The Cabinet at 2 p.m. on the 2nd cancelled the orders for Territorial training and at 6 p.m. those
^ The German declaration of war was delivered by the Ambassador at Petrograd, Count Pourtales, at 7 p.m on the 1st August ; he at the same time demanded his passports (Kautsky's " Die deutsche Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch," iii. pp. 50 and 83, which is confirmed by the Russian Orange Book). The Russian Foreign Minister, M. Sazonov, said to him, " You could have prevented war by a word ; you would not do so. In " all my efforts to preserve peace, I received not the slightest help from " you."
ACTION OF BELGIUM 27
for the Army manoeuvres, but still issued no orders for 2 Aug. mobilization.^ The Navy was quite ready for active service, ^^i'*- and the French Ambassador was given the assurance that " if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through " the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the " French coasts or shipping, the British Fleet Avill give all " the protection in its power." Beyond this conditional promise of naval intervention the Cabinet would not go without consulting Parliament. Parliament was consulted on the following day, the 3rd August ; but in the meanwhile a most momentous event had occurred.
Faithful to the obligations imposed upon her by treaty, Sketch i. Belgium on the 1st August had ordered her forces to be ^^^P ^' mobilized, and was preparing to resist violation of her territory from any quarter whatsoever ; but at seven o'clock in the evening of the 2nd the German Minister at Brussels presented a Note to the Belgian Government, requesting a reply within twelve hours. This Note had been drawn up by the Great General Staff as early as 26th July, and despatched under seal to the German Minister at Brussels on the 29th, with orders that it was not to be opened pending further instructions. It set forth that the German Government had certain intelligence of the intention of the French forces to march on the Meuse by Givet and Namur, and, in view of this attack, requested free and unresisted ingress for the German troops into Belgian territory. The Belgian Government replied that they would repel any attempt either of France or Germany upon Belgium ; and they also declined the help of France against any German encroachment until they should have made formal appeal to the Powers, Prussia among them, which had guaranteed Belgian neutrality.
Other important events on the 2nd August were that German troops crossed the Polish frontier, broke also into France at four different points, ^ and entered the territory of Luxembourg.^
^ At 10 A.M. on the 2nd the leaders of the Unionist party despatched by special messenger to the Prime Minister a letter assuring the Government " of the united support of the Opposition in all measures required by " England's intervention in the war."
^ They are enumerated in F.O.A. i. (i.), p. 83, which adds that " at " Petit Croix German cyclists fired on French custom house officers."
According to the lieichsarchiv : " There were transgressions of the " frontier by small detachments, contrary to the will of the High Command."
^ By the treaty of 1867 Prussia guaranteed the perpetual neutrality of Luxembourg ; by the Convention of ] 902 Germany re-insured the neutrality and contracted that the railways in the Grand Duchy which she exploited should not be used for the transport of her troops.
28 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
3 Aug. Sir Edward Grey had no accurate information as to the 1914. exact nature of the German ultimatum to Belgium when he met the House of Commons on the 3rd August. He was aware, however, of the crude fact that an ultimatum had been tendered, and, whilst coming down to the House, he had been informed that King Albert had telegraphed to King George invoking England's diplomatic intervention to safeguard the integrity of Belgium. He presented, in due order, the course of action he had pursued and the motives dictating it. The House of Commons, as it followed him, applauded his decision not to commit the country to armed intervention on account of the Serbian quarrel, but approved the conditional promise of the Fleet's aid to France, and grew enthusiastic when it heard that England would be true to her engagements to uphold the integrity of Belgium.
No resolution followed upon the speech of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. After the adjournment which followed it, towards 7 p.m., he was able to read to the House full information, received from the Belgian Legation, of the German Note that had been presented in Brussels. It left no doubt that a German attack was about to take place, if indeed it had not already begun.
The immediate measures taken were to announce that a moratorium would be proclaimed and that the Govern- ment would undertake the responsibility of maritime insurance. The Territorial Force was embodied and the Naval Reserves were called out. It was now clear that our mobilization must take place at least three days later than the French, and that, even so, movement could not be simultaneous with it. The Government, however, reckoned that by this delay they had gained more than they had lost by securing the unanimity, or approximate unanimity, of the nation and the benevolence of neutrals.
On the 3rd August, at 6.45 p.m., Germany declared war on France, making alleged violation of her frontier by patrols and of her territory by aviators a pretext.^ Italy,
* These allegations have since been admitted to have been false. See M. Poincare's " The Origins of the War," pp. 3 and 4.
G.O.A., i., p. 104 f.n. 2 and p. 105 f.n, 1, revives the charges, although Freiherr von Schoen, German Ambassador in Paris in 1914, in his book translated as " The Memoirs of an Ambassador," p. 201, has declared the alleged air attacks to be " merely the product of highly overwrought im- " agination." He adds : " How such false reports could have been given " the weight of facts in our responsible quarters, and of such momentous " facts, is inconceivable."
THE BRITISH PLANS 29
though a member of the Triple Alhance, declared that she 4-6 Aug would maintain her neutrality in the impending struggle. iQi-i--
Meanwhile Germany, unhampered by moral considera- tions, completed her arrangements for the invasion of Belgium. On the morning of the 4th August, she declared war on Belgium, and two of her cavalry divisions passed the frontier : in the afternoon the heads of infantry columns also entered Belgium.
Early in that same afternoon of the 4th August Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to the British Ambassador at Berlin instructing him to ask for his passports if no satis- factory answer were given regarding the observance of Belgium's neutrality by 12 midnight (11 p.m. Greenwich mean time). At 4 p.m. the British Government gave orders for the mobilization of the Army. At 12.15 a.m. on the morning of the 5th August, the Foreign Office issued the following statement :
Owing to the summary rejection by the German Govern- ment of the request made by His Majesty's Government for assurances that the neutrality of Belgium will be respected, His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin has received his passports and His Majesty's Government have declared to the German Government that a state of war exists between Great Britain and Germany as from 11 p.m. on the 4th August.
On the 5th and 6th August, two meetings, attended by the principal Ministers, including Lord Kitchener, who was at home on leave from Egypt and became Secretary of State for War on the 6th, and by the leading members of the Staffs of the Navy and Army of Britain, were assembled to consider the conduct of the war. The exact state of affairs at the moment was that Great Britain, France and Russia were at war with Germany ; that Belgium had been wantonly attacked but was making a better defence than had been expected ; that Austria was at war with Serbia only ; and that Italy was neutral. The main military questions to be decided were the employment and disposition of the Expeditionary Force, questions which were complicated by the delay in mobilization. It was determined first that the Force, less the 4th and 6th Divisions, should embark for the continent. In order to reduce the chance of a German landing in force interfering with this move, the Secretary of State decided that the 18th Brigade of the 6th Division, then at Lichfield, should move to Edinburgh, and two brigades of the 4th Division should
30 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
proceed to Cromer and York, in each case accompanied by some artillery. The 11th Brigade of the 4th Division was already at Colchester. Five cyclist battalions and eventually the Yeomanry Mounted Division were also sent to the East coast. The rest of the 6th Division was to remain in Ireland.
Then came the final decision as to the destination of the Expeditionary Force. In view of the attack on Belgium, had the British contingent been of a size adequate for independent operations of a substantial character, there would have been much to be said in favour of making Antwerp the base of its military operations ; but as it was so small, and as Antwerp, owing to part of the Schelde being Dutch territorial waters, would have to be reached overland after disembarkation at Ostend and other ports, and as operations in the north might involve separation from the French, the suggestion was not followed. There remained the area already considered with the French, narnely, that around Le Cateau and Avesnes. Certain military opinion, however, was against a concentration of the British forces in any area in advance of Amiens. Finally, after discussion as to the expansion of the army, it was agreed to leave the decision with our Alhes, the French ; ^ and the council broke up after passing three resolutions, namely — First, to embark ultimately five (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th), but for the present only four (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th) of the divisions and the Cavalry Division (plus the extra brigade) of the Expeditionary Force, to commence on the 9th ; Secondly, to bring home the Im- perial troops from South Africa ; Thirdly, to transport two Indian divisions to Egypt, but no further, and to urge the Governrnent of India to send a division to capture Dar es Salaam in German East Africa.
Through the efforts of Colonel Huguet, who as inter- mediary travelled backwards and forwards between Paris and London, it was settled that the Expeditionary Force should proceed to the zone selected in peace time by the
1 According to Marechal Joffre's official report to a Parliamentary Commission d'Enquete : " The directions for concentration did not " mention the place eventually reserved for the British Army. . . . Our " military arrangements with England had in fact a character which was " both secret and contingent {iventuel), and made it improper to mention " them in such a document. ... In the event of its arrival, its employment " was looked for at the place which should be logically reserved for it, on the " left of the line of the French Armies, which it would thus prolong." " La preparation de la guerre et la conduite des operations," par Le Marechal Joffre, p. 21.
PROGRESS OF EVENTS 31
French Staff, with some slight modification, but according 4 Aug. to the British time table. General Joffre's request, that i^i"*- at least one British division should be sent over as rapidly as possible to take its place in the line, Lord Kitchener refused on the grounds that any alteration of the plan of transport would cause confusion and, in the end, delay.
To Field - Marshal Sir John French, who had been selected to command the Expeditionary Force, special instructions as to his co-operation with the French were issued by the Secretary of State for War.^
Lieut. -General Sir Douglas Haig was appointed to com- mand the I. Corps ; Lieut. -General Sir James Grierson, the II. Corps ; Lieut. -General W. P. Pulteney, the III. Corps ; and Major-General E. H. H. Allenby, the Cavalry Division. The six divisions were to be commanded by Major-Generals S. H. Lomax, C. C. Monro, H. I. W. Hamilton, T. D'O. Snow, Sir C. Fergusson and J. L. Keir.
PROGRESS OF EVENTS
At 4 P.M. on the 4th August, as already stated, the order for mobilization of the Expeditionary and Territorial Forces was issued by the British Government, the 5th August being declared " the first day of mobilization." As a matter of fact, mobilization occurred at an extremely awkward moment, for the 3rd August had been Bank Holiday and, as usually is the case in the middle of summer. Territorial units were in the act of moving to various camps for their annual training when the orders cancelling it arrived. Hence arose the question whether the existing time-tables for concentration should stand, or whether the movements by railway should be postponed. The Cabinet decided for a short postponement, and gave orders, as already men- tioned, that the embarkation of the Expeditionary Force should not begin until the 9th, although " the advanced parties " were to proceed on the 7th. Meantime the mobilization of the various units proceeded with the smoothness which had been anticipated. In all essentials everything went " according to plan " ; and even the task of collecting 120,000 horses was accomplished within twelve days. Embarkation was conducted upon the principle that every train-load should be a complete unit or subdivision of a unit, so that upon arrival in France after its passage, it should be self-contained and in possession
^ Appendix 8.
32 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
of enough transport to go straight into a rest-camp or into another train. The ports of embarkation were as follows :
Southampton — all troops in Great Britain ; Avon- mouth — motor transport and petrol ; Newhaven — stores and supplies ; Liverpool — frozen meat and motor transport ; Glasgow — a few details ; and Dublin, Cork and Belfast for the 5th and 6th Divisions.
The ships were also divided into classes : (1) personnel ships ; (2) horse and vehicle ships ; (3) motor transport ships ; (4) store ships.
The ports of disembarkation in France were : Havre, Rouen and Boulogne.
In the five days of greatest activity 1,800 special trains were run in Great Britain and Ireland ; on the busiest day of all, eighty trains, containing the equivalent of a division, were run into Southampton Docks ; the daily average of ships despatched was thirteen, with an average daily tonnage of about 52,000 tons gross. At first the transports were despatched singly as they were ready, both by day and by night ; for, as yet, there was no menace by German sub- marines, and the measures taken by the Navy gave absolute security.^ Everything went regularly and smoothly, and the official programme was carried out to the letter ; but there was little margin to spare.
To his embarking troops, H.M. the King sent the following message : —
" You are leaving home to fight for the safety and honour " of my Empire.
" Belgium, whose country we are pledged to defend, " has been attacked, and France is about to be invaded by " the same powerful foe.
" I have implicit confidence in you, my soldiers. Duty " is your watchword, and I know your duty will be nobly " done.
" I shall follow your every movement with deepest *' interest and mark with eager satisfaction your daily " progress ; indeed, your welfare will never be absent from " my thoughts.
" I pray God will bless you and guard you, and bring " you back victorious."
Meanwhile the situation in Belgium ^ and on the French
^ See " Naval Operations," i. p. 72 et seq.
* The Belgian Official Account has been published serially in the " Bulletin Beige des Sciences Militaires," but no doubt will shortly be available in book form.
LII^GE 33
frontier was developing rapidly. When during the night 4-5 Aug. of the 3rd/4th August, it became clear that the Germans ^^^*- intended to advance through Belgium, with or without permission, the Belgian Staff at once took the measures necessary for the defence of their country's neutrality against Germany. The 3rd Division, supported by the Map i. fortifications of Liege, was to check the German advance ; and, under cover of the 3rd Division, the 1st, 2nd, 5th and 6th Divisions were to move to the line of the river Gette, the Cavalry Division and detachments from Liege and Namur screening the movement. This position covered a considerable part of Belgium, Brussels and the com- munications with Antwerp. The concentration began on the 4th August, and by the morning of the 6th the Belgian Army was in position two marches west of Liege, in the area Tirlemont (1st Division), Perwez (5th Division), Louvain (2nd Division) and Wavre (6th Division).
On the morning of the 4th, when German cavalry crossed the Belgian frontier and moved upon Vise, north of Liege, it found the bridge over the Meuse broken, and the western bank held by Belgian troops. Two regiments were then pushed northward to Lixhe (3 miles north of Vise), where they crossed the river by a ford. The Belgians, finding their left threatened, thereupon fell back on Liege. By evening the heads of six small German columns of all arms which had crossed the frontier were nearly two miles into Belgium. Further concentrations were also reported to the south ; and it became evident that a very large army threatened invasion along the lines of advance guarded by the fortress of Liege and by the 3rd Division.
Liege ^
On the 5th August, the Germans, having bridged the Meuse at Lixhe, pushed forward patrols to Tongres (about ten miles N.N.W. of Liege), and the commander-in-chief of the invading troops. General von Emmich {X. Corps), demanded free passage through Liege. This being at once refused, he attempted to seize the place by a coup de main. His troops consisted of six infantry brigades (at frontier peace strength)^ provided by the ///., IV., VII., IX., X. and XI. Corps, each with a squadron of cavalry, a battery of artillery, a battalion of Jdger (Rifles), and cyclists attached to it.
^ See " La Bataille de Liege " (Belgian Official Account) and " Liittich- Namur." ^ See, however, page 54, para. 3 of Note I.
VOL. I D
34 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
5-16 Aug. Two of the six batteries had field guns, and the other four,
1914. f^gj(j howitzers. Besides this force, General von Emmich
had at his disposal two heavy mortar batteries and General
von der Marwitz's cavalry corps, comprising the 2nd, 4th
and 9th Cavalry Divisions.
After an unsuccessful attempt had been made to kidnap the commandant of Liege, General von Emmich gave orders for a night attack. His general plan was to make a demonstration against the forts with a few companies, and to send the six brigades through the intervals between the forts to secure the town and citadel, and then to fall upon the forts from the rear. This attack was delivered soon after nightfall in five columns ; one from the north ; one from the north-east (two brigades which took different routes) ; one, the central column, from the east ; and two from the south. The first two columns, for the most part, lost their way, and fell back after suffering heavy losses, though one battalion penetrated into Liege and was there captured. Of the two southern columns, one halted, having casualties so severe as to forbid further progress, and the other was seized with panic, the men firing upon each other. The central column met with serious resistance, the brigadier and the commander of the leading regiment being killed. It was on the point of falling back when Major-General Ludendorff, who, as Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Second Army, was with General von Emmich watching the operations, came up and, taking command, pushed on. He was specially interested, for he had planned these very operations in peace when Chief of the Operations Section of the Great General Staff. After giving his men a rest, he renewed the attack in the forenoon of the 6th, and advanced until his leading troops were within a mile of Liege. Though unsupported by the other columns, he decided to make a dash for the citadel, and on advancing found practically no opposition. The Belgian Staff, an- ticipating that the 3rd Division might be surrounded, had withdrawn it to the Gette ; so the Germans found themselves in possession of the town of Liege.
The true siege of the fortress then began. Marwitz's cavalry corps worked round to the western side of the defences, and the German artillery shelled the forts. On the 12th, 42-cm. howitzers were brought up, and the last of the forts fell at 8.30 a.m. on the 16th. General Leman, the commandant, was taken unconscious from under a heap of wreckage and made prisoner. Liege was lost, but by
SKETCH 3.
LIEGE 35
delaying the German advance it had rendered transcendent 10-20 Aug. service to the cause of Belgium's Allies.^ 1914-
Whilst the siege was in progress, on the 10th, German sketches cavalry and Jciger ^ appeared before the line of the Gette, 1 & 3. and gradually extended their front northwards as far as ^ g^"^ ^' ^ Hasselt (18 miles north-east of Tirlemont) and Diest (12 miles north of Tirlemont). On the 12th six German cavalry regiments, with three horse-batteries and two Jdger battalions attacked the line of the Gette at Haelen, a little to the south-east of Diest, and made some progress, but were ultimately driven back by the Belgians, with appreciable loss, after ten hours of sharp fighting.
German troops, however, continued to pour into Bel- gium, and by the 17th the space between the Meuse, the Demer and the Gette was occupied by them in strength, in spite of the fact that the Belgian Army, assisted by the Garde Civique, had systematically obstructed the roads and destroyed the bridges. The right flank of the line of the Gette was already threatened, and columns to support the turning movement were passing the Meuse at Huy, where the bridge, blown up by the Belgians, had been re- paired. On the 18th, the Germans again attacked and carried Haelen, and also entered Tirlemont. They then fell upon the front and left flank of the Belgian 1st Division, and only by hard fighting were held at bay. The Gette position was now evidently in imminent danger. It was certain that the German //., IV. and IX. Corps, covered
^ The time gained to the Allies would appear to have been about four or five days. According to Kluck (pp. 10-19), his three leading corps were on the line Kermpt — Stevort — Gorssum, forty miles (say three marches) west of Aix la Chapelle, on the night of the 17th. They had begun to arrive in the concentration area north-east of Aix on the 7th. Had Liege offered no opposition and had they at once marched off into Belgium, there seems no reason why the II., III. and IV. Corps should not have reached the above line on the 10th, and completed concentration there on the 12th or 13th — four or five days earlier than was the case. The six composite brigades and cavalry corps which attacked Liege were available to cover the concentration. Even on the 10th August the German Supreme Command hoped to commence the advance on the 13th, five days earlier than was possible (Biilow, pp. 11, 12). According to post-war German publications however, e.g. " Graf Schlieffen und der Weltkrieg " by Foerster, the German time-table made the armies reach the line Thion- ville — Sedan — Mons, on the 22nd day of mobilization (23rd August), and Sketch they were actually slightly ahead of it ; but this is accounted for by the hasty retreat of the French Armies after the first contact. Belgian opinion is that at least four days were gained (" Bulletin Beige des Sciences Mili- taires," Sept. 1921). See also Note II. at end of Chapter.
^ It must be borne in mind that a German cavalry division was a mixed force of all arms, with two or more Jdger (Rifle) battalions included. (See Plate 1.)
36 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
Aug. 1914. by the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions were opposite the Belgian left between Diest and Tirlemont ; whilst the Guard, X. and VII. Corps were marching against the Belgian right on a front from Jodoigne (7 miles S.S.W. of Tirlemont) to Namur. It was also known that the Active corps were being followed by Reserve formations, namely, in the First Army by the ///., IV. and IX. Reserve Corps ; in the Second Army by the Guard, VII. and X. Reserve Corps ; and in the Third Army by the XII. Reserve Corps. The French and the British, as will be seen, were neither of them yet at hand to render assistance ; and it was hopeless for the Belgians to think of contending against odds of four or five to one. Accordingly, on the evening of the 18th, the five Belgian divisions were skilfully drawn off from the Gette north-westward to Antwerp, and on the 20th entered the lines of that fortress without being seriously molested. There, on the flank of the Ger- mans if they advanced westward, and in their rear if they should turn southward, the Belgian Army remained — an effective menace to the enemy. ^
Namur ^
Further to the south, about Namur, where the Belgian 4th Division was stationed, German cavalry patrols were in touch with the Belgian cavalry to the north of the fortress on the 5th August, and to the south-east of it on the 7th. But it was not until nearly a fortnight later that the main bodies of the enemy approached ; meanwhile, on the 19th, the garrison had been joined by the Belgian 8th Brigade which, finding itself completely isolated at Huy, had blown up the bridge over the Meuse there and fallen back on Namur. On that day the Guard Reserve Corps of the German Second Army appeared on the north
^ According to Hansen, the commander of the Third Army (" Marne- schlacht," p. 244, f.n.), the III. Reserve Corps and IX. Reserve Corps were originally detailed to push forward to the coast " direction Calais," but this order was cancelled when the Belgian Army went into Antwerp, and both corps were sent to watch the fortress. Later, in early September, the XV. Corps was detained near Brussels on account of a sortie being expected from Antwerp. These three corps were absent from the Battle of the Marne, though the IX. Reserve and XV. Corps reached the Aisne in time to oppose the Allied advance. There were further employed at Antwerp : the 4th Ersatz Division (sent from the Sixth Army), the 1st Ersatz Reserve Division, a Matrosen division, the 26th and 37th Landwehr Brigades, besides heavy artillery and engineers.
^ See " La Defense de la Position Fortifiee de Namur " (Belgian official work), and " Liittich-Namur."
NAMUR 37
of the fortress, and the XI. Corps, consisting of the 22nd 5-23 Aug. and 38th Divisions, of the Third Army, on the south-east, i^^"*- the whole under the command of General von Gallwitz. With these troops was a large proportion of heavy artillery, including four batteries of Austrian 30-5-cm. mortars and one battery of Krupp's 42-cm. howitzers.
On the 20th August, the Germans drove in the Belgian outposts, but this time instead of attempting a coup de main, waited for their heavy guns which on the 21st opened fire on the eastern and south-eastern forts. The Belgian com- mandant was powerless either to keep these monster howit- zers at a distance or to silence them by counter-batteries. Before evening two of the principal forts had been very seriously damaged ; within another twenty-four hours both were practically destroyed. Two Belgian counter-attacks on the 22nd August failed ; and by the evening of the 23rd the northern and eastern fronts had been laid bare, and five out of the whole circle of nine forts were in ruins. At midnight the 4th Division and the mobile garrison with- drew southwards, losing 5,500 men but just escaping the clutches of the enemy who was closing round the fortress ; so they made good their escape into France, whence later they rejoined the main Belgian Army at Antwerp.
Thus for eighteen days the Belgians had faced the German invasion, delaying the hostile advance during a most critical period, and gaining time which was of price- less value to the Allies. In addition to this great strategic advantage, the fact that the first German operations against fortresses, conducted under the conditions obtain- ing in modern warfare, were so rapidly successful gave warning to the French to readjust their conceptions of the defensive value of their fortified front, and reorganize it on lines calculated to counter the effect of bombardment by heavy howitzers.
0
The Operations of the French ^
(Sketch 2 ; Maps 1, 2 «fe 5)
On the 2nd August, the day of the presentation to Sketch 2. Belgium of the German ultimatum, the French Commander-
1 F.O.A., i. (i.) pp. 87, 93, 134 ; also General Joffre's statement to the Parliamentary Commission d'Enquete : Defense du bassin de Briey ; the very lucid commentary on this Commission, by its rapporteur, M. Fernand Engerand, entitled " La Bataille de la Frontidre " ; and the official pub- lication " Quatre Mois de Guerre : Rapport sur I'ensemble des operations du 2 aout au 2 decenibre 1914."
38 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
2-12 Aug. in-Chief decided to use " the alternative concentration 1914. " areas " for the Fourth and Fifth Armies, so as to inter- polate the former in the general line, and extend the left wing further towards the north. Map 1. On the 3rd, in view of the German violation of Luxem- bourg territory, General Joffre ordered Sordet's cavalry corps to push forward next day to the east of Mezieres, but telephoned to its commander and to the Army commanders insisting " on the imperious obligation " not to cross the frontier ; " if there are incidents," he said, " they must " only arise and develop on French territory." On the evening of the 4th, twenty-four hours after the German declaration of war and twelve hours after German cavalry had advanced into Belgium, King Albert authorized the French to enter his territory for the purpose of ascertaining the direction of advance of the Germans and of delaying their columns. General Sordet crossed the frontier on the 6th and moved first towards Neufchateau (36 miles east of Mezieres). Then, striking north, he eventually arrived within nine miles of Liege ; but, finding that the Belgian field troops had been withdrawn from the area of the for- tress, he retired on the 10th in the direction of the Meuse. Valuable information was obtained by him as to the enemy's movements from an officer who was captured on the 9th, but otherwise the intelligence gained in the strategic reconnaissance was negative; neither did the latter achieve its secondary object of delaying the enemy's advance ; for, owing to the resistance of Liege, no important columns of German troops had at the time entered the area explored.
To fill the gap between the French Fifth Army and the Belgian troops defending Namur, a French infantry regi- ment was sent on the 8th to occupy all the bridges on the Meuse north of Dinant and gain touch with the Belgians ; ^ and the I. Corps extended its protective troops along the
Meuse from Mezieres to Givet. On the 13th the whole I. Corps was sent northwards " to oppose any attempts of " the enemy to cross the Meuse between Givet and Namur." On the 15th, in conjunction with General Mangin's 8th Brigade (specially detailed to support the cavalry corps), it repulsed an attempt of Richthofen's cavalry corps {Guard and 5th Cavalry Divisions) to cross near Dinant.
Between the 6th and 8th August, it became certain that an enemy force containing units belonging to five different army corps was operating against Liege ; but the main
OPERATIONS OF THE FRENCH 39
group of the German Armies appeared to the French is-iGAuj General Staff to be around Metz, in front of Thionville and ^^^^• in Luxembourg. The enemy was thus, it was thought, in a position either to advance westwards if Liege fell, or if Liege held out to wheel southwards, pivoting on Metz. A decision was therefore made by General Joffre, and com- municated to the French Armies on the 8th August,^ to the effect that his intention was to bring the Germans to battle with all his forces united, as in the original plan, with his right extended to the Rhine. If necessary, the left of the line would be held back, so as to avoid the premature engagement of one of the Armies before the others could come to its assistance. If, however, the enemy's right were delayed in front of Liege, or turned southwards, the left would be advanced. General directions were issued as to the objectives and zones of action for the Armies, the Fifth being ordered to remain concentrated so as to be in a position either to prevent an enemy passage of the Meuse between Mouzon (20 miles above Mezieres) and Mezieres, or to cross itself between those two places. The instruc- tions ended with an order to make all preparations so that the movement could be carried out on receipt of a telegram, and to render the offensive crushing (foudroyante).
On the 13th General Joffre came to the conclusion that the enemy was wheeling south towards the Third, Fourth and Fifth Armies on the Upper Meuse, and it was too late for them to seek battle beyond that river " under good " conditions." He directed them to be prepared to counter- attack. He paid no heed to the view of General Lanrezac (Fifth Army), that the enemy wheel was of a much wider nature.
Meantime in Alsace, " to facilitate the attack of the " main Armies," the small offensive — outlined in the original plan — was commenced on the extreme right by a detach- ment of the First Army, consisting of the VII. Corps and 8th Cavalry Division. This detachment crossed the frontier on the 6th August. After its advanced guard had reached Mulhausen, it found itself in the presence of superior forces, and was withdrawn. On the 14th the offen- sive was renewed with a stronger force, called the Army of Alsace, consisting of the VII. Corps, and the Alpine and three Reserve divisions, under General Pau. On the same date the First and Second Armies began their forward
^ In Instruction No. 1, dated 8th August 1914, 7 a.m. F.O.A., i. (i.) Annexe No. 103.
40 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
\ug. 1914. movement across the frontier. P'or the Armies on the left only certain precautions were ordered. But during the afternoon of the 15th, news came from the Belgian Army that 200,000 Germans were crossing the Meuse below Vise, and from the I. Corps of the attack at Dinant ; the Grand Quartier General (G.Q.G.) in consequence ordered the Fifth Army to hand over to the Fourth Army its right corps (II.) and Group of Reserve divisions, which were guarding the Meuse in touch with the I. Corps, and take the rest of its forces northwards across the Belgian frontier into the angle of the Meuse and the Sambre to the region of Mariembourg (24 miles north by west of Mezieres) or Philippeville (33 miles north of Mezieres), " to act in concert " with the British Army and the Belgian forces against the "enemy forces in the north." G.Q.G. placed Sordet's cavalry corps and Valabregue's Group of Reserve divisions, then at Vervins (36 miles west of Mezieres), under the Fifth Army, and also ordered to it two recently arrived African divisions and the XVIII. Corps, originally in the Second Army, from the general reserve.^
In order to leave the Third Army entirely free to con- centrate its attention on offensive operations the duty of masking Metz was given to a new force, the Army of Lorraine, composed of three Reserve divisions from the Third Army and three others sent up for the purpose ; General Maunoury, who had originally been on the Italian frontier, was given command of it. There was thus a general taking of ground to the left.
The French general plan of operations now began to
take definite shape as cumulative evidence showed that the
main German advance was in progress through Belgium,
Map 2. The situation as it presented itself to G.Q.G. on the 16th
August was as follows :
In the north, seven or eight German army corps and four cavalry divisions are endeavouring to pass westwards between Givet and Brussels, and even beyond these points.
^ To make the changes clear, they are enumerated together here :
The Third Army was reinforced by one Reserve division, and then by two more.
The Fourth Army took over from the Fifth Army : II. Corps ; XI. Corps ; 52nd and 60th Reserve Divisions (leaving it the 51st) ; a cavalry division ; and the Moroccan Division from the IX. Corps of the Second Army.
The Fifth Army, to make up for this, received the 37th and 38th Divisions from Africa ; the XVIII. Corps from the Second Army ; and General Valabregue's Group of three Reserve divisions. So that the corps it now contained were the I., III., X. and XVIII., with the 37th Division added to the III. and the 38th to the X.
OPERATIONS OF THE FRENCH 41
In the centre between Bastogne and Thionville there were Aug, 1914, thought to be six or seven army corps, and two or three cavalry divisions.
South of Metz, the Germans appeared to be on the defensive.^
General Joffre's intention now was to make the principal attack with the Third and Fourth Armies through Luxem- bourg and Belgian Luxembourg, so as to strike at the flank and communications of the enemy forces which had crossed the Meuse between Namur and the Dutch frontier, and if possible attack them before they could deploy for battle by wheeling south. To support this offensive the First and Second Armies were to make only a secondary attack between Metz and the Vosges, for the purpose of holding the enemy, who seemed to be gradually shifting westwards and might otherwise be able to take in flank the French Armies attacking in Luxembourg. Lastly, the left wing, consisting of the Fifth Army, the British Army when it should arrive, and the Belgian Army, was to move up so as to hold in check any German forces which might ad- vance from the Meuse, and so gain sufficient time to allow the attack of the Third and Fourth Armies to become effective. In order to give weight to the attack, the Third and Fourth Armies were somewhat strengthened. ^
In brief, General Joffre's first object was to break the enemy's centre ; that done he intended to fall with all available forces on the right or western wing of the German Armies.
The instructions which he sent out on the 20th were as 20 Aug. follow : 1^1^-
To General Ruffey :
" The Third Army will begin its offensive movement
^ The German Order of Battle was given as follows :
" Two Armies of the Meuse under the orders of General von Biilow " are operating in front of the Fifth Army ; one comprises the VII., IX. " and X. Corps, the 2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions ; the other is said to '• be formed of the III., IV., VI. and XI. Corps and two cavalry divisions, " Guard and 5th.
" There is no precise information of the great concentration in Belgium " and Belgian Luxembourg. It is believed that there is in Belgian Luxem- " bourg one Army commanded by General von Heeringen, including the " Guard, XII. and XIX. Corps and a cavalry division ; and between " Luxembourg and Thionville a fourth Army under General von Eichhorn, " in which are grouped the VIII., XVI. and XVIII. Corps, and the 3rd " and 6th Cavalry Divisions.'''
This, except for the commanders' names, was not far from the mark ; but there is no mention of the Reserve corps. (See page 36.)
^ See footnote on previous page.
42 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
20 Aug. " to-morrow in the general direction of Arlon. . . . The 1914. " mission of the Third Army is to counter-attaek any " enemy force which may try to gain the right flank of the " Fourth Army."
To General de Langle of the Fourth Army, he tele- graphed :
" I authorize you to send strong advanced guards of " all arms to-night to the general line Bertrix — Tintigny " to secure the debouchment of your Army beyond the *' Semoy. . . . The general direction of the movement will " be Neufchateau."
The positions on the morning of the 20th indicate the preliminary movements which had been made for the purpose. They were :
The Army of Alsace had reached Miilhausen. The First and Second Armies were across the frontier in front of Luneville and Nancy, from near Sarrebourg to Delme, about thirtv-six miles north-west of Sarrebourg. The Army of Lorraine was observing Metz. The Third and Fourth Armies were close up to the Belgian frontier, astride the river Chiers, from near Longwy to Map 5. Sedan, ready to cross the river Semoy.
The Fifth Army was disposed :
The I. Corps and 8th Infantry Brigade on the Meuse, near Dinant, facing east, with
The 51st Reserve Division marching up from the south to act as a link between the French Fourth and Fifth Armies.
The X. and III. Corps, each with an African division attached to it, lay in depth close up to the Sambre near Charleroi, facing north.
The XVIII. Corps was echeloned to the left rear on the line Gozee — Thuin (6 miles and 9 miles south-west of Charleroi).
General Valabregue's two remaining Reserve divisions were on the left of the XVIII. Corps and north-east of Maubeuge, on the east of the gap into which General Joffre intended the British Army should move.
Further to the west and beyond the space to be occupied by the British, were three Territorial divisions under General d'Amade, sent up on the 14th, the 84th near Douai, the 82nd near Arras, and the 81st between Hazebrouck and St. Omer.
It will be observed that the front of the Fifth Army under General Lanrezac along the Meuse and Sambre
OPERATIONS OF THE FRENCH 43
formed a salient, with its apex just short of the Belgian 20-2iAug. fortress of Namur, on which by the evening of the 20th 1914. the Germans were closing. Consequently, any failure of his right to hold its ground on the Meuse would place his centre and left in a very dangerous situation, and render them liable to be cut off.
On the 20th, however, before the general advance had begun, misfortunes had already overtaken the French. According to the bulletins originally issued : " The First " and Second Armies, tired by several days of marching and " fighting, came up against strongly organized positions, " armed with powerful artillery, whose fire was admirably " prepared and corrected by aeroplanes." This, however, was not quite the case. The Germans [Sixth Army) had at first withdrawn before the Second Army, and the latter, with the XX. Corps under General Foch on the left, had on the 18th followed in pursuit. Early in the morning of the 20th the enemy had come forward again and attacked the Second Army in front and left flank ; it had been compelled to retire and the First Army had to conform to its movements. The actions in which the First and Second Armies were engaged are known as the battles of Sarrebourg and Morhange (25 miles north-west of Sarrebourg). ^
On the 21st August, in spite of this reverse to the French right wing, the Third and Fourth Armies crossed the frontier and advanced from ten to fifteen miles into the difficult Ardennes country, an area of rough hills and deep river valleys, covered by forests broken only by narrow belts of pasture land. Aeroplanes could see nothing, the cavalry could not get forward, and in the defiles, which the roads through the villages and forests con- stitute, the French columns ran literally at right angles into German columns belonging to the Armies of the German Crown Prince and Duke Albert of Wiirttemberg, numerically slightly superior to them,^ which were crossing their front. After fighting the actions known as the battles
1 It may be added here that an attempted pursuit of the Second Army by the Germans received a serious check on the 25th ; for, in spite of the reverse, the French First Army returned to the offensive and struck them in flank. After some indecisive fighting, the situation of the French First and Second Armies became stabihzed on a Une in France, just inside tlie frontier.
2 French. German.
Third Army . . . 168,000 Fifth Army . . . 200,000 Fourth Army . . . 193,000 Fourth Army . . . 180,000
361,000 380,000
44 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
21 Aug. of Virton and of the Semoy,i having suffered heavy losses, 1914. particularly in officers, the Third and Fourth Armies were compelled to fall back towards the Meuse. The attempt to break in the German centre before the right wing could deliver its blow against the Allied left wing had thus failed, owing to the French having neglected to adapt their method of advance to the nature of the ground (an advance by bounds from the edge of one open belt to another does not appear to have been considered) ; to their having been caught in column in narrow defiles and thus unable to use their artillery with effect ; and to their line of advance having brought them head-on to the broadside of the German columns. Thanks however to a premature en- veloping attack attempted by the German Crown Prince the reverse was less serious than it might otherwise have been.
As regards the French Fifth Army, General Lanrezac had considered it inadvisable to advance simultaneously with the Armies on his right. He preferred to wait until his reinforcements should have arrived, which would not be until the 23rd ; ^ until the Fourth Army should have cleared the gorges of the Semoy and shortened by its ad- vance the eastern face of the salient which the front of the Fifth Army presented to the enemy ; and until the British Army should similarly have come up on his left. As will presently be seen, Sir John French's force on the 21st was approaching the line of the Mons — Conde canal. The general situation in which it was about to play its part may be thus summarized : —
The French First and Second Armies were retiring after the battles of Sarrebourg and Morhange ;
The Third and Fourth " had failed, and the reverse seemed serious " ;
The Fifth Army was in a salient about to be attacked by two German Armies ;
Namur was on the point of falling (the last fort surrendered on the 25th) ; and
The Belgian Army had been driven into Antwerp.^
1 There are vivid accounts of these actions in Commandant Grasset's " Ethe," " Virton " and " Neufchateau."
2 See page 40.
* The French tactical doctrine — infantry attack head down, regardless of fire and of artillery support — had proved so totally unsuited to modern warfare that on 24th August the following note was issued to all the French Armies over General Joffre's signature : — •
" It has been noticed in the information collected with regard to the
OPERATIONS OF THE GERMANS 45
Operations of the Germans ^
Leaving only three Active corps and three Reserve i7 Aug. divisions, assisted by a cavalry division, one Ersatz division ^^i^- and Landwehr formations, some 250,000 men in all, on her sketch i . Eastern frontier, where she had the co-operation of the ^^^ps i Austro-Hungarian Army, and the IX. Reserve Corps (until the 23rd August) and Landwehr formations in Sehleswig to guard against a possible landing, Germany had assembled the rest of her available mobile troops on her Western frontier in seven Armies,^ with Generaloberst von Moltke as Chief of the General Staff and practically in command.
By the evening of the 17th August these Armies were concentrated, ready to move, on a long front extending from the fortress of Strasbourg to the Dutch frontier north of Liege. This front ran through Sarrebourg, Metz and Thionville ; ^ up the centre of the Duchy of Luxembourg (the neutrality of which had been violated on the 2nd August), to Liege ; and then to the north-west of this fortress, where the northernmost German Army, Kluck's,
" actions which have so far taken place that attacks have not been carried " out with close co-operation between the infantry and the artillery.
" Every combined operation includes a series of detailed actions aiming " at the capture of the points d'appui.
" Each time that it is necessary to capture a point d'appui the attack " must be prepared with artillery, the infantry must be held back and not " launched to the assault until the distance to be covered is so short that " it is certain the objective will be reached. Every time that the infantry " has been launched to the attack from too great a distance before the " artillery has made its effect felt, the infantry has fallen under the fire of " machine guns and suffered losses which might have been avoided.
" When a point d'appui has been captured, it must be organized imme- " diately, the troops must entrench, and artillery must be brought up."
1 See G.O.A., i., and Note II. at end of Chapter.
2 For Order of Battle, see Appendices 6 and 7. In round numbers (G.O.A. i. p. 69), 1,600,000 ; excluding 4 cavalry corps and the covering troops in Upper Alsace :
|
First Army . . . . Second Army Third Army . Fourth Army Fifth Army . Sixth Army . Seventh Army |
. 320,000 men . 260,000 „ . 180,000 „ . 180,000 ,, . 200,000 „ . 220,000 „ . 125,000 „ |
|
1,485,000 „ |
In addition 6^ mobile Ersatz divisions (say another 100,000 men), which would be ready on the 12th day of mobilization.
^ The continuous fortifications round and connecting these two latter places formed the so-called Moselle Position.
46 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
17 Aug. was deployed facing the Belgians on the Gette. In order 1914. ^Q reach the far side of the neutral barrier formed by the projecting peninsula of Dutch Limbourg, behind which it had been assembled, Kluck's Army had defiled in three columns through Aix la Chapelle. The Supreme Command (O.H.L.) orders directed the Armies of Kluck (First) and Biilow (Second), acting together under the latter general/ to deal with the Belgian Army, to force it away from Antwerp and to reach the line Namur — Brussels. The Fi7'st Army was to detail a detachment to mask Antwerp, arid by holding back its right provide against a British landing on the coast. Hausen's (Third) Army was to gain the line of the Meuse from Givet to Namur. Namur was to be attacked and taken as soon as possible by the left of the Second and the right of the Third Army. Meanwhile, the Fourth and Fifth Armies were to conform so that the whole five Armies on the right might carry out a gigantic wheel, first to the line Thionville— Brussels, and then in a south-westerly direction, Thionville still remaining the pivot.
The Sixth and Seventh Armies, under the senior Army commander, Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, were given as their principal task the protection of the left flank of the five wheeling Armies. How they could do so, said the instructions, depended on the action of the enemy. If the French, based on their fortress line, remained on the strategic defensive. Crown Prince Rupprecht was to take the offensive, " advance against the Moselle below " Frouard (5 miles below Nancy) and the Meurthe, hold " fast the French troops [First and Second Armies] as- " sembled there and hinder their transfer to the French " left wing." If, on the other hand, the French moved against his front in superior numbers, and he had to give ground, he was to retire to a prepared position on the Nied, which was flanked by Strasbourg and Metz. If the left flank of the wheeling Armies did not seem to be threatened, part of the Sixth and Seventh Armies might be withdrawn via Metz to take part in the fighting on the left bank of the Moselle.^
^ The order of the 17th August which placed Kluck under Bulow was cancelled on the 27th, but reissued on the 10th Sept.
2 Crown Prince Rupjirecht had begun a retirement on 14th August, under the second case, keeping in touch with the outer defences of Metz ; but by the evening of the 17th the French Second Army in its advance had exposed " a long-spread and visibly thin flank towards Metz, which " invited a blow," and the mass of that Army was crowded together
THE GERMAN PLAN 47
The strategic objective was to outflank the French by 17 Aug. the west and drive them eastwards against the Swiss ^^i** frontier. To give sufficient weight to the blow which was to crush the Allies' left, roll up the line from the westward and, in conjunction with the advance of the Third, Fourth and Fifth Armies, push the entire line of battle south-east towards neutral territory, five of the ten cavalry divisions and twenty-six out of the total of the whole seventy-two divisions on the Western Front were allotted to the two Armies under General von Biilow.^
To summarize the initial movements of the two belligerents, we find that the French offensive carried out by the Armies of Dubail and de Castelnau on the 14th August south of Metz " was counter-attacked by the " German Sixth and Seventh Armies and failed tactically " : the general strategic advantage too remained with the Germans ; for their 345,000 men, including the detachments in Upper Alsace, contained about 456,000 French. The offensive of the Armies of Ruffey and de Langle de Gary north of Thionville, commencing on the 21st August, en- countered the German Fourth and Fifth Armies, which had begun on the 17th to wheel forward to the line Thionville — Givet, so that two Armies met two Armies of about equal strength ; yet the French suffered a number of small disasters.
The result of the above operations was distinctly, but Map 5. not decisively, in favour of the Germans. This however was not all. Their dispositions left three Armies, Hansen's, Billow's and Kluck's, comprising in all thirty-four divisions, free to deal with Lanrezac's Army of thirteen divisions, the tiny British Army of four divisions, and the almost equally small Belgian Army of six divisions — thirty-four divisions against twenty, covering a frontier destitute of natural
between Morhange and Sarrebourg. Rupprecht therefore issued orders, although Moltke was in favour of letting the French come further, for a " lightning and surprise attack," with the result already recorded. (Bavarian Official Account, " Die Schlacht in Lothringen.")
^ The density of the dilTerent German Armies on the original front on the 17th August is of interest :
First Army front 18 miles, about 18,000 men per mile. Second „ 20
|
Third |
15 |
12,000 „ |
||
|
Fourth |
30 |
6,000 ,, |
||
|
Fifth |
40 |
5,000 ,, |
||
|
Sixth |
70 |
3,100 „ |
||
|
Seventh |
35 |
3,500 „ |
48 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
obstacles, guarded only by obsolete fortresses, and with the shortest and most direct route to Paris behind it.
The first step in the German plan had therefore been successful, as regards its objectives ; the line laid down for the first stage of the wheel on Thionville had been reached, and Liege and Namur had been taken ; it Avas unsuccessful only in that the Belgian Army had not been forced away from Antwerp, which it entered, after rear-guard fighting, on the 20th. Surprise has sometimes been expressed that the Germans did not push at least detachments to the Channel ports in August 1914, when there was no force available to oppose them except some French Territorial units. It would appear that they had intended to do so, but the necessity of investing the Belgian Army in Antwerp absorbed the two corps, ///. Reserve and IX. Reserve, which had been selected for that purpose. Besides, when the opening phase of the campaign was going so nearly accord- ing to plan, and there seemed a certainty of winning the war in a few days by a defeat of the French in a super- Sedan in the open field, it would have been strategically unjustifiable to divert a single man to seize a section of coast, which, like Italy after the battle of Austerlitz, must have fallen to the invaders without serious conflict directly the main decision had been gained.
THE BRITISH ENTRY INTO FRANCE
12 Aug. On the 12th August, the Commander-in-Chief, retain-
Sketeh 1. ing only a small party of his immediate staff with him.
Map 2. despatched General Headquarters (G.H.Q.) from London
to Southampton. They crossed to Havre on the 14th, and
proceeded by rail early on the 16th, reaching Le Cateau
late that night.
On the 14th August, Sir John French himself, with his party, left London. He arrived at Amiens soon after 9 P.M. An hour later, General Valabregue's chief staff officer came to report that his group, the 53rd and 69th Reserve Divisions, was entrenching south of the Oise between Vervins and Hirson, as a second line to the French left.
On the following days, 15th, 16th and 17th August, the Commander-in-Chief proceeded to visit, in succession, the French Minister of War at Paris, General Joffre at the Grand Quartier General (G.Q.G.) at Vitry le Frangois, and General Lanrezac at Fifth Army Headquarters at Rethel.
ARRIVAL OF THE B.E.F. IN FRANCE 49
From them he learned in some detail the disposition of the i4-i7Aug. French forces in the angle formed by the Sambre and the ^^^4,' Meuse, south-west of Namur.^ General Lanrezac's Army was then rapidly concentrating in the area south of Charleroi, the I. Corps, on the right, being already massed between Namur and Givet ; the head of the III. Corps was at Philippeville, and that of the X. Corps at Bohain, midway between St. Quentin and Le Cateau. The XVIII. Corps was expected to begin arriving in the area between Bohain and Avesnes on the 18th and 19th. General Valabregue's divisions were in position, as already stated above, south of Avesnes. General Sordet's cavalry corps was advancing j again, this time north-east, from Charleroi and, if driven I! back, would pass to the left of the British Army. The task of that Army was to move northward and form the extreme left of the French advance.
Throughout this period, that is to say between the 12th and 17th August, the British troops had been passing across the Channel and disembarking on French soil. All was ready for their reception, and the welcome given to them by the inhabitants was enthusiastic. On the 14th and following days the corps and divisions began to move up by train to the areas of concentration, which were Sketch 4. arranged so that the army was assembled in a pear-shaped area between Maubeuge and Le Cateau, about twenty-five miles long from north-east to south-west, and averaging ten miles wide. The cavalry was at the north-eastern end, ready to join hands with the French Fifth Army.
In detail, the areas were : Map 3.
Cavalry : East of Maubeuge, Jeumont, Damousies, Cousolre.
Divisional Headquarters, Aibes. II. Corps : East of Landrecies. Headquarters, Landrecies. 3rd Division : Marbaix, Taisnieres, Noyelles. 5th Division : Maroilles, Landrecies, Ors. I. Corps : East of Bohain. Headquarters, Wassigny. 1st Division : Boue, Esqueheries, Leschelles. 2nd Division : Grougis, Mennevret, Hannappes. The Royal Flying Corps, taking the field in war for the first time, assembled four squadrons, with 105 officers, 755 other ranks, and 63 aeroplanes at the aerodrome of Maubeuge ; it also formed an aircraft park at Amiens.
^ As neither General Lanrezac nor Sir John French could speak or fully understand the other's language, a good personal accord was not, unfortunately, established between them at their meeting. See Lan- rezac's "Le Plan de Campagne fran9ais," pp. 91-2 ; French's " 1914," pp. 3G-7.
VOL. I E
50 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
20 Aug. The concentration was virtually complete on the 20th, 1914. that is gix days late according to French reckoning, owing to the various delays which have been enumerated. One sad incident marred the progress to the scene of action, namely the death of Lieutenant-General Sir James Grierson, commanding the II. Corps, who expired suddenly in the train on the morning of the 17th. Sir John French asked that Sir Herbert Plumer might take General Grierson' s place ; but the Secretary of State for War decided to send Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.
On the 19th August, G.H.Q. was informed that the 4th Division would be despatched from England immediately ; and it was settled that the 2/Royal Welch Fusiliers, 1 /Scottish Rifles, 1 /Middlesex and 2/Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, which had been employed on the Lines of Communication, should be formed into the 19th Brigade, under Major-General L. G. Drummond. On the same day the Flying Corps carried out its first reconnaissances from Maubeuge northward towards Brussels, and north-west over Tournai and Courtrai. No large bodies of troops were seen. On the 20th the cavalry was pushed forward as far as Binche on the north without encountering any enemy. But an aerial reconnaissance that day observed a column of troops stretching through Louvain as far as the eye could reach. This was a column of the German First Army. Diverting one of his corps, the ///. Reserve, followed later by the IX. Reserve Corps and the equivalent of five divisions,^ to follow the Belgian forces towards Antwerp, Kluck was pressing westward. On this day, the 20th, his troops entered Brussels. It was a fateful day in many respects, for during its course the main Belgian Army retired into Antwerp, the Germans approached with- in decisive range of Namur, and General Joffre gave his orders for the general advance.
In this great movement, the outline of which has already been given, the British were to advance on the left of the Fifth Army north-east, by way of Soignies, in the general direction of Nivelles. If Kluck wheeled south- ward from Brussels, it was not anticipated that his right would extend much beyond Mons, If, therefore, the British were in line about this place, they would be ready, when once General Lanrezac had passed the Sambre, to wheel eastward and envelop the right of the Germans. To make this envelopment the more certain. General Sordet's cavalry
1 See f.n. 1, page 36.
SKETCH 4.
ADVANCE OF THE B.E.F. TO MONS 51
corps, which had on this day fallen back across the Sambre 20 Aug. ,, to Fontaine I'Eveque (midway between Charleroi and i^^"*- y Binche), was directed to take position beyond the left of the British. Still further to the west, the three French Territorial divisions, under the command of General d'Amade, were to push gradually forward.^
The initiative seemed to be passing into the hands of Sketches the Germans, and it was urgent to ascertain by aerial and ^ *^ ^• other reconnaissance what use, if any, they were making of & 3^^^ it. IMeanwhile, in pursuance of General Joffre's plan, G.H.Q. on the evening of the 20th issued orders ^ for a movement northward during the three ensuing days. An attached march table gave the approximate positions to be reached each day. The general effect of these orders when executed would be that the 23rd August would find the Army aligned on a front, roughly facing north-east, from Estinne au Mont (near Binche) on the south-east, to Lens, eight miles north of Mons, on the north- west, with the Cavalry Division (Major-General E. H. H. Allenby) on the left, while the 5th Cavalry Brigade (Br.-General Sir P. W. Chetwode), having covered the right flank during the movement, would find itself finally in advance of the right front. The daily moves were to be as follows :
The 5th Cavalry Brigade was to proceed on the 21st to the neighbourhood of Binche, the right of the line, and there remain ; the Cavalry Division, moving on the left of the 5th Cavalry Brigade, was to march level with it on the 21st, and on the 22nd proceed to Lens, the left of the line, where it would halt astride the road that connects Mons and Ath. Covered by the cavalry, the rest of the Army was to advance.^
On the 21st the II. Corps to the line Goegnies — Bavai ; the I. Corps to the line Avesnes — Landrecies.
On the 22nd the II. Corps north-westward to the line from Mons westward to Thulin ; the I. Corps north-eastward to the line Hautmont — Hargnies.
On the 23rd the II. Corps was to wheel eastwards, so that one division would be in rear of the other, with the front east of Mons between Spiennes and St. Denis ; the I. Corps was to incline north-eastward and come up on the right of the II.,
^ For further information as regards General d'Amade's force, see Note II. at end of Chapter IV.
^ Appendix 10.
3 The positions of troops are always given from right to left, unless otherwise stated.
52 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
on a line from Estinne au Mont westward to Harmignies (im- mediately south-east of Spiennes).
21 Aug. The morning of the 21st broke thick and misty, render- 1914. jj^g aerial reconnaissance impossible until the afternoon. The cavalry moved northwards early, and after reaching Villers St. Ghislain (six miles south-east of Mons) heard that German cavalry was in force five miles to the north- ward. A patrol which entered Mons found a similar report current there. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade (Br.-General H. de B. de Lisle), after crossing the Conde canal east of Mons, occupied a line on both banks from Maurage to Obourg. Patrols of the 9th Lancers and 4th Dragoon Guards sighted German patrols in the vicinity of the two bridges east of Mons, those of Nimy and Obourg ; but contact was not established. Information from peasants, however, pointed to the movement of considerable forces southward from Soignies (10 miles north-east of Mons),
The II. Corps followed the cavalry to a line level with and west of Maubeuge, the 3rd Division, on the right, to the line Bettignies— Feignies — La Longueville, and the 5th Division, on the left, to the line Houdain — St. Waast — Gommegnies. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reached Bavai from England at 4 p.m. and took over command of the corps. The outposts of the 9th Brigade on this evening overlooked the old battlefield of Malplaquet, and were found by the Lincolnshire Regiment which, together with the Royal Scots Fusiliers, had fought in the action, two hundred years before.
The I. Corps simultaneously moved up to the line from Avesnes to Landrecies, about ten miles behind the front of the II., the 1st Division on the right, and the 2nd on the left. The day was sultry and many of the reservists suffered in consequence ; a considerable number of men were still feeling the effects of inoculation, and all found the hard irregular surface of the cobbled roads extremely trying for marching. In the afternoon the weather cleared and the Flying Corps was able to carry out reconnaissances. Map 5. It reported a large body of cavalry with some infantry and guns south-east of Nivelles. This intelligence was confirmed, and the formation identified as the German 9th Cavalry Division, by a British intelligence officer who was in Nivelles when the division entered, but escaped by motor. The presence of two more cavalry divisions was ascertained ; one of them, the 2nd, had pushed parties
ADVANCE OF THE B.E.F. TO MONS 53
far to the westward, which had reached the hne Ghent — 21 Aug. Audenarde, being evidently intended to explore the area ^^i^* as far as the sea. The other division, supposed to be the 4ih, was between Charleroi and Seneffe.^ These three cavalry divisions formed the German //. Cavalry Corps under General von der Marwitz.^ The main German line was reported as extending south-east from Grammont, through Enghien, Nivelles, Genappes and Sombreffe to Charleroi. It is now known that from right to left — that is to say from north-west to south-east — the order of the German corps was IV. (with //. echeloned behind it), ///., IX., VII., X. and Guard Corps, with four Reserve corps in rear of them. The Allied High Command was correctly informed as to the actual number of German corps in Belgium ; but it could do no more than forecast the scope of the movement in progress. Part of Kluck's cavalry at least, and possibly some of his infantry had begun a wheel south-westwards from Brussels. Whether he intended to continue in that direction or sweep further westwards, it was as yet impossible to judge on the available information. On the British right, General Lanrezac's Army was in contact with infantry of the German Second Army along the whole line of the Sambre on either side of Charleroi, from Tamines to Pont a Celles, so that hard fighting in that quarter on the morrow was almost certain. There seemed every chance that it might spread further to the west.
At 2.45 P.M. G.H.Q. ordered the cavalry to close the line between the French left and Mons : the 5th Cavalry Brigade to take up a line from the left of General Sordet's cavalry corps at Fontaine I'l^veque to Peronnes, in front of Binche, and the Cavalry Division to prolong that line to the canal at Boussoit (five miles east of Mons) with another brigade, the 3rd (Br. -General H. de la P. Gough). Thence patrols were to be pushed out north and north-east. Operation orders, issued from G.H.Q. shortly before midnight,^ directed that the march table issued on the 20th would hold good for the 22nd, with two modifica- tions : the outposts of the II. Corps, instead of having
^ The 4th Cavalry Division was on the Hne mentioned about midday on the 20th, and on the 21st was moving westwards from Soignies towards Ath ; otherwise identifications were qiute correct. Poseck, Map.
* The corps, after concentrating near Ath, was sent north-westwards towards the coast, in front of the right flank of the First Army, to look for the British army. Poseck, p. 35.
' Appendices 11 and 12.
54 ALLEGED GERMAN TROOP MOVEMENTS
their right on Mons, were now to hold an angle with Mons in the apex — that is from Givry north-westward to Nimy and thence westward along the canal to Pommeroeul ; and as soon as they had relieved the Cavalry Division, the latter was to move westward to a position in echelon behind the left, in the area comprised within the triangle Thulin — Quievrain — Baisieux, with outposts along the line of the canal from the left of the II. Corps to Conde. It was still the intention that the British Army should take the offensive.
NOTE I
Alleged German Troop Movements before Mobilization
Some further information with regard to the Potsdam Conference of the 5th and 6th July 1914 has been pubhshed in " Stenographisehe " Berichte iiber die offenthchen Verhandlungen des Untersuchungs- " ausschusses der verfassunggebenden deutschen Nationalver- " sammlung," the shorthand reports of the Commission ordered by the German National Assembly to take evidence on matters affecting critical periods of the war. One of the terms of reference was : " It is to be ascertained what political and military proceedings took " place in Berlin or Potsdam on the 5th and 6th July 1914."
In the evidence there given, General von FalkenhajTi states that the Kaiser, on the afternoon of the 5th, warned him that the Army should be ready for all emergencies. Admiral Capelle and Admiral Behnke, temporary Chief of the Staff, Admiralty, were similarly warned ; these two officers then arranged to make such " intellectual " preparations " (intellektuele Vorbereitungen) as were possible without
arousing suspicion. Admiral Behnke then describes what was done:
the mobilization orders, etc., were carefully gone through and got ready, steps were taken for the immediate preparation of ships and auxiUary vessels, all ships filled up with fuel, the movements of ships arranged in accordance with the situation, etc.
No evidence of the exact military measures taken was asked for or given at the Commission. An article in the " Revue Militaire "Generale " of September 1919, however, gives a large number of extracts from captured German diaries and interrogations of prisoners which tend to shew that inobilization orders were issued secretly some days before the 31st July ; men on leave were recalled, the brigades on the frontiers intended for the surprise of Liege were brought up to war strength by the recall of reservists, and Landsturm battalions were formed on 31st July to replace active troops in guarding the frontier, railways, etc. There would thus seem no room for doubt that in a variety of ways Germany gained a most valuable start of several days on her opponents.
The above three paragraphs appeared in the original edition. The ReichsarcMv, however, states with reference to fhem that no mobilization took place in Germany before the 1st August and that the Landsturm in the frontier districts was called out on the same date, not on the 31st July : the troops employed against Liege were at peace strength [in 1913 the peace strength of the infantry battahons
ALLEGED GERMAN TROOP MOVEMENTS 55
of the frontier regions had been raised from 663 to 800]. Movements of men and troops were those made in consequence of the proclamation of " Imminent Danger of War."
The Reichsarchiv official history of the German railways in the war (" Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen," i., p. 28) reads as follows :
" As the political situation became acute, the Imperial Chancellor ' von Bethmann-HoUweg, on the 28th July put into force, in the ' areas near the frontier and in the Berlin railway district, ' the ' ' augmented railway protection,' provided for times of political ' tension. It affected principally the guarding of the more important ' bridges, tunnels and other engineering structures on the lines ' required for mobilization and deployment, and was carried out ' by railway employees, assisted by the normal machinery of public ' safety, and, so far as the watching of bridges from the water, by the ' conservancy authorities.
" On the same day the recall was ordered of all bodies of troops ' absent from their garrisons which on mobilization should be ready ' to leave ' at once ' or ' at short notice ' for the duty of frontier ' protection or for certain definite special tasks. The return of all ' other troops absent on marches or at training grounds followed ' on the evening of the 29th. On this day also orders were issued ' for the military guarding of the larger bridges and engineer struc- ' tures on the railways and waterways in the frontier areas.
" On the 30th July the state of ' Alert ' for the German fleet ' was ordered ; this required the provision of a few trains for the ' Active troops detailed for the protection of the North Sea islands. ' On the proclamation of ' Imminent Danger of War ' at 1 p.m. on ' the 31st July, all the measures settled on in times of peace for the ' military guarding of the railways came into force."
General von Moser (commander of the 53rd Brigade) in his ' Kampf und Siegestage 1914 " (Mittler, Berlin, 1915), page 1, says :
" On the 29th July early the order ' Return to Garrison ' reached ' us on the troop training ground, where we had assembled on the ' previous day for regimental and brigade training. On the 1st ' August ' Last Preparations for taking the Field.' On the 2nd ' August (first day of mobilization) the brigade, reinforced by a ' squadron and 3 batteries, left at 9 a.m. on frontier protection duty."
The regimental history of the Isl Jdger Battalion, " Im Yorckschen Geist," pages 5-6, contains the following :
" It was a relief to everyone from the company commander to ' the youngest rifleman when on the 30th July the commanding ' officer, Lieut. -Colonel Modrow, suddenly paraded the battalion on ' the barrack square, announced the state of ' Imminent Danger ' ' of War ' [not publicly proclaimed until next day], and in glowing ' words reminded officers, N.C.O.'s and men of their oath and their ' duty to their country. With heavy heart, he at the same time ' bade farewell to the battalion. He was entrusted with the com- ' mand of the 59th Reserve Infantry Regiment. Major Weigeit ' succeeded him in command of the battalion. The companies were ' on the spot clothed and equipped for war. Every man received ' 150 rounds of ammunition. , . . In exactly two hours the battalion ' was ready to march off. . . . The four companies marched about ' 2 P.M. to occupy the line of obstacles (Hindernislinie) which ran ' parallel to the frontier, a few kilometres east of Ortelsburg, through ' the thick woods, and was intended, in case of war, to offer the
56 THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN
" first resistance to the Russian advanced troops. . . . The machine- " gun company and cycHst company remained in Ortelsburg in " alarm quarters at the disposal of the battalion commander. Here, " as in the blockhouse line in front, an always increasing state of " nervous tension soon made itself observed."
In the market place of Treis, on the Moselle, a place visited by British officers during the occupation of the Rhineland, is a War Memorial to 302 men of the village, on which appears the words :
" Auf dieser Stelle traten an 31.7.14 abends um 8| Uhr unsere " ersten Kampfer ein." (" On this spot our first fighting men fell " in at 8.30 p.m. on the 31.7.14.")
If the date is correct these men " fell in " two days before the first day of mobilization.
In the captured papers of Captain von Papen (in 1914 German military attache at Washington) was found a letter from a bank, the Disconto-Gesellschaft, Potsdam branch, signed " R. Mimel," dated 25th July 1914 (postmark, Potsdam 7 p.m. of same day), in which occurs the sentence : " We have never before seen such " preparations for war as are being made at present." ^
NOTE II
The Schlieffen Plan "
The strategical conception underlying the initial deployment of the German Armies on the Western Front, and the invasion of Luxembourg, Belgium and France, were founded on what is known as the " ScWieffen Plan." Field-Marshal Graf Alfred Schlieffen became Chief of the Prussian General Staff in 1890, in almost im- mediate succession to Moltke tlje elder, Graf Waldersee having held the post for a little over one year between them. Just before vacating office in favour of Moltke the younger, in December 1905, Schlieffen drew up a Memoir (Denkschrift) for the benefit of his successor. He had already, ten years earlier, departed from the basis of Moltke the elder's plan in the event of a two-front war, which was to attack Russia and stand on the defensive in the Western theatre. The Memoir has never been published in extenso : only extracts from it are given in the German Official Account ; but some other parts of it have been disclosed by authoritative writers.* In 1905 Russia ha^^ng
^ The first financial war measure appears to have been taken on 18th June 1914, when the President of the Reichsbank, " with special emphasis," recommended the directors of the leading Berlin banks to increase the cover of their foreign securities by 10 per cent. From 2nd July en- deavours were made to increase the gold reserve by " drawing in and " holding foreign capital." " Financial readiness " was not officially ordered until 31st July when " Imminent Danger of War " was declared. (G.O.A., K.U.K., i. pp. 472-7.)
2 See G.O.A., i. pp. 49-69, and Bredt, Moltke, Kuhl, Tappen, Baum- garten-Crusius, Foerster's " Graf Schlieffen und der Weltkrieg," Rochs' " Schlieffen."
* Notably by Dr. J. V. Bredt, Member of the Feichstag and of its Committee which enquired into the loss of the war, in his " Die belgische " Neutralitat und der schlieffensche Feldzugsplan." There is a mass of literature on the subject.
THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN 57
only just emerged from the Manchurian war, Schlieffcn in his plan " dealt exclusively \\ath a war against France and England " (G.O.A.). The object was the annihilation of the French Armies and any British troops that might be with them ; and the whole resources of Germany were to be devoted to this single purpose. If, however, it turned out to be necessary to fight on the Eastern Front as well as on the Western, ten divisions, Schlieffen wrote, drawn " proportionately " from the Groups of Armies allotted to the latter, should be detailed.
He calculated that 26i corps, 14 Reserve corps, 8 new Ersatz corps and 11 cavalry divisions were required to ensure success.^ The actual mobilization strength at the time he wrote was 23| corps, 20 Reserve divisions not organized in corps (except one),^ and 11 cavalry divisions ; but he indicated how the balance could gradually be raised. By 1914 the numbers had increased to 26 corps, 13^ Reserve corps, 6i Ersatz divisions (not corps) and 11 cavalry divisions. In this interval, however, the French Army had also increased ; Russia, too, had growTi strong again ; and although only 9 divisions, not 10, were allotted by Moltke to the Eastern Front, " in the end, " the relative strength turned out to be more unfavourable than the " Memoir had assumed." (G.O.A.) In fact, in August 1914 Moltke had for the Western Front 20| divisions less than Schlieffen had counted upon.
Schlieffen divided his forces into two unequal wings, in the proportion of 7 to 1, on either side of the great fortified area of Metz — Thionville. The larger mass, after deploying on the general line Crefeld — Metz, was to make the gigantic left wheel already mentioned, not only across Belgium, but across " South Holland " and the so-called " Limburg Appendix," the narrow 40-mile-long strip of Dutch territory which projects southwards and covers part of the Belgian frontier against Germany.^
To condense what is known of the plan : by the 22nd day of Sketch 1. mobilization (23rd August in 1914), the five Armies of the right wing were expected to reach the line Thionville — Sedan — Mons — • Ghent ; by the 31st day (1st September), the line Thionville — • Rethel — La Fere — Amiens.*
Then — provision having been made for the investment of Antwerp, " where the English may have landed " — whilst the other Armies of this wing held their ground, or advanced methodically by siege methods (the Second Army, in particular, digging in on the line of the Oise or of the Oise — Aisne, thus covering Paris on the north), the First Army, always trying to outflank the French by the west,
^ Landwehr and Landslurm formations are omitted.
' The Guard Reserve Corps consisted of 1 Active and 1 Reserve division,
' Moltke's " Erinnerungen," p. 17. Captain van Voorst, of the Netherlands General Staff, in " Over Roermund," has stated that in 1914 maps were issued to formations of the German First Army showing the routes to be followed through Dutch territory south of Grave — Hertogen- bosch — Tilburg — Turnhout. It is worth looking at Map 2 to see where the routes thus delimited would bring a German Army : it is to Antwerp, behind the Belgian Army deployed on the frontier, and to the Channel coast ports.
In view of possible violation of their frontier, the Netherlands Govern- ment ordered the railway bridges in the Appendix to be prepared for demolition on 2Gth July 1914.
* This was actually accomplished in 1914, the time lost by the Belgian resistance having been regained by the rapid retirement of the French.
58 THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN
was to sweep over the lower Seine, past the west of Paris and round by the south. It was to be followed by six Ersatz corps, which would complete the investment of the capital. When they were in position, the First Army, reinforced by every division which could be spared from other Armies, possibly by part of the left wing brought round by train, was " to advance eastwards and drive the French by attack " on their left flank against their Moselle fortresses, against the Jura " and against Switzerland. The essential for the execution of the " operation as a whole is the formation of a strong right wing, by " whose assistance the battles will be won, and the enemy forced " to give ground again and again by a relentless pursuit." (G.O.A., i. p. 58.) " Everything was risked on the strength and rapidity of " the first blow." (General von Seeckt in a lecture delivered in 1928.)
If the French advanced to the attack, even broke into Alsace- Lorraine, so much the better for the success of the German plan ; it would in fact be " a kind service " (Liebesdienst) if they did so, for they would walk, as they did, into the trap set for them. Indeed, unless they advanced there could not be a " Cannae " and it was with this battle of annihilation, on which he had written a book, in his mind that Schlieffen drafted his plan.
There was to be no ultimatum to Belgium or to Holland. The right of the German Armies was at first to deploy on the Dutch- Belgian frontier without any notification. This would give a hint of the German intentions, and it was assumed that the French would take covmter-measures. In Schlieffen's opinion these could only be the occupation of the natural defensive position along the Meuse south of Namur. Thus the French would be the first to violate Belgian neutrality. (Bredt, p. 52.)
In any case, Schlieffen appears to have thought that there would be no difficulty in obtaining permission from the King of the Belgians, Leopold II., to traverse his territory ; he would make a protest and accept monetary compensation.^ Similarly, " he did not consider " it out of the question, in view of the political situation [in 1905, " that is soon after the S. African War] that Germany on outbreak " of war against England would have no difficulty in obtaining " permission by an amicable arrangement with the Netherlands " Government, for the German Army to cross the Dutch province " of Limbourg (Maestricht, Roermund). Then the [Belgian] fortress " of Liege could be avoided by passing north of it, and quickly " brought to surrender by threatening it from the rear." (Bredt, p. 53.)
To the German left wing Schlieffen assigned no more than 3J corps, IJ Reserve corps and 3 cavalry divisions, in addition to the war garrisons (2 Reserve divisions) of Metz and Strasburg, 3J Land- wehr mixed brigades on the Upper Rhine, and one brigade in Lower Alsace. This small force was not, however, to stand on the defensive : 3 corps, a Reserve corps and the 3 cavalry divisions " were from the " outset to be employed in an attack on Nancy " (G.O.A., i. p. 59) ; their business was to attract as many French troops as possible. If the French did not counter-attack, two corps were to be shipped off by train to the right wing in Belgium (G.O.A., i. p. 60). Other versions, however, speak of an attack by the left wing taking place
^ The Germans issued a proclamation on entering Belgium promising to pay for ever>i;hing in " minted gold." The proclamation is in " Liittich- Namur," pp. 14-15.
THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN 59
at some later stage of the proceedings in order to bring about a " colossal Cannae." Schlieffen's biographer, Dr. Rochs, states the Field-Marshal " kept the plan [of thus using the left wing] in his " eye in order to execute it in the course of the campaign, and thus " achieve the complete rounding up of the Franco-British forces." We shall see that Moltke attempted to do so.
It was easier to sketch out such an academic plan of campaign, with complete contempt of the enemy and neutrals, than to carry it out in the field, and the unfortunate Moltke was forced to make modifications in it.^ In the period that the changes were made, 1908-9, Colonel Ludendorff was head of the Operations Section of the Great General Staff. (Bredt, p. 50, f.n. 44.)
First, ]\Ioltke gave up the idea of marching through Holland, " in " order not to force the Netherlands also into the ranks of our " enemies." (Moltke, p. 17.) " It was not expected that Belgium would offer armed opposition to a march across her territory. But the dropping of the plan of entering Holland forced the extreme German right, the First and Second Armies to pass between Aachen (Aix la Chapelle) and the southern end of the Limburg Appendix. To ensure the rapid passage of this defile it was necessary to gain possession of Liege as quickly as possible. It was most important not to give the Belgians time to put the fortress in a state of defence and destroy the important railway bridges near it. Moltke feared that this could not be done by an " accelerated artillery attack " and therefore decided to take Liege by a coup de main carried out by frontier troops on peace establishment, without mobilization, immediately on outbreak of war. " For the execution of this coup " de main two days and the following night were allowed in the " appreciation." (Bredt, p. 54.) If this failed, it was left to the commander of the Second Army to decide whether to try again with stronger forces, or proceed to " accelerated siege methods." How long these might take is not stated in the scheme.^
The other and more important change was as regards the strength of the left wing. In view of the increased importance of the industrial areas, particularly those of the Saar and Rhine valleys, Moltke could not leave them unnecessarily exposed to enemy attack. It is also stated (Bredt, p. 50) that an additional reason for his not abandoning Alsace was the expectation that the Italians might take part on the German side ; in fact, their General Staff had made arrangements to do so. As their troops would be brought to Upper Alsace, it was necessary to hold that province with at least two corps (the Seventh Army had three). If the Italians did not arrive, then the transport of the corps to the right wing could be taken up. Trains to transport seven corps were in fact collected as a railway reserve, beginning
1 Schlieffen drew up his plan before aeroplanes were in practical use or air reconnaissance behind the adversaries' lines was thought of. There is no hint that INIoltke and his assistants ever took into consideration the fact that their foe might obtain information from the air which would enable him to recognize and to stultify their plan.
- The German Government, too, wanted to keep Holland neutral so as to be able to obtain world supplies through her ports.
' As the 5th August was the " first day " of the coup de main and the last forts fell on the IGth, and the German Armies were mobilized, deployed and ready to move in 7 days, the loss of time occasioned by the resistance of Liege would appear to be at least four days. (See above, page 35.)
60 THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN
on the tenth day of mobihzation. They were assembled in three sections ; the first behind the left wing, the second on the middle and lower Rhine, and the third in the Munster — Cassel area. (G.O.A., Railway Vol. i. p. 41.)
In any case, in 1909 Moltke raised the strength of the left wing from 5 to 8 corps. It is claimed by the German Official Account that by so doing he altered the proportion of 7 to 1 to about 3 to 1 (actually 60 1 divisions to 16, excluding Landwehr), and thereby missed the point of the Schlieffen plan, which was a strong right wing. This does not appear to be quite fair on Moltke ; for he had to consider altered circumstances and his allotment of the extra strength to the left wing was intended to be a temporary measure at the outbreak of war.
After the defeat and retreat of the French First and Second Armies on the 20th August, six or even more divisions, to restore the Schlieffen balance, could, from the operations viewpoint, have been transferred from the left to the right wing ; but this was not practically feasible beyond Aix la Chapelle, owing to the destruction of the Meuse railway bridges and other demolitions carried out by the Belgians. Not until the 24th August could trains run past Liege, and then only by a deviation with 1 in 30 gradients, which required four locomotives for a train, two in front and two behind. The whole of the railway communications of the First, Second and Third Armies were compelled to pass over this one route until the 2nd September, when the Huy — Namur route became available for the Third Army. (G.O.A., Railway Vol. i. pp. 82-3.) " The Thionville— " Libramont — Namur section, so important for the transfer from " the left to the right wing, was opened to traffic on the 8th September "• up to the destroyed Meuse bridge at Namur. The restoration of " the bridge was not accomplished until the last days of September." (Kretschmann, "Eisenbahnen," p. 37.) Not until the 5th September was it possible to begin the transport of troops from the left wing via Aix la Chapelle, Liege, Brussels.^
In consequence of the transport difficulties of sending the troops from left to right as planned (Tappen, pp. 13-15), and of the easy defeat of the French Third and Fourth Armies on the 21st August and their retreat — followed as it was by that of the Fifth Army and the B.E.F., as will be seen — Moltke appears to have jumped to the conclusion that the moment had arrived to carry out the second part of the Schlieffen plan. When in the early afternoon of the 22nd, Major-General Krafft von Dellmensingen, Crown Prince Rupprecht's Chief of the Sta;fif, enquired on the telephone of Lieut. - Colonel Tappen, the head of the Operations Section O.H.L., whether troops would now be transferred to the right wing, the latter gave the astonishing order from Moltke, " Pursuit direction Epinal," and the explanation, " There are still strong forces in the Vosges, " they must be cut off." ^ It was hoped that the French, like the Belgian, frontier fortifications would be easily destroyed and overrun, and that the " operation in co-operation with the movements of the
^ The XV. Corps, sent first, was delayed at Antwerp as the result of a Belgian sortie, and was not in the line of battle until the 14th September on the Aisne.
2 Moltke, p. 434, says of this : " the pursuit came to a stop on the " Meuse, and the break-through (Durchstoss) planned between Epinal and " Nancy did not succeed."
THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN 61
" right wing would be the first stage of the surrounding of tlie " enemy's Armies as a whole, which, if successfully carried out " must, according to the views then held, bring about the end of the " war in a very short time." (Tappen, p. 15.) Thus the " Cannae," the double envelopment dreamed of by Schlieffen was to be accom- plished. It may fairly be said that Moltke failed, not by " watering down " the Schlieffen plan, as sometimes averred, but by trying to carry it out in its entirety, in the spirit of its originator, without the forces necessary for so vast an operation.
There was no doubt of the certain success of the Schlieffen Plan in the minds of the Prussian General Staff. In the negotiations with the Austro-Hungarian General Staff before the war, in 1908-9, the Germans laid dowTi as the basis of the common plan that only twelve or thirteen German divisions would be employed in East Prussia in the first instance (only ten were actually thus employed in August 1914) : " Austria-Hungary, for the rest, must carry on " the conflict alone with Russia until a decision against France has " been obtained, which will be sought with all speed. This accom- " plished, there will be a mass transport to the East of important " German forces, which will be engaged there, in co-operation with " those of Austria-Hungary, to obtain a decision against Russia."
When Conrad enquired of Moltke when this decision against France and this transfer of troops might be expected to take place, he was informed " between the 36th and 40th dav of mobilization " ("Aus Meiner Dienstzeit 1906-1918," i. pp. 369-70, by Feld- Marschall Conrad von Hotzendorf). Later on this was slightly modified, and Conrad was informed, " if France takes the offensive, •' the decision is expected on the 21st day of mobilization ; if she " fights behind her frontier defences, on the 28th day. After this " decision the forces to operate against Russia should arrive there " about the 41st day of mobilization " {idem, p. 374).
CHAPTER II
22nd august 1914
First Contact with the Enemy
(Sketches 4 & 5 ; Maps 2, 3, 5 & 6)
Maps 2 At dawn on the 22nd August C Squadron of the 4th ^ 2' Dragoon Guards (2nd Cavalry Brigade) pushed out two officer's patrols from Obourg, on the canal, north towards Soignies ; one of these found a German piquet on the road, fired on it, and drove it off. This was apparently the first shot of the war fired by the British on the continent. Later a troop of the same squadron advanced to meet a body of German cavalry which was moving south along the road from Soignies towards Mons, turned it back near Casteau, and pursued it until checked by fire.^ The 4th killed three or four of the enemy and captured three more, who proved to belong to the 4th Cuirassiers of the 9th Cavalry Division. Further to the east, the 3rd Cavalry Brigade found all clear for two miles north of the canal within the triangle Gottignies — Roeulx — Houdeng ; but here again the peasants reported the enemy to be in strength to the north, at Soignies and north of La Louviere (eleven miles east of Mons). Still further east patrols of the 5th Cavalry Brigade early found contact with the enemy in the direction of La Louviere and reported German troops of all arms to be advancing from the north, and the French to be retiring across the Sambre. General Sordet's 3rd Cavalry Division passed through the British 5th Cavalry Brigade soon after, on its march westward ; but it was not until nearly 10 a.m. that a German detach- ment of all arms ^ came in contact with two squadrons of the Scots Greys (5th Cavalry Brigade), which were holding
* German accounts also record this as the first contact. " Mons," p. 17. 2 Of the 13th Division. See page 70.
62
ADVANCE OF THE B.E.F. 63
the bridges over the Samme at Binche and Peronnes, 22 Aug. facing east. The enemy made httle effort to force the ^^i** passage, though he shelled the Greys heavily but ineffec- tively, and kept up a fairly accurate rifle fire. The 3rd Cavalry Brigade, in support of the 5th, remained about Bray, two miles in rear, whence D and E Batteries R.H.A. fired a few shells. At 2 p.m. the Greys slowly drew off, having apparently, by sheer superiority of marksmanship, inflicted some thirty or forty casualties at the cost of one officer wounded. A troop of the 16th Lancers, which had been sent to their support, gave chase to a hostile patrol on the way, and came suddenly upon a party of Jdger on the hill immediately to the west of Peronnes. The troop rode straight over the Jdger, charged through them again on the return journey, at a cost of only one man wounded and three horses killed, and then left them to E Battery R.H.A., which had unlimbered to cover its return. Alto- gether, the cavalry was heartened by its work on this day, being satisfied that it was superior to the German horsemen, both mounted and dismounted, alike with rifle and with sword.
The cumulative effect of the encounters during the day on the British cavalry commanders was the con- viction that German infantry in great force was in close support of the German cavalry. They had made reports in that sense on the previous day, and they were now more than ever confirmed in their opinion. Aerial reconnais- sance during the forenoon did not tend to shake this view. One aviator landing at Beaumont (about 12 miles east of Maubeuge) to take in petrol, learned from General de Mas-Latrie, the commander of the French XVIII. Corps, that General Sordet, on his march westwards to the left flank of the Allied Armies, had on the 21st encountered German infantry north of the Sambre canal, and had been compelled to fall back. This accounted for his movement southward to Binche. Later, another British aeroplane (which returned to the aerodrome at 1.10 p.m.) reported the northern part of Charleroi and many other towns and villages near it to be in flames, and on its return westward was fired at by an infantry brigade between Ath and Enghien. A third aeroplane had a similar experience, the observer being wounded. The sum total of these observations was to the effect that brigades of German infantry, probably amounting to a corps in all, filled the roads south of Grammont, that a cavalry division was at
&5
64 OPERATIONS OF 22nd AUGUST
Soignies, and that the general front of this corps and cavalry division extended, facing south-west, from Lessines to Soignies,^ no part of them being west of the Dendre canal, excepting a party of mounted troops which had been seen at Peruwelz, immediately to the north of Conde. Their further advance, if the direction were maintained, would bring their left (east) flank to Mons. Sketch 5. Meantime, the British I. and II. Corps were advancing. Maps 3 In view of the